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Yesterday’s	tomorrow	today:	Turing,	Searle	and	the	contested	
significance	of	Artificial	Intelligence	
	
Chp	5	pp.	82-137	in	Al-Amoudi,	I.	and	Morgan,	J.	editors	(2018)	Realist	Responses	
to	Post-Human	Society:	Ex	Machina	(Volume	1)	London:	Routledge	
	
Jamie	Morgan		
	
Introduction	
	
Artificial	 intelligence	 (AI)	 has	 become	 an	 increasingly	 important	 issue	 in	 and	 for	
societies.	It	has	also	become	entangled	with	what	is	termed	Transhumanism	(TH).	In	
this	paper	I	explore	the	way	AI	is	conceived	and	focused	upon	(with	some	comment	
on	TH).	Two	conceptual	focuses	of	AI	have	emerged	and	these	in	turn	have	roots	in	
and	are	related	to	key	works	that	have	dominated	how	AI	has	been	addressed	through	
philosophy.	 The	 key	 works	 are	 Turing	 (1950)	 and	 Searle	 (1980).1	 I	 explore	 the	
arguments	of	these	two.	The	intent	is	not	a	pejorative	‘back	to	basics’,	but	rather	an	
exploration	 of	 sophisticated	 origins	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 how	 dividing	 lines	 and	
omissions	can	become	in	some	ways	ingrained	and	in	others	interstitial.	Both	involve	
problems	of	ontology	and	social	ontology,	which	in	turn	creates	problems	for	how	we	
seek	to	shape	the	future.	From	both	Turing	and	Searle	a	weak	and	strong	focus	in	AI	
has	developed	and	this	has	had	a	variety	of	further	consequences.	The	consequences	
are	themselves	complicated	and	inter-connected	and	so	cannot	be	simply	stated	or	
enumerated	but	arise	cumulatively	as	the	argument	proceeds.	 In	the	final	section	I	
draw	 the	 whole	 argument	 together	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 social	 significance	 of	 actual	
technological	changes	occurring	under	the	aegis	of	AI,	and	do	so	finally	with	reference	
to	the	concept	of	relational	goods	(Donati	and	Archer,	2015).	
	
Two	concepts	of	artificial	intelligence	(AI)	
		
For	AI	a	convenient	place	to	start	 is	with	the	much-publicised	first	 report	 from	the	
Stanford	One	Hundred	Year	Study	on	Artificial	Intelligence.	The	project	was	launched	
in	2014	and	as	the	title	suggests	is	a	long-range	study	of	AI.	Its	remit	is	to	explore	both	
the	state	of	and	consequences	of	AI.	The	project	brings	together	a	designated	multi-
disciplinary	panel	of	experts	every	five	years	to	provide	an	update	on	progress.	As	an	
authoritative	exercise	it	expresses	some	typical	positions	within	AI	research.2	The	first	
report	notes	there	is	a	‘lack	of	a	precise,	universally	accepted	definition’	of	AI	(Stone,																																																									
1	 In	 stating	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 new	 and	 in	 drawing	 attention	 to	 Turing	 and	 Searle	 as	 longstanding	
sources	of	key	ideas	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	the	history	of	AI,	computing,	robotics,	animatronics	
and	 automata	 begins	with	 these	 two.	Neologisms	may	 be	 new	 but	 ideas	 far	 older.	 John	McCarthy	
coined	the	term	AI	at	a	conference	in	1956.	There	are	‘robots’	in	the	Iliad	and	actual	animatronics	of	
varying	degrees	of	sophistication	are	scattered	throughout	history.	See	Adam	Rutherford	‘Rise	of	the	
Robots:	The	history	of	things	to	come’	Radio	4	broadcast	Monday	13th	February	2017:	
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b08crvz3		
2	There	are	recognized	limitations.	The	first	report	restricts	itself	to	impacts	for	a	typical	American	city	
based	on	8	domains.	 It	 explicitly	 excludes	military	 and	 security	 aspects	of	AI	 and	assumes	 that	 the	
material	presented	will	be	relevant	to	different	degrees	on	a	global	basis.		
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2016:	p.	12).	However,	this	is	not	quite	right.	There	are	two	basic	conceptual	focuses	
for	 AI	 and	 some	 confusion	 about	 how	 they	 relate.	 How	 something	 is	 conceived	 is	
usually	more	complex	in	its	formation	than	how	it	is	defined.	Furthermore,	what	the	
conceptual	focus	emphasises	has	consequences	for	how	a	concept	operates.3	What	I	
mean	by	this	will	become	clearer	as	we	progress.	
For	our	purposes,	Searle	introduces	the	relevant	basic	conceptual	distinction	
for	AI	in	his	‘Minds,	brains	and	programs,’	(1980).	His	concern	was	the	significance	of	
AI	for	the	study	of	the	mind.	For	Searle,	‘weak	AI’	concerns	computers	as	a	tool	for	the	
study	 of	 the	 human	mind,	whilst	 ‘strong	 AI’	 assumes	 or	 asserts	 that	 a	 sufficiently	
complex	computer	is	a	mind.	We	will	return	to	Searle	later.	The	distinction,	though	
still	partly	rooted	in	Searle’s	work,	has	generalised	beyond	a	focus	on	philosophy	of	
mind.	Weak	AI	focuses	primarily	on	AI	as	functions	and	strong	AI	as	entities.			
	
Weak	artificial	intelligence	(AIw)		
	
In	 contemporary	 usage	 the	weak	 concept	 of	 artificial	 intelligence	 (AIw)	 focuses	 on	
function	 and	 is	 on	 closer	 inspection	 semantically	 minimal	 and	 tautological.	 The	
Stanford	report	adopts	Nils	Nilsson’s	well-known	definition	and	neatly	encapsulates	
key	aspects	of	AIw:				
	
Artificial	 Intelligence	 is	 that	 activity	devoted	 to	making	machines	 intelligent	
and	intelligence	is	that	quality	that	enables	an	entity	to	function	appropriately	
and	with	foresight	in	its	environment	[...	According	to	this	view]	the	difference	
between	an	arithmetic	calculator	and	a	human	brain	is	not	one	of	kind,	but	of	
scale,	 speed,	degree	of	autonomy	and	generality	 […	There	 is	a]	 intelligence	
spectrum	[…	and]	the	characterization	of	intelligence	as	a	spectrum	grants	no	
special	status	to	the	human	brain.	But	to	date	human	intelligence	has	no	match	
in	the	biological	and	artificial	worlds	for	sheer	versatility,	with	the	abilities	to	
reason,	 achieve	 goals,	 understand	 and	 generate	 language,	 perceive	 and	
respond	 to	 sensory	 inputs,	 prove	mathematical	 theorems,	 play	 challenging	
games,	synthesize	and	summarize	information,	create	art	and	music	and	even	
write	histories	[…	But	for	AI]	matching	any	human	ability	 is	only	a	sufficient	
condition,	not	a	necessary	one.	(Stone,	2016:	p.	12)	
	
It	should	be	emphasised	that	AIw	is	a	default	position,	and	often	a	placeholder.	The	
Stanford	report,	like	many	others,	attempts	to	leave	open	exactly	what	AI	might	be	
and	become.	New	reports	are	to	be	commissioned	by	a	Standing	Committee	for	the	
Stanford	 project	 every	 5	 years.	 The	 first	 report	was	 produced	by	 a	 selected	 Study	
Panel,	mainly	comprised	of	experts	in	robotics,	programming,	data	analysis,	systems	
theory	and	planning,	and	economics	(drawn	from	Microsoft,	MIT,	Harvard	etc).	The	
default	to	AIw	reflects	the	lack	of	agreement	and	coherency	across	these	fields.	This	
lack,	awkward	though	it	seems,	 is	not	empty	for	the	purposes	of	how	something	is																																																									
3	To	be	clear,	as	an	exercise	in	analytical	philosophy,	one	could	formally	distinguish	definition,	concept	
and	conceptual	focus.	In	what	follows	I	do	not	elaborate	significantly	regarding	distinctions.	The	main	
point	I	am	making	is	that	definition	starts	from	a	simple	statement	about	intelligence	as	a	kind	of	doing,	
and	that	the	concept	of	AI	observably	emphasises	either	function	or	entity,	and	so	in	a	practical	sense	
of	development	of	concerns	is	bound	up	with	focus,	which	in	turn	has	consequences.		
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conceived,	since	it	 invites	reduction,	minimalism	and	tautology	to	create	a	point	of	
departure:	 the	 troubling	problem	of	defining	AI	has	been	addressed	and	so	we	can	
move	on.	 This	 tacitly	 introduces	a	 ‘be’	 into	AIw.	 If	one	 reads	 the	Stanford	 report	 it	
claims	AI	will	be	what	AI	researchers	do	and	explore.	So,	AI	becomes	an	accidental	
identity:	AI	is	AI.	Concomitantly,	since	there	is	a	great	deal	of	activity	and	development	
occurring	under	the	rubric	AI,	what	it	does	becomes	the	convenient	focus	for	what	it	
is.	Thus,	AIw	focuses	on	function,	albeit	increasingly	complex	function,	and	what	can	
be	 tested	 and	 (mainly)	 observed.	 Here,	 function	 is	 primarily	 an	 expression	 of	
‘intelligence’.	 The	 main	 subsidiary	 distinction	 becomes	 one	 between	 specific	
‘intelligence’,	defined	as	the	more-or-less	efficient	or	appropriate	doing	of	something,	
and	general	‘intelligence’,	defined	as	the	replication	of	this	functionality	in	multiple,	
different	and	new	domains	of	application.4		
	 Many	 AI	 researchers	 are	 aware	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 specific	 and	
general	intelligence	is	based	on	a	blurring	of	what	‘intelligence’	itself	is.	For	example,	
Legg	 and	Hutter	 (2007)	 collate	 around	 70	 available	 definitions	 of	 intelligence,	 and	
subcategorise	these	into	those	deriving	from	psychologists	and	from	AI	researchers.	
Their	intent	is	to	synthesise	a	human	independent	concept	of	intelligence	amenable	
to	AI	researchers.	They	identify	3	primary	features:	1)	intelligence	is	a	property	of	an	
individual	agent	as	it	interacts	with	an	environment,	which	2)	relates	to	its	ability	to	
succeed	 with	 reference	 to	 an	 objective,	 and	 3)	 depends	 on	 agent	 adaptability	 to	
objectives	and	environments.	‘Intelligence’	can	then	be	measured	via	‘achievement’,	
subject	to	1-3.	Clearly,	since	the	paper	is	developed	in	the	context	of	AI	concerns,	this	
definition	can	be	read	as	tending	towards	a	general	intelligence	concept	of	AI.	Still,	it	
remains	heavily	weighted	towards	AIw.	Moreover,	the	derived	concept	of	intelligence	
has	been	based	on	a	particular	selective	synthesis.	It	notes	but	puts	aside	a	whole	set	
of	key	aspects	of	the	psychologists’	definitions	and	broader	conceptual	statements.	
What	seems	common	is	selected,	whilst	what	may	be	important	but	only	highlighted	
by	 some	 is	 omitted.	 Several	 non-AI	 definitions	 highlight	 the	 composite	 and	
interpretive	basis	of	 intelligence,	and	the	range	of	aspects	of	 intelligence	stated	by	
psychologists	but	omitted	in	the	final	definition	includes:	to	plan,	to	think	abstractly,	
to	show	good	sense,	practical	sense	and	initiative	through	judgement	and	associated	
activity,	 to	 learn	 facts	and	skills	and	appropriately	apply	 them	and	 to	demonstrate	
awareness	of	the	relevance	of	behaviour.	These	aspects	are	sieved	from	the	synthesis,	
and	so	the	concept	of	intelligence	is	pre-structured	in	Legg	and	Hut’s	synthesis	in	a	
way	that	encourages	a	focus	on	function.	AI	as	a	focus	of	practical	concerns	can	focus	
on	little	else	than	function,	and	so	seeking	a	common	definition	is	either	circular	or																																																									
4	 There	 have	 been	major	 developments	 in	 specific	 ‘intelligence’,	 in	ways	 that	 address	 some	of	 the	
specific	 areas	 of	 complexity	 in	 the	 Stanford	 report	 quoted	 list	 of	 human	 achievements.	 The	 EMI	
program	has	successfully	imitated	the	work	of	Bach.	In	a	more	high	profile	case,	the	DeepMind	project	
at	Google	is	responsible	for,	AlphaGo,	which	is	now	able	to	defeat	a	human	Go	world	champion	using	
Monte	 Carlo	 simulation	 and	 tree	 search	 within	 a	 system	 based	 on	 multiple	 self-play.	 See	 neural	
networks	material	later	section	and	also:	
https://deepmind.com/research/publications/mastering-game-go-deep-neural-networks-tree-
search/	In	general,	machine	learning	using	large	datasets	has	changed	some	aspects	of	how	a	computer	
plays	games.	However,	this	is	still	currently	far	from	general	intelligence,	even	in	the	AIw	sense,	since	
the	AI	so	far	are	unable	to	simply	turn	their	‘intelligence’	to	a	different	setting	or	game	etc.	They	must	
begin	anew	each	time.	This	may	change	of	course,	but	this	in	itself	would	not	satisfy	characteristics	for	
strong	AI.			
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self-propagating.	 The	 intent	 to	 develop	 something	 human	 independent	 becomes	
simply	 isolated	 (rather	 than	 abstracted)	 from	 important	 characteristics	 that	 may	
situate	intelligence.	Function,	is	the	common	concern	that	occurs	across	all	definitions	
and	so	becomes	the	central	aspect	of	intelligence.		
Concomitantly,	the	focus	on	function	in	AI	is	a	pragmatic	response	to	potential	
based	on	one	set	of	key	contemporary	concerns.	It	takes	the	present	and	expresses	a	
future	based	on	an	engineer	or	designer’s	frame	of	reference.	Since	AI	is	not	currently	
conscious	etc.	it	seems	convenient	to	concentrate	on	what	identified	‘AI’	can	do	and	
may	do	 rather	 than	what	 a	 ‘intelligent	 entity’	 is	 and	may	be.5	 There	 is	 a	 tacit	 and	
sometimes	acknowledged	semantic	slippage	involved	since	AI	researchers	sometimes	
refer	to	AI	and	then	‘true	AI’,	with	the	latter	referring	to	a	fully	realised	entity.	Yet	AIw	
still	 involves	 a	 version	 of	 ‘be’.	 AIw	 adopts,	 often	 inadvertently,	 an	 external	 and	
behaviouristic	approach	to	how	AI	is	defined	and	so	how	AI	is	conceived.	This	is	most	
readily	understood	in	terms	of	specific	‘intelligence’,	but	is	significant	also	for	general	
‘intelligence’.	Difference	of	kind	is	put	aside	in	favour	of	position	along	a	spectrum	and	
this	 has	 consequences:	 a	 calculator	 and	 a	 human	 function	 differently	 and	 are	
differently	complex,	but	are	as	‘intelligences’	not	properly	distinguished	constitutively	
or	qualitatively.	This	ambiguity	of	distinction	is	basic	to	AIw.	It	is,	as	we	shall	see,	rooted	
in	 Turing’s	 approach,	 though	 arguably	 Turing	 also	 made	 strong	 AI	 claims	 that	
encourage	a	focus	on	function	via	functionalism	as	constitutive	for	an	entity.	
One	 should	 note	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 kind	 for	 AIw	 is	 not	 clear-cut.	 Read	
sympathetically	in	context,	the	typical	intent	of	an	AIw	default	is	to	defer	discussion	of	
what	 AI	 may	 be	 in	 a	 constitutive-qualitative	 sense,	 until	 such	 time	 as	 it	 becomes	
germane.	This	is	conceptually	problematic	and	potentially	dangerous,	even	if	one	puts	
aside	doomsday	Terminator	scenarios.	The	previous	quote	from	the	Stanford	report	
states	 that	 matching	 human	 abilities	 is	 sufficient	 but	 not	 necessary	 (SbnN)	 as	 a	
benchmark	 for	 AI.	 Given	 that	 AI	 has	 already	 been	 subject	 to	 a	 spectrum	 that	
encompasses	function	referenced	to	a	calculator,	SbnN	introduces	a	component	that	
affects	the	coherence	of	this	way	of	defining	AI.	One	might	now	infer	anything	less	
able	 than	 a	 human	 in	 its	 flexibility,	 diversity	 and	 complexity	 (i.e.	 AIw	 general	
intelligence)	would	be	insufficient	to	be	AI.6	The	authors	seem	to	mean	no	more	than	
that	the	future	abilities	of	AI	may	exceed	the	comparable	abilities	of	humans	and	that	
given	abilities	may	not	be	restricted	to	those	of	humans.	This	is	still	about	function	and	
so	says	nothing	directly	about	what	 is	sufficient	or	necessary	 to	 the	constitution	of	
‘intelligence’	or	to	the	human,	despite	that	the	human	is	stated	as	the	benchmark.		
There	is	thus	a	basic	ambiguity	in	AIw	regarding	what	it	is	that	is	different,	what	
this	difference	derives	from	and	whether	emergence	is	a	meaningful	concept	to	apply	
to	both	the	human	and	AI	(for	context	see	Stephan,	2006).7	It	is	perhaps	worth	noting																																																									
5	Clearly	a	programmer	or	designer	must	give	thought	to	what	something	is	in	order	to	make	it,	but	this	
is	 in	order	to	make	 it	do	something	and	 is	different	than	extended	rumination	or	reflexive	focus	on	
what	something	is	as	an	entity	in	terms	of	matters	of	status,	kind,	comparative	constitution,	qualities	
and	so	forth.		
6	And	yet	may	contain	something	necessary	to	AI,	so	there	is	the	possibility	of	insufficient	necessary	as	
well	as	sufficient	non-necessary	constitution.	The	problem	is	logical-semantic	and	so	infects	claims	of	
substance	formulated	within	the	schema.	
7	The	implication	is	not	that	intelligence	emerges	from	prior	forms	such	as	calculators	along	a	spectrum	
(since	this	would	be	absurd	in	various	ways)	but	rather	that	any	particular	entity	on	the	spectrum	may	
be	described	in	emergent	terms.	
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that	Darwin	ultimately	positioned	humans	and	animals	in	the	same	way,	so	this	is	not	
a	 procedure	 that	 is	 especially	 controversial	 when	 dealing	 with	 distinctions.	 The	
problem	it	creates	is	that	it	seems	to	inadvertently	equate	entities	that	are	distant	on	
the	spectrum,	since	the	spectrum	implies	no	breakpoints	or	thresholds	for	difference,	
even	if	one	might	want	to	acknowledge	that	a	threshold	could	be	broad	and	blurred	
rather	than	narrow	and	neat.		
In	the	case	of	AI,	the	curious	corollary	of	this	AIw	functional	approach	is	that	it	
decentres	what	 it	 is	to	be	human	or,	to	be	 less	prejudicially	anthropocentric,	to	be	
equivalent	in	terms	of	possible	essential	characteristics	(since	these	invoke	issues	of	
kind	and	may	be	relevant	matters	to	address	in	terms	of	some	animals,	aliens	etc.).	
This	 is	 important	 because	 it	 is	 built	 into	 the	 conceptual	 construct,	 and	 so	 cannot	
readily	 be	 rectified	 by	 subsequently	 acknowledging	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 human	
whilst	analysis	and	argument	proceeds	on	the	basis	of	AIw.	A	conceptual	disjuncture	is	
liable	to	linger.	This	is	also	problematic,	since	the	future	is	a	matter	of	how	technology	
is	designed,	shaped,	and	used	by,	in	and	for	humans	within	societies.	As	the	authors	
of,	 for	example,	 the	Stanford	 report	are	aware,	what	matters	 is	how	technology	 is	
shaped,	and	how	technology	in	turn	will	shape	society.	Few	AI	scholars	set	out	to	be	
simple	 technological	 determinists.	However,	 the	disjuncture	 and	 focus	on	 function	
does	encourage	a	kind	of	tacit	weighting	towards	characteristics	of	determinism:	AI	is	
coming	 and	 we	 have	 to	 cope	 with	 it.	 Concomitantly,	 the	 disjuncture	 creates	
problematic	 beginnings	 for	 how	we	 deliberate	 regarding	 human	 futures	 based	 on	
what	it	is	to	be	human,	which	can	affect	in	turn	how	humans	flourish	or	suffer.	These	
are	quintessentially	issues	of	ontology.	
	
Strong	artificial	intelligence	(AIs)	
	
Whilst	AIw	 focuses	on	function,	 in	contrast	strong	artificial	 intelligence	 (AIs)	 takes	a	
step	back	to	consider	what	directs	function.	AIs	thus	locates	‘intelligence’	within	an	
expanding	set	of	characteristics	which	may	be	associated	with	this	direction:	purpose,	
awareness,	 cognitive	 unity,	 consciousness,	 self-consciousness	 etc.	 AIs	 is	 mainly	
concerned	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 entities.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 constitution	 that	 affects	
external	expression,	and	so	mediates	and	enables	function.	Moreover,	function	is	not	
the	only	concern,	being	merely	a	subset	of	the	consequences	of	the	existence	of	an	
entity.	 There	 are	 two	 main	 subcategories	 of	 an	 AIs	 conceptual	 focus.	 First,	 one	
subcategory	 focuses	on	 the	equivalence	between	human	and	 ‘AI’,	and	 thus	on	 the	
validity	 of	 analogical	 claims.	 This	 locates	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 intelligent	 within	
philosophy	of	mind.	Inter	alia,	when	posed	as	a	machine-mind	(program)	problematic	
it	 invites	 disputes	 regarding	 what	 function	 alone	 can	 reveal	 or	 allow	 one	 to	 infer	
regarding	the	nature	of	mind,	organic	or	otherwise.	Though	concerned	by	AI	the	main	
concern	is	with	the	human	and	what	AI	does	or	does	not	tell	us	about	the	human.	This	
focus	 follows	 from	 Searle’s	 work.	 Searle	 is	 concerned	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	
functionalism	 in	 cognitive	 science	 and	 with	 the	 mutual	 relation	 between	 this	
functionalism	and	AI.	His	‘Minds,	brains	and	programs,’	(1980)	raises	significant	issues	
that	 we	 will	 set	 out	 later.	 Second,	 and	mirroring	 this,	 another	 subcategory	 of	 AIs	
includes	the	work	of	speculative	science,	futurists	and	of	science	fiction	writers	that	
project	or	imagine	the	potentials	of	a	human	(animal/alien)	equivalent	AI	and	then	of	
super-AI.	Though	this	latter	subcategory	is	mainly	concerned	with	what	AI	is	not	yet	
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(and	may	never	be),	discussion	in	terms	of	it	already	has	material	consequence	and	
some	 focus	 on	 imminent	 prospects.	 This	 is	 because	 AIs	 encompasses	 legal	 and	
regulatory	discussion	and	development.		
One	of	the	more	prominent	current	examples	of	the	latter	subcategory	of	AIs	
is	 provided	 by	 the	 work	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 Committee	 on	 Legal	 Affairs	
Commission	on	Civil	Rules	on	Robotics.	Since	AIs	focuses	on	intelligence	in	terms	of	
what	it	is	and	what	it	may	be,	it	raises	issues	in	terms	of	‘autonomy’.	Clearly,	matters	
of	autonomy	are	immediately	significant	for	the	legal	status	of	AI.	Once	an	AI	becomes	
a	 seat	 of	 decision-making	 it	 becomes	 a	 source	 of	 concern	 regarding	 its	 material	
consequences.	 Here,	 there	 is	 some	 ambiguity	 that	 glosses	 over	 the	 difference	
between	a	locus	(site)	of	decision-making	and	a	source	of	decision-making,	with	the	
former	tending	to	inform	how	‘autonomy’	is	conceived.	In	any	case,	since	decision-
making	 can	 be	 programmed,	 an	 AIs	 set	 of	 legal	 concerns	 need	 not	 wait	 on	 any	
demonstrated	extensive	list	of	all	imaginable	AIs	characteristics.	‘Autonomy’	creates	a	
legal	 issue	 regarding	 liability	 for	 actions,	 harms	 etc.	 since	 it	 introduces	 a	 potential	
break	 in	chains	of	causation	with	reference	to	owners,	designers	and	builders,	and	
makes	ambiguous	the	concept	of	‘operator’	(think	of	a	driverless	vehicle,	a	warehouse	
mobile	delivery	unit,	an	adaptive-targeting	drone	weapon).		
Moreover,	 since	 AI	 are	 also	 manifestly	 developing	 or	 changing,	 a	 legal	
perspective	 immediately	 invites	 forward	 thinking	 regarding	what	 an	AI	 is	 and	may	
become.	These	are	already	germane	 in	a	way	that	 they	are	not	necessarily	 for	 the	
programmer,	 the	 data	 analyst,	 the	 systems	 theorist,	 the	 economist	 etc.	 Note,	 the	
Stanford	project,	like	others	of	its	kind,	does	not	simply	ignore	a	legal	perspective	but	
this	 is	 not	 its	 core	 concern,	 and	 so	 matters	 of	 what	 constitutes	 intelligence	 are	
marginalised.	The	typical	default	to	AIw	is	a	matter	of	dominance	rather	than	a	simple	
denial	of	the	concerns	of	AIs.	In	contrast,	a	legal	perspective	on	the	present	expressed	
into	the	future	cannot	marginalize	matters	of	AIs	precisely	because	of	the	nature	of	
law.	In	law,	function	begs	questions	regarding	consequences	and	thus	responsibility,	
which	cannot	evade	issues	of	the	constitution	and	status	of	entities.	The	current	draft	
report	prepared	for	the	European	Union	Civil	Law	on	Robotics	conveniently	illustrates	
this:	
	
[T]hanks	to	the	impressive	technological	advances	of	the	last	decade,	not	only	
are	 today’s	 robots	able	 to	perform	activities	which	used	 to	be	 typically	and	
exclusively	 human,	 but	 the	 development	 of	 autonomous	 and	 cognitive	
features	 --	 e.g.	 the	 ability	 to	 learn	 from	 experience	 and	 take	 independent	
decisions	--	has	made	them	more	and	more	similar	to	agents	that	interact	with	
their	 environment	 and	 are	 able	 to	 alter	 it	 significantly;	 whereas	 in	 such	 a	
context,	the	legal	responsibility	arising	from	a	robot’s	harmful	action	becomes	
a	crucial	legal	issue	[…]	the	more	autonomous	robots	are,	the	less	they	can	be	
considered	simple	tools	in	the	hands	of	other	actors	(such	as	the	manufacturer,	
the	owner,	 the	user	 etc.)	whereas	 this	 in	 turn	makes	 the	ordinary	 rules	on	
liability	insufficient	and	calls	for	new	rules	which	focus	on	how	a	machine	can	
be	held	--	partly	or	entirely	--	responsible	for	its	acts	or	omissions;	whereas	as	
a	consequence,	it		becomes	more	and	more	urgent	to	address	the	fundamental	
question	of	whether	robots	should	possess	a	legal	status	[…]	ultimately	robots’	
autonomy	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 their	 nature	 in	 the	 light	 of	 existing	 legal	
	 7	
categories	 --	 or	 whether	 a	 new	 category	 should	 be	 created,	 with	 its	 own	
specific	 features	 and	 implications	 as	 regards	 the	 attribution	 of	 rights	 and	
duties,	 including	 liability	 for	 damage	 […The	 report	 recommends]	 creating	 a	
specific	 legal	 status	 for	 robots,	 so	 that	 at	 least	 the	 most	 sophisticated	
autonomous	 robots	 could	 be	 established	 as	 having	 the	 status	 of	 electronic	
persons	with	specific	rights	and	obligations,	including	that	of	making	good	any	
damage	they	may	cause,	and	applying	electronic	personality	to	cases	where	
robots	 make	 smart	 autonomous	 decisions	 or	 otherwise	 interact	 with	 third	
parties.		(EP,	2016:	pp.	5	&	12)	
	
The	EU	draft	report	demonstrates	that	an	AIs	frame	of	reference	is	already	within	the	
purview	of	organizations.	However,	 it	 is	probably	more	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	
matters	 of	 AIw	 have	 provoked	 a	 partial	 AIs	 response.8	 The	 driving	 force	 even	 here	
remains	 for	 the	moment	 function	 and	 consequences.	 The	 draft	 report	 defers	 and	
delegates	fuller	development	of	matters	relating	to	the	status	of	an	electronic	person.	
For	example,	the	profound	question	of	whether	an	AI	can/could	flourish	or	suffer	and	
whether	this	is	the	basis	for	the	ascription	of	rights.	So,	whilst	AIw	decentres	what	it	
means	to	be	human,	current	tentative	steps	towards	greater	focus	on	AIs,	in	terms	of	
the	AI,	for	and	from	the	position	of	the	AI,	are	also	limited.	This	is	partly	because	it	is	
difficult	to	consider	derivative	issues	of	electronic	persons	for	those	persons	until	one	
has	 an	 adequate	 concept	 of	 the	 person	 and	 then	 some	 knowledge,	 based	 on	
realisation,	of	an	actual	electronic	person	--	so	an	AI	is	AI	problem	returns	in	a	different	
guise	 (however,	 see	Calverley,	 2007).	 In	 any	 case,	 exploration	of	AIs	 is	 a	 small	 but	
important	aspect	of	the	whole	EU	report.	This	pattern	is	repeated	in	terms	of	current	
legal	and	regulatory	committee	investigations	in	many	countries.9	AIs	remains	mainly	
a	matter	for	philosophers,	futurists,	and	science	fiction.		
	
Shifting,	adequacy	and	the	interstitial	problem	
	
Ultimately,	when	AI	 is	 considered	as	a	discourse,	 there	 is	a	 shifting	back	and	 forth	
between	AIw	as	a	focus	on	function	and	AIs	as	a	focus	on	entities	(which	may	explicitly	
be	functionalist).	A	good	example	of	this	is	provided	by	a	recent	collection	edited	by	
Brockman	(2015).	The	collection	brings	together	contributions	by	leading	scientists,	
social	theorists	and	philosophers	first	published	as	responses	to	the	‘question	of	the	
year	2015’	on	the	Edge	online	science	salon:	what	do	you	think	about	machines	that	
think?10	Some	contributions	are	overwhelmingly	AIw	and	some	AIs.	However,	given	the																																																									
8	Gary	Lea,	visiting	researcher	in	AI	regulation,	makes	this	clear	in	his	blog	on	the	well-known	site,	The	
Conversation.	 As	 already	 noted	 AI	 researchers	 are	 aware	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 intelligence	 remains	
ultimately	ambiguous	and	that	it	might	be	preferable	to	have	a	‘human	independent’	measure;	various	
attempts	have	been	made	to	address	this	in	terms	of	function	that	increasingly	recognize	aspects	of	
general	 intelligence	 along	 AIw	 lines,	 but	 do	 so	 with	 an	 AIs	 set	 of	 concerns	 related	 to	 foreseeable	
regulatory	 issues:	 https://theconversation.com/why-we-need-a-legal-definition-of-artificial-
intelligence-46796	Many	individual	governments	are	now	starting	to	take	an	interest	along	these	lines.	
9	For	example,	the	UK	House	of	Commons	Science	and	Technology	Committee	has	produced	a	series	of	
reports	 on	 Robots	 and	 Artificial	 Intelligence.	 These	 invite	 expert	 evidence,	 and	 this	 includes	 from	
prominent	 figures	 concerned	 with	 AIs.	 For	 example,	 Alan	 Winfield,	 Professor	 of	 Robot	 Ethics	 at	
University	of	the	West	of	England.	
10	https://www.edge.org/about-edgeorg		
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nature	of	the	question,	which	invites	deliberation	regarding	the	scope	for	‘thought’,	
some	contributions	shift	between	the	two,	taking	an	AIw	approach	to	contemporary	
technology	 and	 its	 immediate	 prospects	 and	 an	 AIs	 approach	 to	more	 speculative	
possibilities.	 For	 example,	 the	 Harvard	 psychologist	 and	 public	 intellectual,	 Steven	
Pinker	praises	the	focus	on	function	as	a	means	to	overcome	‘spiritualism’	along	AIw	
lines,	but	adopts	a	speculative	AIs	position	to	make	the	point	that	future	AI	need	not	
be	 innately	 aggressive,	 since	 this	 is	 a	masculine	 trait	 and	 not	 necessary	 to	 a	 non-
masculine	AI;	a	thought	likely	provoked	by	his	own	work	on	gradual	progress	in	human	
civilization	(Pinker	in	Brockman,	2015,	pp.	5-8).		By	contrast,	but	still	shifting,	the	MIT	
Nobel	prize	winning	physicist,	Frank	Wilczek	tends	towards	AIw,	but	does	so	in	terms	
of	 an	 AIs	 first	 subcategory	 framing:	 ‘What	 distinguishes	 natural	 from	 artificial	
intelligence	is	not	what	it	is	but	only	how	it’s	made’	(Wilczek	in	Brockman,	2015:	p.	
121).		
	 Following	 this	 example,	 one	 might	 conclude	 that	 since	 both	 AIw	 and	 AIs	
concepts	occur	and	are	subject	to	development,	and,	moreover,	it	is	possible	to	shift	
back	and	forth	between	them,	that	there	is	no	problem	regarding	how	AI	is	conceived.	
However,	two	problems	arise.	First,	the	existence	of	concepts	does	not	entail	concepts	
are	adequate.	For	example,	varieties	of	entity	related	functionalism	may	be	critiqued	
in	 different	 ways.	 Second,	 legitimating	 shifting	 does	 more	 than	 legitimate	 both	
concepts	 (AIw	 and	 AIs),	 it	 tends	 to	 put	 aside	 how	 focus	 affects	 the	 way	 concepts	
operate.	The	existence	of	two	basic	focuses	for	AI,	one	where	function	dominates,	and	
one	where	the	nature	of	an	entity	dominates,	creates	scope	for	one	conceptual	focus	
to	be	more	influential	than	another.	Currently,	and	in	many	ways	understandably,	that	
is	AIw.	So,	the	existence	of	two	focuses	creates	the	potential	for	dominant	effects	from	
the	dominant	concerns	of	a	concept,	since	others	are	marginalized.	Moreover,	issues	
may	be	marginalized	in	ways	that	do	not	appear	in	the	concerns	of	the	subordinated	
conception,	 becoming	 rather	 interstitial.	 There	 may	 then	 be	 a	 link	 between	 the	
adequacy	of	each	concept	and	the	problem	of	both	concepts.	There	 is	 thus	a	prior	
problem	of	ontology	that	may	be	used	to	appropriately	explore	these	matters.	I	will	
return	to	this	later	in	terms	of	relational	goods.	At	this	stage	I	simply	suggest	that	the	
existence	of	a	juxtaposition	of	concepts	and	foci	creates	grounds	for	perpetuation	of	
problems	of	many	kinds.	Consider	this	in	terms	of	the	difference	between	a	spectrum	
view	of	intelligence	and	the	possibility	of	breakpoints	and	emergence,	and	how	this	
may	render	what	it	is	to	be	human	decentred.11	One	way	in	which	this	is	important	
starts	to	become	clear	when	one	begins	to	think	about	Transhumanism	(TH).											
	
Transhumanism	lower	and	upper	case	(th«TH)	
	
In	 an	 ordinary	 language	 sense,	 lower	 case	 transhumanism	 (th)	 is	 a	 portmanteau	
blending	of	‘transitional’	and	‘human’,	though	one	that	also	invokes	transforming	and	
transcending	 some	 prior	 limit	 on	 the	 capacities,	 abilities	 or	 typical	 observable	 life	
outcomes	of	the	human.	As	such,	the	term	is	extremely	broad,	if	not	amorphous,	but																																																									
11	Note	one	might	categorise	some	complexity	theory	approaches	to	AI	as	AIs	and	complexity	theory	is	
typically	defined	in	terms	of	emergent	properties	(though	what	this	means	is	highly	variable),	so	it	is	
important	not	to	give	the	impression	that	the	purpose	of	differentiating	AIw	and	AIs	is	to	create	a	simple	
dichotomy.	Rather	it	is	to	establish	that	dichotomisation	is	a	tendency	that	affects	nuance	and	subtlety	
and	focus.			
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it	is	also	intimately	bound	up	with	function.	As	transition	etc.	it	involves	change,	and	
since	changes	to	capacity,	ability	and	observable	life	outcomes	are	not	new,	there	is	
nothing	intrinsically	new	to	the	notion	of	th.	Throughout	history	humans	have	been	
changing,	 augmenting	 and	 enhancing	 their	 bodies,	 and	 also	 the	 context	 in	 which	
bodies	 are	 capable	 of	 achieving	 (and	 suppressing)	 things	 --	 in	 relation	 to	 persons,	
roles,	 agency	 etc.	 Consider	 some	 of	 the	 range	 of	 means	 by	 which	 this	 has	 been	
achieved	 over	 time:	 artefacts	 (tools,	 machines,	 prosthetics,	 exo-tech	 etc.),	
pharmaceuticals,	 surgical-intervention	 (transplants,	 implants,	 amputation),	
technologically	based	services	that	create	grounds	for	or	affect	human	activity	and	so	
forth.	Consider,	in	addition	to	‘augment’	and	‘enhance’,	some	of	the	further	language	
we	 apply	 to	 changes	 in	 terms	 of	 these	 means:	 facilitate,	 stimulate,	 extend,	
(re)generate,	suppress	(negate),	mutilate,	delegate,	perfect…	And,	consider	some	of	
the	 historical	 consequences	 of	 related	 change	 for	 the	 human.	 Health	 immediately	
springs	to	mind:	life	expectancy,	vitality,	heights,	weights,	shapes,	mental	states	etc.	
However,	many	other	aspects	of	living	can	also	be	thought	through	in	similar	ways.	
For	 example,	 our	 relation	 to	 time	 in	 terms	of	 how	 long	 given	 activities	 take,	what	
activities	 are	 possible,	 our	 sense	 of	 distance	 as	 a	 time	measured	 relation,	 our	 life	
ordering	through	clock	time	etc.				
If	translated	into	matters	of	social	ontology,	the	above	seems	no	more	than	a	
specific	way	of	making	 the	 general	 point	 that	 humans	 live	within	open	 systems	 in	
process.	Human	history,	the	history	of	the	human,	has	always	been	entangled	with	
invention	and	innovation.	Tool	use	is	as	old	and	older	than	Homo	sapiens.	However,	
changes,	 recognized	 potentials	 and	 speculations	 have	 made	 possible	 a	 particular	
discursive	 response	 regarding	 transition	 and	 transformation.	Modern	 surgery,	 the	
prospects	 for	 genetic	 manipulation,	 and	 continual	 development	 of	 information	
technologies	as	hardware	and	 software	have	provoked	 issues	 regarding	 interfaces,	
melding,	mutation,	and	perhaps	even	re-embodiment	and	disembodiment.	Here	th	
becomes	entangled	with	AI	in	various	ways	and	this	has	been	recognized	as	uppercase	
Transhumanism.	Proponents	of	Transhumanism	tend	to	use	H+	or	h+	to	refer	to	 it.	
However,	 I	will	continue	to	use	TH.	Within	TH	there	are	transitional	humans	and	a	
potential	 for	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 entity,	 the	 ‘posthuman’,	who	will	 live	 in	 new	 kinds	 of	
societies	that	welcome	and	celebrate	future	AI	as	equivalent	(and	different)	entities	
(see	 Regis,	 1991;	 O’Connell,	 2017).	 Though	 it	 has	 antecedents,	 the	 term	
Transhumanism	began	to	be	used	in	the	1980s.	A	World	Transhumanist	Association	
(WTA)	 was	 founded	 in	 1998,	 and	 there	 are	 several	 different	 versions	 of	 a	
Transhumanist	declaration	or	manifesto.	Key	aspects	of	the	WTA	declaration	are:	
	
Transhumanists	 advocate	 the	 moral	 right	 for	 those	 who	 so	 wish	 to	 use	
technology	 to	 extend	 their	 mental	 and	 physical	 (including	 reproductive)	
capacities	and	to	improve	their	control	over	their	own	lives.	We	seek	personal	
growth	beyond	our	current	personal	 limitations	[…]	 It	would	be	tragic	 if	the	
potential	 benefits	 failed	 to	 materialize	 because	 of	 technophobia,	 and	
unnecessary	prohibitions	[…]	Transhumanism	advocates	the	well-being	of	all	
sentience	(whether	in	artificial	intellects,	humans,	posthumans,	or	non-human	
animals)	and	encompasses	many	principles	of	modern	humanism.	(WTA,	2005:	
p.	1)			
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The	 core	 emphasis	 on	 the	 benefits	 of	 AI	 and	 on	 augmenting	 and	 ultimately	
transforming	 the	 human	 (and	 enabling	 posthumans)	 has	 outlasted	 the	 various	
incarnations	of	TH	organizations	(which	are	themselves	in	flux).12	Notably,	all	versions	
incorporate	 a	 moral	 argument:	 the	 right	 of	 free	 expression	 (where	 TH	 and	 the	
posthuman	 are	 creative	 and	 liberating)	 and	 a	 duty	 or	 obligation	 to	 recognize	 and	
accommodate	 fully	 realised	 AI	 entities.	 Many	 adherents	 of	 TH	 also	 prioritise	 a	
‘proactionary	principle’	over	a	‘precautionary’	one:	the	requirement	to	transcend	risk	
through	activity	 rather	 than	avoiding	or	 suppressing	change	because	of	 recognized	
risks	 (such	 as	 the	 loss	 of	 identity,	 quasi-Gattaca	 coercive/competitive	 eugenic	
societies,	worse-case	scenarios	of	abrupt	transition	to	fully	realised	AI	--	a	‘singularity’	
--	with	Terminator	consequences	etc).13	The	emphasis	on	benefits	and	the	weighting	
towards	 a	 proactionary	 principle	 is	 also	 associated	 with	 an	 ‘abolitionist’	 thesis:	
biotechnology	 and	 social	 transformation	 can	 (and	 should)	 eradicate	 suffering	 as	 a	
human	experience	(by	altering	the	capacity	to	experience).	This	thesis	is	most	closely	
associated	with	David	Pearce,	one	of	the	founders	of	the	WTA.14		
The	exotica	of	TH	is	part	of	its	appeal	and	has	created	public	curiosity,	often	
within	Future	Studies	(see	Gidley,	2017).	Moreover,	since	th	has	created	the	grounds	
for	TH	as	a	discursive	response	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	same	set	of	possibilities	has	
provoked	 an	 interest	 from	other	 perspectives.	 Various	media	 have	 pursued	 a	 ‘the	
future	 is	 now’	 theme	 in	 relation	 to	 current	 forms	 of	 th	 advances	 in	 science	 that	
necessarily	raise	concerns	regarding	a	TH	position	of	advocacy.	For	example,	general	
advances	such	as	CRISPR	gene	editing,	recent	advances	in	synthetic	blood	production,	
experimental	implants	to	control	Parkinson’s,	as	well	as	more	specific	pioneering	work	
such	as	the	successful	 implantation	of	microchip	technology	 in	a	quadriplegic	male	
enabling	him	to	gradually	recover	some	use	of	an	arm	(Mason,	2016).	One	might	also	
note	Elon	Musk’s	recent	corporate	launch	of	Neuralink,	a	company	dedicated	to	the	
development	of	a	neural	lace	for	human-computer	interfacing.	Clearly,	aspects	of	TH	
potentials	 immediately	 invite	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 concern,	 and	 so	 parallel	 some	
aspects	of	how	AIs	has	been	motivated.	This	is	a	matter	of	(in	the	political	sense)	public	
interest	and	public	concern.	 In	 the	US,	 for	example,	 research	 from	the	Pew	Centre	
indicates	popular	misgivings	about	a	transition	from	helping	the	unhealthy	to	shaping	
and	intervening	in	the	lives	of	the	already	well	(Funk	et	al,	2016).	In	focus	groups,	the	
more	participants	were	invited	to	consider	the	issues,	the	more	it	became	evident	that	
society	was	underprepared	to	deal	with	any	consequences	because	of	a	lack	of	public	
deliberation	and	informed	awareness	(Rainie	et	al,	2016).15																																																													
12	The	WTA	is	now	HumanityPlus:	http://humanityplus.org		
See	also	Transhumanity:	http://transhumanity.net		
13	For	the	proactionary	argument	see	Bostrom	and	Ord,	2006.	At	the	extreme	this	becomes	a	reversal	
of	a	posited	‘magic-in-the	meat’	position	(see	critique	of	Searle	later).	For	an	account	of	future	risk	from	
super	intelligence	see	Bostrom	(2016)			
14	There	is	a	potential	dangerous	elision	in	the	abolitionist	position	since	there	is	a	difference	between	
removing	suffering	from	the	world	--	changing	the	relations	of	the	world	--	and	removing	the	capacity	
to	 suffer	 from	 the	 human;	 the	 latter	 does	 not	 mean	 ills	 are	 removed	 merely	 one’s	 capacity	 to	
experience	them.	This	inscribes	an	unpleasant	potential:	create	inhumans	because	we	act	‘inhumanly’,	
perpetuate	harms	because	we	are	something	other	than	human.			
15	The	Pew	focus	groups	were	designed	to	cover	significant	subcategories	of	US	society	but	each	was	
constructed	with	an	internal	similarity	of	members	in	order	to	expedite	free	flow	of	conversation.	In	
general	participants	expressed	views	sharply	at	odds	with	a	TH	proactionary	approach	and	emphasised	
the	need	 for	 caution	 and	 intervention	beginning	 from	a	 ‘first	 do	no	harm’	 principle	 for	 the	human	
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Given	the	growing	attention	above,	various	academic	disciplines,	and	notably	
ethics,	 have	 oriented	 on	 th	 and	 TH.	 Again,	 there	 is	 some	 crossover	 here	 with	 AI,	
notably	 AIs.	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 now	 Professors	 of	 Robot	 Ethics,	 such	 as	 Alan	
Whitfield,	as	well	as	Bioethics,	such	as	Robert	Sparrow.	Ethics’	disciplinary	interest	and	
crossover	also	extends	to	critique	or	defence	of	TH	(for	an	initial	range	see	Sandel,	
2007;	Cabrera,	2015;	Clarke	et	al,	2016).	TH	has	also	attracted	critique	 from	other	
academic	positions.	Though	TH	refers	to	posthumans,	TH	can	also	be	differentiated	to	
some	 degree	 from	 a	 set	 of	 humanities	 and	 cultural	 studies-based	 social	 theories	
collectively	referred	to	as	Posthumanism.	These	tend	to	be	critical	of	TH,	locating	it	as	
hasty	valorisation	of	novelty	and	fantasy	that	does	not	pay	due	attention	to	feasibility	
or	 to	 the	 social	 theory	 basis	 of	 society.16	Many	Posthumanists	 are	 still	 engaged	 in	
rethinking	theory	as	a	necessary	precursor	to	any	emphasis	on	remaking	society	or	
understanding	the	human	(see	Badmington,	2000;	Herbrechter,	2013;	Wolfe,	2009;	
Braidotti	2013).	The	sources	for	this	rethinking	range	across	Butler,	Deleuze,	Derrida,	
Foucault,	Latour	and	Woolgar,	Haraway,	Luhmann	and	many	others.		
Other	essays	in	this	collection	have	more	to	say	about	the	inter-connections	
between	TH	and	Posthumanism.	For	our	purposes,	it	is	sufficient	to	note	that	the	main	
threads	of	Posthumanism	take	a	different	approach	to	decentring	the	human	than	we	
introduced	earlier	in	this	essay,	and	this	needs	to	be	distinguished	here	to	avoid	any	
confusion.	 Literary	 theory,	 cultural	 studies,	 post-structuralism	 and	 postmodernism	
emphasise	 the	 entanglement	 of	 knowledge	 and	 power	 and	 tend	 to	 associate	 the	
Enlightenment	and	humanist	tradition	with	the	uncritical	projection	of	universals	that	
are	 actually	 expressions	 of	 oppressive	 and	marginalizing	 particularities,	 as	 well	 as	
sources	of	dangerously	posed	discourses	of	scientistic	science	that	foster	harms.	As	
such,	 decentring	 the	 human	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 important	 theory	 move	 in	 opposing	
problems	of	gender	constructs,	ecological	destruction	and	so	forth.	Many	realists	have	
great	 sympathy	 with	 the	 intent,	 but	 are	 sceptical	 regarding	 the	 ontological	
implications	of	subsequent	theory	and	critiques.17	There	is	some	crossover	here	with	
issues	already	explored	in	the	five	volume	Centre	for	Social	Ontology	working	group	
Morphogenic	 Society	 project	 (see	 Morgan,	 2016).	 Realists	 argue	 that	 the	 new	
materialism,	 vitalism,	 actor	 network	 theory	 etc.	 replace	 one	 set	 of	 problems	with	
another	set	(flat	ontologies,	lack	of	adequately	explored	differentiation,	conflation	of	
particulars	as	universals	in	epistemology	with	essence	and	kind	in	ontology	etc.).																																																									
(based	on	unintended	consequences),	and	with	due	attention	paid	to	preventing	the	exacerbation	of	
current	inequalities	based	on	privilege	enabling	the	few	to	pay	for	augmentations	and	changes	that	put	
them	and	their	descendants	apart	(noting	however	that	society	is	already	unequal	and	that	technology	
might	 actually	 allow	 for	 equalisation,	 depending	 on	 how	 it	 inhered	 in	 society).	 The	 responses	 also	
mirrored	the	idiosyncratic	US	suspicion	of	big	government	preferring	some	more	cross-social	means	of	
oversight	of	technological	change	(see	Rainie	et	al	2016).		
16	For	an	early	feasibility	critique	see	Nordmann,	2007.	Note	that	realist	critique	seems	to	logically	trade	
on	the	irreversibility	of	TH	transformations	(so	something	is	harmed	or	lost	without	full	consideration	
of	what	is	harmed	or	lost).	However,	reversibility	may	change	some	of	the	force	of	argument	--	since	
experimental	TH	to	create	mutable	entities	may	carry	different	force	of	argument	(and	is	a	staple	of	
space	opera	sci-fi	utopia,	such	as	Iain	Bank’s	Culture	novels.		
17	One	might	also	note	Steve	Fuller’s	Humanity	2.0	 (2011)	here.	Fuller	raises	many	 important	 issues	
(especially	the	moral	horizon	of	the	human)	but	does	so	in	terms	of	his	usual	social	epistemology.	He	
sets	out	how	discourse	disputes	and	makes	ambiguous	science	in	society	but	ultimately	provides	no	
definite	position	 regarding	what	 it	means	 to	be	human	or	what	 the	prospects	 for	humanity	are	 (or	
should	be).	Though	thought	provoking,	the	work	explores	evasion	evasively	(see	Morgan,	2013).		
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The	 initial	 point	 we	 have	 made	 in	 this	 essay	 is	 that	 an	 AIw	 functional	 approach	
decentres	what	it	is	to	be	human	or,	to	be	equivalent	in	terms	of	possible	essential	
characteristics,	and	that	an	AIs	entity	focus	may	not	easily	resolve	this.	Clearly	matters	
of	kind	and	essence	are	problematic	for	Posthumanism	based	on	its	theory	sources,	
and	 for	 TH	 based	 on	 a	 combination	 of	 optimistic	 emphasis	 on	 the	 benefits	 of	
transformations	and	a	proactionary	principle.	Again,	others	have	more	to	say	about	
this.	My	concern	is	with	problems	of	social	ontology	that	may	become	ingrained	or	
interstitial	based	on	how	AI	has	been	conceived.	As	such,	I	now	move	on	to	Turing	and	
Searle	to	consider	the	‘sophisticated	origins’	and	implications	of	AIw	and	AIs.		
	
Turing,	AIw	and	AIs:	finding	a	question	that	can	be	answered	
	
In	his	seminal	1950	paper	‘Computing,	machinery	and	intelligence,’	Turing	clears	the	
ground	for	a	dominant	AIw	focus	on	function,	whilst	also	setting	the	scene	for	AIs	sub-
categorical	concerns.	Turing’s	point	of	departure	is:	can	machines	think?	However,	for	
Turing,	 the	 ordinary	 language	 sense	 of	 this	 question	 is	 too	 ambiguous	 and	 this	
impedes	any	satisfactory	answer.	As	such,	what	 is	required	is	a	substitute	question	
that	 can	 in	principle	be	answered.	 Specifically,	 could	a	machine	provide	 responses	
indistinguishable	 from	 those	 a	 human	 provides,	 and	 so	 pass	 for	 human?	 The	
substitution	 takes	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 thought	 experiment	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 test,	 the	
‘imitation	game’.	Turing	describes	 the	game	 initially	as	one	played	by	3	people:	an	
interrogator	 (C)	 and	 a	 man	 (A)	 and	 woman	 (B).	 C	 is	 in	 a	 separate	 room	 and	
communication	is	via	some	medium	(another	party	or	by	cards,	teleprinter	etc).	The	
interrogator	(C)	is	unaware	which	of	the	two	others	is	the	man	or	woman.	For	C	they	
are	merely	x	and	y.	The	task	for	C	is	to	decide	which	of	x	and	y	is	the	man	and	which	
the	 woman.	 The	 man	 (A)	 is	 given	 the	 task	 of	 confounding	 the	 interrogator’s	 (C)	
attempts	to	identify	which	of	x	and	y	is	the	man	and	woman,	and	the	woman	(B)	is	
given	the	task	of	helping	the	interrogator.	However,	neither	A	nor	B	can	simply	state	
who	is	who.		
Turing	then	proposes	that	a	machine	take	the	part	of	A,	and	by	machine	he	
means	a	digital	computer	of	some	possible	future	variety.	This	digital	computer	is	a	
machine	designed	to	carry	out	operations	that	could	be	done	by	a	‘human	computer’.	
A	human	computer	 in	 these	 terms	 is	one	 that	would	be	 ‘following	 fixed	 rules’	and	
without	‘authority	to	deviate	from	them’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	436).	The	digital	computer	
(which	stands	in	the	place	of	AI)	is	then	described	as	an	extrapolation	of	contemporary	
technology:	 a	 technology	 that	 follows	 fixed	 rules	 where	 the	 technology	 is	 a	
combination	of	a	store	of	 information,	an	executive	unit	 that	carries	out	 individual	
operations	in	a	calculation,	and	a	control	table	of	instructions	(a	program	code).	Turing	
describes	 this	 digital	 computer	 as	 for-all-intents-and-purposes	 a	 ‘discrete-state	
machine’.	That	is,	one	that	follows	rules	and	shifts	from	one	definite	state	to	another,	
which	unless	error	occurs	is	ultimately	predictable	(in	a	basic	‘Laplacian’	sense).	It	thus	
has	 a	 clear	 set	 of	 input-output	pathways.	However,	 given	 that	 one	 can	program	a	
digital	computer	to	fulfil	any	function	that	can	follow	this	procedure	one	can	describe	
digital	computers	as	‘universal	machines’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	441).	Turing	then	suggests	
that	a	digital	computer	with	a	sufficiently	large	storage	capacity	and	processing	speed	
could	in	principle	play	the	imitation	game.		
	 13	
Read	carefully	the	imitation	game	is	clearly	a	test	of	functional	equivalence.	
The	interrogator	C	is	simply	being	asked	can	you	distinguish	between	two	entities	in	
relation	to	tasks	and	indicative	characteristics.	Though	the	range	of	tasks	can	be	wide	
the	underlying	structure	of	them	for	the	original	argument	is	highly	circumscribed:	a	
set	of	rule	following	actions.	However,	there	is	more	involved	since	Turing’s	underlying	
argument	can	be	differentiated	from	the	initial	underlying	structure	of	the	game	he	
sets	out.	This	becomes	clear	based	on	the	examples	used	and	the	way	some	of	the	9	
counter	arguments	or	objections	to	the	test	are	addressed.			
The	underlying	structure	of	the	imitation	game	requires	a	machine	to	follow	a	
program	that	enables	it	to	simulate	the	responses	of	a	human.	The	human	point	of	
reference	discussed	as	equivalent	in	the	argument	in	the	paper	is	a	human	computer	
who	 does	 not	 deviate	 from	 fixed	 rule	 following	 behaviour.	 However,	 the	 human	
responses	 actually	 illustrated	 for	 the	 game	 are	 wide-ranging	 and	 include	 more	
naturalistic	responses.	They	do	not	focus	only	on	a	human	engaged	in	unequivocally	
fixed	 response	 answers	 to	 given	 questions.	 For	 example,	 they	 are	 not	 closed-end	
yes/no	 issues	 or	 simply	matters	 of	 a	 human	 calculating.	 Clearly	 this	would	 be	 too	
narrow	 to	 satisfy	 any	 reasonable	 form	 of	 imitation	 test.	 Significantly,	 then,	 the	
statement	of	a	range	requires	an	intuitive	leap	or	inference	that	a	discrete-state	yet	
‘universal’	machine	can	at	some	point	in	the	future	play	the	imitation	game	in	a	way	
that	can	answer	the	possible	range	of	questions.	At	a	minimum,	 it	must	be	able	to	
address	Turing’s	illustrations	in	the	paper.	Most	notably	in	setting	the	scene	for	the	
game:	 ‘C:	Will	 X	please	 tell	me	 the	 length	of	his	or	her	hair?’	 If	A	 is	 X:	 ‘My	hair	 is	
shingled	and	the	longest	strands	are	about	9	inches	long’	(Turing,	1950:	pp.	433-434).	
And	 then	 in	 the	 following	 section	 when	 identifying	 different	 ‘specimen’	 question	
forms:	‘Q:	Please	write	me	a	sonnet	on	the	subject	of	the	Forth	Bridge.	A:	Count	me	
out	on	this	one,	I	never	could	write	poetry’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	434).	For	Turing,	passing	
such	 a	 test	 is	 sufficient	 to	 answer	 the	 question:	 can	 a	machine	 imitate	 a	 human?	
However,	 there	 is	more	 to	 it	 than	 this,	 since	Turing	 is	 reasonably	 confident	 that	 a	
machine	will	eventually	pass	the	test	and	in	introducing	possible	objections	he	states:	
‘I	believe	that	at	the	end	of	the	century	the	use	of	words	and	general	educated	opinion	
will	have	altered	so	much	that	one	will	be	able	to	speak	of	machines	thinking	without	
expecting	 to	 be	 contradicted’	 (Turing,	 1950:	 p.	 442).18	 He	 situates	 this	 claim	 as	
‘conjecture’,	but	the	impression	conveyed	is	important.	The	claim	is	made	based	on	
the	digital	computer,	the	human	computer	and	then	the	intuitive	leap.	For	Turing,	the	
current	 impediment	 to	 playing	 the	 game	 is	 processing	 capacity	 and	 speed.19	 The	
inference	 is	 that	 it	 is	 based	 on	 future	 technology	 following	 similar	 lines	 and	 with	
reference	to	the	game	that	it	will	be	reasonable	to	claim	that	a	machine	thinks	(despite	
that	the	game	is	about	imitation).																																																													
18	An	alternative	argument	to	the	one	that	follows	is	that	the	‘use	of	words’	changes,	and	so	thinking	is	
defined	differently,	such	that	a	digital	computer	and	human	think	without	addressing	the	points	I	make.	
This,	however,	does	not	help	Turing’s	position,	since	it	relies	on	semantic	incoherence	as	a	solution	to	
substantive	 incoherence	 of	 argument,	 and	 so	 replaces	 one	 problem	with	 another,	 where	 the	 new	
problem	fails	to	respond	to	the	original	issue:	it	merely	repositions	and	evades	the	issue.			
19	‘I	believe	that	in	about	fifty	years’	time,	it	will	be	possible	to	programme	computers	with	a	storage	
capacity	of	about	10
9
,	to	make	them	play	the	imitation	game	so	well	that	an	average	interrogator	will	
not	 have	 more	 than	 70	 percent	 chance	 of	 making	 the	 right	 identification	 after	 five	 minutes	 of	
questioning’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	442).		
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Now,	consider	what	is	involved	in	Turing’s	position.	The	point	of	departure	is	
equivalence	between	a	human	computer	and	a	digital	computer,	but	the	language	use	
of	 the	 former	 is	 ambiguous	 once	 the	 argument	 starts	 to	 be	 extended.	 There	 is	
semantic	slippage	from	the	claim	that	a	human	can	compute	and	this	follows	fixed	
rules	or	procedures	(whose	archetypal	form	is	calculation	according	to	formulae)	to	
the	implication	that	a	human	computing	is	equivalent	to	a	human	thinking.	Turing’s	
argument	claims	a	digital	computer	 following	 fixed	rules	can	achieve	 imitation	and	
also	(as	confident	conjecture)	implies	that	the	technology	(presumably	with	reference	
to	the	game)	will	settle	the	issue	of	whether	digital	machines	think.	For	this	 line	of	
reasoning	to	be	plausible	it	must	rely	on	the	assumption	that	a	human	thinking	and	a	
digital	computer	computing	are	equivalent.	There	is	thus	a	logical	substructure	that	
encourages	both	an	AIw	focus	for	future	AI	researchers	(a	concentration	on	function	
where	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 entity	 will	 take	 care	 of	 itself	 based	 on	 technological	
development)	and	(beneath	the	conjecture	caveat)	an	AIs	first	subcategory	claim	that	
can	easily	become	a	conflation:	the	human	mind	is	equivalent	to	a	computer,	so	the	
human	mind	is	a	computer.	This	latter	form	also	trades	on	the	inference	that	a	human	
mind	can	be	reduced	to	input-output	procedures	(and	so	is	also	overwhelmingly	about	
function).	
At	this	stage	it	is	important	not	to	traduce	Turing,	but	rather	to	highlight	the	
problems	 of	 his	 lines	 of	 reasoning.	 Turing’s	 claim	 implies	 equivalence	 but	 he	
introduces	further	caveats	and	considerations	in	addressing	9	objections.	Three	are	
immediately	relevant	here.	Turing	acknowledges	that	a	human	nervous	system	is	not	
a	discrete-state	machine	but	argues	that	if	a	machine	can	play	the	game	and	thus	be	
indistinguishable	 from	a	human	 then	 this	 is	 irrelevant.	 The	 implication	 is	 thus	 that	
equivalence	is	not	identity	of	constitution	but	similarity	of	outcome.	In	the	context	of	
the	 claim	 about	 machines	 thinking,	 the	 implication	 is	 thus	 that	 behavour	 is	 the	
significant	locus	that	allows	the	inference	that	a	machine	can	think.	If	one	reverses	the	
line	of	reasoning	then	the	implication	is	also	that	the	internal	operation	of	the	human	
in	 the	 act	 of	 thinking	 is	 conducive	 to	 the	equivalence	of	 outcomes	 and	equivalent	
status	(both	the	human	and	machine	‘think’).	The	‘difference’	thus	seems	to	make	no	
‘difference’.	However,	Turing	also	notes	the	objection	that	the	game	is	not	a	test	of	
consciousness,	 since	 the	digital	machine	 is	not	 required	 to	 (or	demonstrate	 that	 it	
actually	can)	know	what	it	is	doing,	or	feel	emotion.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	Turing	
is	simply	claiming	that	the	test	is	purely	a	matter	of	simulation	based	on	the	game.		
However,	 the	 very	point	 of	 the	 game	 is	 to	 replace	 the	 ambiguous	ordinary	
language	variety	of	question	(can	a	machine	think?)	with	an	operationally	answerable	
question	(can	a	machine	play	the	imitation	game?).	It	is	this	that	underpins	Turing’s	
claim	that	in	the	future	it	will	be	permissible	to	state	a	digital	computer	can	think.	For	
this	 to	 be	 so,	 one	 must,	 therefore,	 invoke	 the	 underlying	 assumption	 that	 it	 is	
meaningful	to	substitute	the	latter	question	for	the	former,	which	in	itself	can	only	be	
meaningful	as	an	act	 if	one	assumes	the	substituted	question	bears	on	 the	original	
one.	The	context	and	purpose	of	the	game	thus	create	 implications	that	shape	the	
subsequent	 caveat:	 ‘I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 give	 the	 impression	 that	 I	 think	 there	 is	 no	
mystery	 about	 consciousness’	 (Turing,	 1950:	 p.	 447)	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 subsequent	
statement:	‘But	I	do	not	think	these	mysteries	necessarily	need	to	be	solved	before	
we	can	answer	the	question	with	which	we	are	concerned	in	this	paper’	(Ibid).	One	
might	infer	then	that	the	‘mystery’	can	be	answered	--	Turing	does	not	say.	However,	
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he	 immediately	moves	 onto	 the	 possible	 objection	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	
humans	 follow	 laws	of	behaviour	and	actual	activity	 is	variable	 in	 terms	of	specific	
conduct.	Here,	he	notes	that	general	laws	of	behaviour	may	exist	that	condition	the	
scope	of	variability	in	specific	conduct.	Turing	seems	to	be	implying	here	that	general	
laws	 inhere	 in	 the	human	thinking	and	so	equivalence	 is	an	 interior	matter	of	 rule	
following	behaviour	rather	than	merely	exterior	circumscribed	equivalent	outcomes.	
There	 is,	 therefore,	 grounds	 to	 infer	 based	 on	 Turing’s	 argument	 that	 a	 human	
thinking	and	a	digital	computer	thinking	are	(or	could	in	the	future	be)	doing	the	same	
thing.					
It	 remains	 the	 case	 that	 Turing’s	 position	 is	 sufficiently	 underdeveloped	 to	
allow	different	 interpretations.	As	a	consequence,	there	is	a	 line	of	AIs	subcategory	
work	 that	explores	Turing’s	 imitation	game	 in	 terms	of	what	he	actually	 intended,	
including	whether	he	intended	the	game	to	be	behavioural	in	its	implications	because	
of	 its	 functional	 focus	 (for	early	examples	that	assess	the	debate	see,	Millar,	1973;	
Lassegue,	 1988).	 This	 notwithstanding,	 the	 point	 I	 want	 to	 emphasise	 is	 that	 the	
direction	of	argument	Turing	pursues	in	terms	of	key	objections	follows	a	pattern.	He	
affirms	the	relevance	of	the	imitation	game	as	a	valid	test	and	does	so	by	orienting	on	
the	significance	of	behaviour,	 function	and	equivalence.	This	enables	a	 slide	 in	 the	
argument	such	that	equivalence	is	a	matter	of	function,	which	is	suggestive	of	more	
than	mere	function:	function	becomes	the	significant	indicator	of	‘thinking’.	So,	whilst	
there	 are	 manifest	 tensions	 in	 the	 way	 Turing	 reasons,	 his	 argument	 conveys	 an	
impression	regarding	‘thinking’	relevant	to	(and	encouraging)	both	AIw	and	AIs	despite	
that	 the	 game	 is	 about	 imitation.20	 Since	 it	 has	 given	encouragement	 to	both,	 the	
original	problematic	created	by	Turing	is	thus	multiply	suggestive,	and	so	ambiguous	
in	 its	 particular	 implication,	 despite	 that	 it	 is	 constructed	 to	 enable	 definitive	
consideration	 of	 what	 Turing	 considers	 would	 otherwise	 be	 too	 amorphous	 a	
problem.	This	returns	us	to	Turing’s	intent.	Turing	intends	to	find	a	question	that	can	
be	answered	that	can	stand	in	for	an	ordinary	language	approach	to:	can	machines	
think?	 However,	 one	 can	 reasonably	 ask:	 1)	 does	 the	 form	 of	 the	 imitation	 game	
argument	as	constructed	by	Turing	actually	provide	grounds	for	concluding	that	the	
game	can	be	played	effectively	by	a	digital	computer?	2)	is	the	new	question	actually	
an	appropriate	substitute	for:	can	machines	think?	Exploring	the	former	highlights	the	
tensions	in	Turing’s	position,	which	have	contemporary	significance,	whilst	identifying	
the	latter	provides	an	entry	point	to	Searle’s	approach.		
	
Playing	the	imitation	game,	substitution	as	seduction			
			
The	question:	does	the	form	of	the	imitation	game	argument	as	constructed	by	Turing	
actually	provide	grounds	for	concluding	that	the	game	can	be	played	effectively	by	a	
digital	computer?	creates	multiple	grounds	for	dispute.	The	original	 imitation	game																																																									
20	This	 impression	is	also	created	by	Turing’s	reply	to	the	‘solipsist’	 implications	of	the	argument	for	
consciousness	where	he	states	that	a	sonnet	writing	machine	capable	of	demonstrating	opinion	would	
be	unlikely	to	be	described	as	merely	‘signalling’	(see	Searle	on	the	fallacy	here).	Note:	it	has	also	been	
pointed	out	that	the	9	objections	mainly	rely	on	emphasising	the	lack	of	evidence	to	refute	Turing’s	
position	i.e.	absence	of	proof	is	not	proof	of	absence.	However,	such	arguments	for	the	negative	have	
the	general	property	as	argumentation	structures	that	they	contain	no	evidence	for	the	argument,	and	
as	reductio	ad	absurdum	this	allows	any	non-evidential	claim	to	hold	(particularly	those	for	which	no	
evidence	seems	likely	to	be	ever	forthcoming).	It	is	arguable	how	far	this	actually	applies	to	AI.	
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requires	an	A	and	B	as	x	and	y	to	either	seek	to	fool	or	aid	the	interrogator.	This	is	an	
open-ended	strategic	problem	of	context,	even	though	it	is	stated	as	two	roles	with	a	
master	 directive	 for	 each	 role	 (in	 addition	 to	 the	 role	 of	 C).	 There	 is	 a	 significant	
difference	between	a	codified	response	to	a	specific	question	within	this	remit	and	
the	strategic	narrative	that	emerges	to	express	that	remit.	A	fixed	rule	approach	must,	
therefore,	solve	the	problem	of	strategic	conversation	 rather	than	merely	syntactic	
and	 semantic	 consistency	 of	 an	 individual	 response.	 The	 terms	 of	 the	 game	 thus	
conceal	the	problems	of	complex	improvisation	and	the	naturalistic	feel	that	such	a	
conversation	must	convey.	Turing	does	not	resolve	these	problems,	since	his	actual	
examples	 (quoted	 previously)	 focus	 on	 individual	 or	 single	 responses	 rather	 than	
strings	or	pathways	of	interactive	dialogue.21	His	first	example	(hair)	seems	to	reduce	
questions	 and	 answers	 to	 a	 simple	 problem	 of	 logic	 where	 a	 game	 is	 deductive	
elimination	(e.g.	x	is	not	B	because	of	answer	z).	His	second	example	(the	sonnet)	is	
simply	a	form	of	evasion.	However,	the	former	example	as	human	conversation	could	
quickly	 become	 confounded	 by	 non	 sequitur,	 confusion	 and	 ambiguity	 as	
characteristics	of	the	conversation,	and	so	a	deductive	approach	as	coding	would	find	
this	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	cope	with.	Coding	responses	that	sought	to	rectify	the	
problem	 by	 putting	 the	 conversation	 back	 on	 track	 would	 immediately	 strike	 an	
interrogator	 as	 non-naturalistic,	 creating	 suspicion	 likely	 leading	 to	 failure	 in	 the	
seamless	substitution	(machine	for	man)	aspect	of	the	imitation	game.	The	very	name	
of	 the	 game	 trades	 on	 a	 conflation	 of	 two	 different	 purposes:	 imitation	 qua	
man/woman	 for	 any	 player	 (implicit	 in	 the	 different	 role	 remits	 of	 A	 and	 B)	 and	
substitution	of	machine	in	one	role.	In	the	case	of	the	second	example	(the	sonnet),	if	
codified	responses	to	such	questions	are	all	in	the	form	of	evasions,	rather	than	either	
demonstrated	ability	or	qualitative	opinion,	then	there	is	another	cumulative	effect	of	
suspicion.	The	interrogator	will	become	suspicious	as	to	what	kind	of	entity	they	are	
dealing	with.	This	is	a	double	hermeneutic	problem	once	the	Turing	test	becomes	a	
matter	of	public	knowledge	(as	it	would	over	the	rest	of	the	century).			
Both	 examples	 highlight	 that	 an	 interrogator	 is	 an	 interlocutor	 within	 a	
dialogical	open	process.	As	such,	it	is	not	clearly	established	that	the	Turing	test	can	
be	passed	based	on	the	basic	foundations	of	technology	as	stated,	and	extrapolated	
from,	by	 Turing:	 a	 discrete-if-universal	machine.	Multiplying	discrete	 functions	 is	 a	
confusion	of	what	universal	implies,	since	it	indicates	universality	is	merely	additive.	
This	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 continues	 to	 dog	 contemporary	 AI	 technology.	 There	 is	 a	
difference	between	operative	efficacy	 in	a	 task	and	navigating	seamlessly	between	
tasks	 (AI	 researchers	 typically	 refer	 to	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 specific	 and	 general	
intelligence	 problematics).	 For	 our	 purposes,	 there	 is	 something	 analogous	 in	
conversation	since	it	is	the	way	one	adapts	and	contributes	that	signals	constructive	
appropriateness.	At	root	there	is	another	problem	of	emergence	here	(to	add	to	the	
issue	of	spectrum	intelligence).					
Moreover,	careful	consideration	of	the	examples	and	the	problem	of	dialogue	
indicate	that	what	it	means	to	pass	the	test	is	also	disputable.	The	purpose	of	the	test	
is	clearly	stated,	but	the	specific	design	of	the	test	and	the	context	in	which	it	is	applied	
are	not	fully	developed	by	Turing.	As	such,	he	does	not	address	the	issue	that	coding	
could	be	developed	in	accordance	with	how	the	test	is	specifically	operationalised.	So,																																																									
21	Though	one	might	refer	to	his	objection	based	on	consciousness	point	here.	
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‘passing’	the	test	can	become	a	matter	of	passing	a	test	in	the	context	of	gaming	the	
game	or	substituting	some	other	version	of	the	test.	This	became	a	matter	of	some	
controversy	in	June	2014	when	the	‘chatbot’	program	Eugene	Goostman	persuaded	
10	of	 30	 judges	 (33%)	 at	 a	 Royal	 Society	 organized	AI	 event	 that	 it	 could	 pass	 for	
human.22	The	2014	Royal	Society	event	was	not	recognizably	Turing’s	imitation	game.	
It	was	a	5	minute	keyboard	based	interaction	between	judges	and	the	program,	where	
the	judges	were	asked	whether	they	could	distinguish	a	program	from	a	human.		The	
event	set	a	threshold	of	success	at	persuasion	of	30%	of	judges.	The	Eugene	program	
simulates	a	13-year-old	Ukrainian	boy,	and	so	the	form	of	the	program	creates	limited	
expectations	 for	 the	 range	 of	 interactions	 and	 builds	 in	 anticipations	 of	 errors,	
evasions	and	inconsistencies	that	then	become	‘idiosyncrasies’.	This	is	quite	different	
than	 simulating	 a	 fully	 operational	 adult	meeting	 core	 norms	within	 any	 given	 yet	
open-ended	 socio-cultural	 milieu	 over	 an	 extended	 duration.	 Passing	 the	 Royal	
Society	event	test	thus	quickly	became	a	matter	of	what	kind	of	test	was	passed	based	
on	what	kind	of	coding.	The	best-known	AI	event	is	the	annual	Loebner	competition,	
which	 has	 offered	 a	 cash	 prize	 of	 $100,000	 since	 1991	 for	 a	 program	 fully	
indistinguishable	from	a	human,	and	a	smaller	prize	for	the	best	entry	of	the	year.	As	
of	2016,	no	program	had	won	the	$100,000.				
However,	dispute	regarding	test	design	is	not	itself	a	decisive	refutation	that	a	
digital	computer	can	be	programmed	to	successfully	play	the	imitation	game.	What	
one	can	state	is	that	Turing	does	not	establish	that	it	is	possible.	However,	again	it	is	
important	 not	 to	 traduce	 Turing.	His	 specific	 development	of	 the	 form	of	 a	 digital	
computer	 is	 as	 a	 discrete-state	 machine	 with	 definite	 input-output	 relations.	
However,	in	discussing	objections	he	considers	the	possibility	of	a	‘learning’	machine	
capable	 of	 ‘induction’	 (not	 abduction/retroduction).	 He	 makes	 no	 attempt	 to	
articulate	how	this	might	be	constructed,	nor	is	it	central	to	his	argument,	but	he	does	
at	least	introduce	the	possibility.	Chatbots	and	related	‘AI’	technologies	are	constantly	
developing	and	the	use	of	big	data	analytics	drawing	on	a	huge	pool	of	conversation	
and	communication	creates	 the	possibility	 that	an	effective	digital	 computer	 could	
draw	 on	 blocks	 of	 similar	 responses	 from	 similar	 situations,	 and	 so	 simulate	
naturalistic	language	with	a	level	of	apparent	sophistication	that	an	interlocutor	would	
deem	appropriate.	This	possibility	 falls	under	 the	remit	of	 ‘learning’	programs.	The	
implication	 is	 that	 it	 is,	as	Turing	claimed,	only	 (though	perhaps	mainly)	processing	
capacity	and	speed,	and	 time	 (time	 for	AI	 to	 ‘learn’,	 time	 for	coding	 to	develop	as	
problems	 are	 identified	 and	 solved)	 that	 stand	 between	 the	 digital	 computer	 and	
successful	playing	of	the	game.	There	is	also	a	convergent	technology	argument	here,	
since	 imminent	 developments	 such	 as	 quantum	 computing	 offer	 the	 possibility	 of	
significant	 leaps	 in	processing	capacity	and	speed	(if	so	then	Moore’s	 law	does	not	
confront	 the	 impending	 limit	 entailed	 by	 non-quantum	 processing).	 The	 inference	
drawn	 would	 then	 be	 that	 chatbots	 such	 as	 Apple’s	 Siri	 and	 Amazon’s	 Alexa	 will	
become	 or	 have	 descendants	 that	 are	 increasingly	 naturalistic	 in	 their	 interactions	
(pushing	 past	 momentary	 embarrassments,	 such	 as	 those	 created	 by	 Microsoft’s	
Tay).23																																																												
22	See	BBC	coverage:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27762088					
23	Recent	research	published	in	Science	indicates	that	though	it	may	be	possible	to	make	chatbots	more	
polite,	since	learning	is	based	on	big	datasets	in	which	meaning	is	embedded,	AI	faces	a	deeper	problem	
of	absorbing	pre-existing	human	socio-cultural	bias	based	on	the	way	language	is	associated	and	used:	
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Clearly,	technological	change	is	altering	what	it	means	to	talk	about	‘AI’	and	
the	 terminology	 across	 the	 field	 is	 likewise	 changing	 as	 new	 fields	 propagate.	 AI	
research	 has	 moved	 on	 from	 simple	 discrete-state	 input-output	 concepts	 and	
approaches,	 and	 Bayesian	 or	 Boolean	 solutions.	 There	 is	 a	 heavy	 emphasis	 on	
quantifying	‘uncertainty’.	There	is	also	increasing	use	of	the	language	of	‘complexity’	
to	describe	AI.24	The	Stanford	report,	for	example,	makes	much	of	these	as	the	cutting	
edge	of	the	field.25	At	first	sight,	there	would	thus	seem	to	still	be	some	credence	in	
the	way	Turing’s	approach	seems	to	have	cleared	the	ground	for	a	dominant	AIw	focus	
on	function.	AI	will	be	what	AI	researchers	do	and	in	so	far	as	AI	become	capable	of	
passing	 the	Turing	 test,	what	AI	 researchers	do	will	ultimately	 (if	 later	 than	Turing	
anticipated)	fulfil	the	expectation	that	‘one	will	be	able	to	speak	of	machines	thinking	
without	expecting	to	be	contradicted’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	442).	However,	consider	how	
this	 claim	 is	 positioned.	 Both	 ‘thinking’	 and	 ‘learning’	 are	 deeply	 ambiguous	 and	
contestable	terms	when	applied	to	an	AI,	and	arguably	the	shift	from	discrete-state	as	
a	definite	input-output	relation	to	more	contingent	approaches	is	a	change	of	scope	
not	of	form.	
One	 might	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 the	 extension	 of	 terms	 under	 ambiguity	 that	
underpins	some	of	the	difference	in	how	argument	is	positioned	and	claims	are	now	
made.	For	example,	one	of	the	major	innovations	in	current	AI	is	‘deep	learning’	using	
artificial	neural	networks	(ANN).	ANN	are	described	as	software	simulations	of	neuron	
connectivity	 (Economist,	 2016).26	 That	 is,	 they	 are	multiply	 layered	 sets	 of	 ‘neural	
units’	creating	multiple	dividing	points	for	direction,	as	processing,	from	some	given	
input	to	some	output.	The	sophistication	of	the	system	or	its	capacity	for	difference	
and	range	is	based	on	the	number	of	layers,	the	‘depth’,	in	the	structure.	What	the	
system	is	directed	to	can	then	(currently)	be	set	up	in	three	ways	expressed	as	learning	
modes:	 1)	 supervised	 learning	 (a	 network	 system	 is	 fed	 an	 example	 dataset	 that	
exemplifies	 what	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 achieve,	 such	 as	 spam	 identification)	 2)	
unsupervised	learning	(a	network	system	is	fed	an	example	dataset	and	is	set	up	to	
look	 for	 patterns,	 clusters	 anomalies	 in	 the	 data,	 which	 then	 become	 the	 specific																																																									
‘We	show	that	standard	machine	learning	can	acquire	stereotyped	biases	from	textual	data	that	reflect	
everyday	 human	 culture...	 stereotypes	 and	 empirical	 associations,	 has	 long	 been	 known	 in	 corpus	
linguistics…	 	 since	 we	 performed	 our	 experiments	 on	 off-the-shelf	 machine	 learning	 components	
[primarily	the	Global	Vectors	for	Word	Representation	(GloVe)	word	embedding],	we	show	that	cultural	
stereotypes	 propagate	 to	 artificial	 intelligence	 (AI)	 technologies	 in	 widespread	 use.’	 Caliskan	 et	 al	
(2017:	p.	183).	This	is	in	addition	to	related	problems	that	commercial	chatbots	are	often	designed	with	
female	 voices,	 which	 are	 considered,	 non-threatening	 and	 submissive	 (drawing	 on	 and	 creating	
gendered	effects).			
24	In	realist	critique	there	are	clear	ontological	problems	involved:	the	shift	from	simple	deterministic	
input-output	to	modelled/programmed	defined	ranges	of	reaction	and	response	produces	a	problem	
of	probabilistic	framing	that	does	not	transcend	determinism	but	merely	resituates	it	(and	a	language	
of	 quantified	 uncertainty	 cannot	 disguise	 this).	 Note	 also	 that	 complexity	 theory	 claims	 as	 a	 key	
component	‘emergence’.	One	might	categorise	some	complexity	theory	as	AIs	work,	but	there	is	also	a	
tendency	to	use	emergence	loosely	to	focus	on	functional	efficacy	as	repeated	outcome	achievement	
(rather	than	differentiate	events	and	consider	emergence	as	a	property	of	an	entity	as	a	source	of	causal	
power	distinct	from	outcome).	Inter	alia,	complexity	sits	awkwardly	with	spectrum	claims.					
25	Revolutions	have	been	heralded	before,	see	Churchland	and	Churchland	(1990)	
26	 So,	 there	 is	 an	 immediate	 issue	here	 since	 simulation	of	neurons	 is	 a	 claim	 that	 the	operation	 is	
neuron-like,	though	once	one	starts	to	consider	the	actual	structure	of	the	technology	rather	than	the	
claim	 made	 then	 it	 becomes	 clear	 the	 statement	 of	 neuron-like	 owes	 more	 to	 metaphor	 than	
substantive	evidence.		
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output	 within	 a	 broader	 data-defined	 remit,	 such	 as	 fraud	 patterns	 in	 insurance	
claims)	3)	reinforcement	learning	(a	network	system	is	fed	an	example	dataset	and	
refines	 its	 behaviour	 based	 on	 rewards	 as	 feedback	 to	 achieve	 goals,	 creating	 a	
simulation	of	‘do	what	works	best	in	situation	x’,	such	as	playing	and	winning	a	video	
game).27	In	all	three	cases	the	key	innovation	is	that	the	network	progressively	refines	
the	weighting	between	connections,	and	it	thus	fine-tunes	the	network	system.	The	
more	data	the	system	has	to	work	with,	the	more	layers	to	the	neural	network	and	
the	more	simulations	run,	then	the	more	effective	the	system	becomes,	over	time	and	
in	real	time,	subject	to	processing	capacity	and	speed.					
Since	2012	there	have	been	significant	advances	in	ANN	AI.28	However,	if	one	
decodes	the	language	of	learning	being	used	then	it	is	about	refining	a	system.	This	is	
termed	training	and/or	learning	because	ANN	does	not	depend	on	precise	coding	of	
every	possible	situation	as	an	‘if	y	then	x’.	Rather	than	definite	input-output	relations	
one	now	has	defined	relations	of	inputs	and	outputs,	but	still	a	focused	system	that	is	
all	about	achievement	of	some	goal.	Clearly	ANN	has	scope	to	be	more	flexible	than	
the	 coding	 that	 Turing	was	working	with,	 but	 as	 yet	 a	 barrier	 still	 exists	 based	 on	
transferring	 between	 different	 specific	 functions	 (the	 problem	 of	 ‘general	
intelligence’),	since	this	still	requires	reconstruction	of	the	system.	Moreover,	systems	
still	require	specification	through	function	in	order	to	exist	at	all.	A	human,	arguably,	
is	not	reducible	to	specification	qua	function	(and	so	as	a	being	is	unspecified	in	this	
sense).	There	is	no	‘I	am	function’	for	the	human,	as	a	restriction	on	construction	and	
existence.	Moreover,	if	one	places	the	potential	of	ANN	in	the	context	of	the	Turing	
test,	and	considers	the	communication	milieu	then	arguably	any	‘learning’	AI	is	using	
language,	it	is	not	in	the	ordinary	language	sense,	a	language	user.			
The	fundamental	question	is	can	one	be	intelligent	or	learning	or	a	language	
user	 if	 one	 lacks	 consciousness,	 self-consciousness	 or	 awareness?	 One	 can	 simply	
loosen	the	use	of	the	terms	by	extension,	and	trade	on	ambiguity.	However,	 if	one	
lacks	consciousness	etc	then	in	what	sense	is	it	semantically	appropriate	to	use	terms	
that	attribute	understanding	to	an	entity?	At	root,	intelligence	requires	one	to	make	
intelligible,	and	so	forth.	In	the	case	of	chatbots,	they	can	be	more	or	less	naturalistic	
and	so	more	or	 less	effective	in	simulating	authenticity,	but	this	does	not	in	and	of	
itself	change	the	status	of	the	chatbot	in	terms	of	the	imitation	game,	unless	functional	
efficacy	confers	the	status	of	thinking	or	unless	something	additional	has	occurred	that	
is	not	yet	demonstrated	about	the	entity	 in	question.	This	returns	us	to	the	central	
problem	 created	 by	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 the	 imitation	 game.	 Turing	 replaces	 the	
question,	can	a	machine	think,	with	the	question:	can	a	machine	play	the	imitation	
game?	As	we	have	noted,	this	only	makes	sense	if	we	assume	the	latter	bears	on	the	
																																																								
27	 The	Economist	 article	notes	 that	DeepMind’s	AlphaGo	 system	uses	 two	deep	neural	networks,	 a	
reinforcement	learning	network	and	a	random	sampling	network.	One	throws	up	possible	moves	that	
the	other	then	play	tests.	It	was	this	that	enabled	the	system’s	much	publicised	achievements	in	the	
game	Go.	
28	In	general,	‘deep	learning’	programs	are	capable	of	‘recognition’	(objects,	audio,	speech	etc)	and	have	
multiple	applications;	inter	alia	one	might	also	note	algorithmic	game	theory	creates	decision	making	
matrices	where	rules	can	be	adjusted.	
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former.	However,	the	replacement	invokes	the	second	question	we	identified	in	the	
lead	in	to	this	section:	is	the	new	question	actually	an	appropriate	substitute?29	
Based	 on	 the	 argument	 so	 far	 Turing’s	 replacement	 seems	 like	 a	 shift	 that	
encourages	problematic	foci,	rather	than	a	warrantable	substitution.	An	‘answerable’	
question	can	be	inappropriate	or	at	least	insufficient,	and	this	can	become	increasingly	
evident	 as	 time	 passes	 and	 subsequent	 work	 is	 undertaken.	 So,	 one	might	 argue	
Turing	 creates	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 that	 ingrains	 a	 bifurcation	 between	 focus	 on	
function	(with	at	least	implicit	problematic	consequences	for	entity	characteristics	-	
intelligence,	thinking,	learning)	and	reactions	that	draw	attention	back	to	entities	that	
reconsider	 the	 nature	 of	 intelligence,	 thinking	 and	 learning	 as	 well	 as	 further	
characteristics.			
At	this	point	one	might	be	tempted	to	say:	so	what?	If	AIw	is	a	focus	on	function	
and	 AI	 research	 cumulatively	 develops	 to	 achieve	 specific	 functions	 then	 does	 it	
matter	whether	an	AI	really	thinks,	has	intelligence	and	learns?	In	a	trivial	sense	the	
answer	may	well	be	no.	However,	in	a	more	basic	sense	whether	an	AI	really	thinks	
etc	 really	 matters	 because	 of	 the	 many	 social	 consequences	 of	 AI.	 Failure	 to	
appropriately	conceive	of	the	nature	of	entities	is	to	invite	obfuscation	and	this	in	turn	
is	indicative	of	a	basic	ontological	omission.	How	we	refer	to	AI	acts	back	on	how	we	
conceive	of	the	human	and	so	has	possible	consequences	for	how	we	value,	preserve,	
develop	and	nurture	the	human.	This	relation	is	not	a	matter	of	effective	cause,	but	
of	discursive	context,	raising	issues	regarding	causation	based	on	distinctions	between	
exercising	a	power	and	being	an	operative	source	of	influence.	Moreover,	the	focus	
on	 function	 without	 due	 consideration	 to	 entities	 creates	 a	 kind	 of	 residual	
behaviouristic	presumption.	Thereafter,	an	AI	 functionalism	can	serve	to	 legitimate	
TH,	in	so	far	as	functionalism	lends	itself	to	the	inference	that	an	AI	is	the	measure	of	
the	human	(allowing	a	move	where	nothing	significant	about	the	human	is	lost	in	a	TH	
or	posthuman	future	because	of	tacit	equivalence	assumed	now,	which	in	turn	leads	
to	complacency	regarding	what	happens	now	as	 it	affects	any	possible	 future).	AIw	
thus	 feeds	 TH.	 Concomitantly,	 the	 focus	 on	 function	 can	 marginalise	 proper	
consideration	 of	 what	 is	 also	 lost	 for	 humans	 through	 what	 is	 done	 on	 behalf	 of	
humans.	I	will	say	more	about	this	in	terms	of	relational	goods.		
As	a	last	point	here	consider	the	inter	alia	effect	of	the	Turing	imitation	game.	
Function	 is	 highly	 seductive.	 It	 can	 become	 its	 own	 self-confirming	 technocratic	
discourse	 following	AIw	 rationales,	and,	as	already	noted,	 it	 can	 inspire	disciplinary	
responses	along	AIs	lines.	It	is,	for	example,	easy	to	become	seduced	by	the	minutiae	
of	the	imitation	game.	We	have	provided	more	than	3	pages	of	analysis	regarding	how	
and	if	the	game	can	be	played.	This	could	easily	be	extended	(and	has	been:	Crockett,	
1994;	Millican	 and	Clarke,	 1996;	 Saygin	 et	 al,	 2000).30	As	 James	Moor	notes	 in	his	
introduction	to	the	special	issue	of	Mind	celebrating	50	years	since	the	publication	of	
Turing’s	paper,	‘This	article	is	arguably	the	most	influential	and	widely	read	article	in	
the	philosophy	of	artificial	intelligence.	Indeed,	most	of	the	debate	in	the	philosophy	
																																																								
29	Note,	Turing	puts	aside	the	question	what	would	a	machine	that	could	think	think?	This	also	turns	
out	 to	be	 important	once	one	 shifts	 to	 Searle’s	 critique	 (see	 subsequent	 argument	 and	also	Pinsky	
1951).		
30	Note	longer	works	regarding	Turing	also	include	analysis	of	Searle	since	the	latter	follows	from	the	
former.	
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of	artificial	intelligence	over	the	last	fifty	years	concerns	issues	that	were	raised	and	
discussed	by	Turing’	(Moor,	2000:	p.	461).			
This	brings	us	to	Searle.	Searle	is	not	the	first	to	respond	to	Turing	(see	Pinsky,	
1951;	Mays,	1952),	but	he	sets	in	motion	many	of	the	points	I	have	already	raised	and	
provides	 the	 archetypal	 AIs	 argument	 that	 contests	 the	 consequences	 of	 Turing’s	
formulation:	its	seductive	qualities,	which	invite	a	focus	on	function,	a	concern	with	
minutiae	and	a	problematic	slide	from	equivalence	to	conflation,	where	the	human	
mind	is	equivalent	to	a	computer	so	the	human	mind	is	a	computer.31	In	responding	
in	the	negative	regarding	this	latter	position,	Searle	introduces	a	particular	emphasis	
to	 the	 framework	 where	 simulation	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 substitute	 question:	 can	
machines	think?	It	is	based	on	this	emphasis	that	interstitial	problems	(based	on	the	
foci	of	AIw	and	AIs	and	the	emphasis	of	the	latter)	can	be	identified.	Responding	to	the	
issue	 of	 simulation	 creates	 further	 grounds	 for	 argument	 and	 these	 have	 resisted	
agreement,	despite	the	significant	plausibility	of	Searle’s	case.			
	
Searle:	AIs,	semantic	versus	syntax	and	the	failure	of	successful	simulation			
	
To	be	clear,	Turing	is	not	Searle’s	immediate	target	in	his	‘Minds,	brains	and	programs’	
(1980).	 His	 point	 of	 departure	 is	 the	 mutual	 influence	 that	 the	 prominence	 of	
computerisation	has	had	for	and	with	cognitive	science,	and	hence	problems	in	the	
philosophy	 of	 mind.	 He	 distinguishes	 the	 use	 of	 computers	 to	 study	 the	 mind	 (a	
functional	 tool)	 from	 the	 claim	 that	 a	 mind	 and	 a	 computer	 are	 the	 same	 (they	
function	in	the	same	way).	The	former	is	Searle’s	version	of	AIw	and	the	latter	AIs.		His	
use	is	thus	narrower	than	I	have	previously	set	out	for	these	terms.	A	focus	on	function	
is	not	really	his	primary	concern,	at	least	in	the	sense	of	the	subsequent	focus	on,	and	
consequences	of,	how	AI	develops	to	function	in	the	world.	He	is	rather	concerned	
with	 the	 problem	 of	 functionalism,	 and	 initially	 with	 behaviourism.	 His	 aim	 is	 to	
demonstrate	that	the	mind	and	a	computer,	as	currently	conceived,	are	not	the	same	
(and	so	one	cannot	claim	that	how	a	computer	works	explains	how	a	mind	works).	In	
so	 doing	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 Turing	 attempts	 to	 put	 aside	 the	 problem	 of	
consciousness,	and	yet	the	imitation	game	as	a	simulation	remains	subject	to	critique.	
The	 point	 of	 the	 critique	 is	 to	 establish	 that	 a	 computer	 and	 a	 human	 mind	 are	
different,	 even	 if	 the	 superficial	 consequences	 can	 be	 the	 same:	 a	 successful	
simulation	remains	merely	a	successful	simulation,	unless	one	can	demonstrate	that	
the	inner	workings	of	both	mind	and	computer	(again	standing	in	for	AI)	have	similar	
characteristics.	His	 focus	 is	 thus	on	 the	entity	 rather	 than	merely	 the	outcome.	He	
clearly	sets	out	a	first	subcategory	AIs	position,	and	the	argument	can	be	located	as	a	
primary	refutation	of	the	substitute	question	that	simulation	is	supposed	to	offer.	
	 Searle’s	 critique	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 thought	 experiment.	 The	 thought	
experiment	reverses	Turing’s	game.	Searle	creates	a	human	simulation	of	a	computer,	
rather	than	introduces	a	computer	as	a	simulation	into	a	game	to	identify	who	is	(what	
gender	of)	human.	The	critique	is	now	commonly	referred	to	as	the	‘Chinese	room’	
thought	 experiment.	 	 A	 person	 is	 placed	 in	 a	 locked	 room,	 which	 contains	 some																																																									
31	Pre	Searle,	perhaps	the	most	notable	are	Block	and	Gunderson.	Note,	Block	provides	a	prototype	
Chinese	 Room	 argument	 in	 ‘Troubles	 with	 functionalism,’	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Chinese	
Gym/Nation	argument	(citizens	are	given	instructions	to	phone	another	in	a	network	creating	a	pattern	
of	calling	that	replicates	neuron’s	firing:	is	the	collective	China	conscious	and	could	it	be	in	pain?’)					
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material	written	 in	Chinese.	The	person	 in	 the	 room	knows	no	Chinese	and	so	 the	
Chinese	characters	are	meaningless	to	her.	A	second	set	of	materials	is	transmitted	to	
the	person.	This	set	consists	of	further	Chinese	and	a	set	of	rules	in	her	native	language	
(English)	that	enable	identification	of	the	symbols	based	on	shape.32	This	enables	the	
person	to	 ‘correlate’	the	formal	symbols	 in	the	first	and	second	sets.	A	third	set	of	
Chinese	materials	is	then	transmitted	with	further	instructions	in	her	native	language.	
This	set	of	instructions	enables	her	to	correlate	symbols	in	the	third	batch	with	the	
first	 two	 batches.	 Significantly,	 the	 new	 instructions	 are	 rules	 that	 dictate	 which	
symbols	to	return	to	outside	the	room	in	relation	to	the	first	two	sets.	The	person	in	
the	room	is	unaware	that	the	first	two	sets	of	Chinese	are	designated	as	stories/scripts	
and	the	third,	questions,	and	that	the	third	set	of	instructions	is	essentially	a	program	
facilitating	answers	to	the	questions.		
Searle’s	point	is	that	in	so	far	as	the	instructions	(program)	are	adequately	set	
out	and	followed,	the	person	is	able	to	transmit	‘answers’	that	are	adequate,	and	so	
indistinguishable	 from	 a	 native	 (literate)	 speaker	 of	 Chinese.	However,	 the	 person	
knows	no	Chinese	and	has	merely	engaged	 in	 formal	symbol	manipulation	without	
comprehension	of	meaning.	The	program	is	syntax	but	for	the	operator	there	is	no	
semantic	content.	They	have	acted	in	accordance	with	a	program	along	input-output	
lines,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 interpretation-as-translation	 of	 the	 symbols.	 This	 is	 quite	
different	 than	what	 a	 human	 does	when	 communicating.	 To	 emphasise	 this	 point	
Searle	introduces	an	additional	feature	to	the	experiment.	The	person	is	also	required	
to	 answer	 a	 parallel	 set	 of	 questions	 in	 English.	 As	 a	 native	 speaker,	 the	 person’s	
answers	to	these	questions	are	also	adequate,	and	so	the	appropriateness	of	answers	
to	 both	 the	 English	 and	 Chinese	 questions	 are	 indistinguishable,	 despite	 that	 the	
former	are	communicative-interpretive	acts	with	semantic	significance	for	the	person	
and	the	latter	are	not.	Searle,	therefore,	concludes	that	successful	simulation	is	not	a	
test	(is	insufficient)	to	establish	that	a	mind	and	a	computer	are	the	same.	Successful	
simulation	is	still	a	failure	in	strong	AI	terms	(there	is	a	confusion	of	simulation	and	
duplication	--	meaning	is	not	duplicated	for	the	operator).	
	 As	 with	 Turing’s	 imitation	 game,	 Searle’s	 Chinese	 room	 has	 invited	 many	
critiques	and	responses	(e.g.	Anderson,	1987;	Harnad,	1987;	Hauser,	1997;	Preston	
and	Bishop,	2002).	This	began	with	more	than	25	brief	responses	and	Searle’s	replies	
that	appear	with	the	original	essay	in	the	journal	Behavioural	and	Brain	Sciences.	In	
tone	they	range	from	the	hostile	to	the	sympathetic.	More	significantly,	the	replies	
are	for-all-intents-and-purposes	varieties	of	the	standard	objections	Searle	sets	out	
(following	the	format	dictated	by	Turing)	as	part	of	the	original	essay:	the	systems,	
robot,	brain	simulator,	other	minds,	many	mansions	and	combination	replies.	Not	all	
are	 relevant	 here.	What	 is	 relevant	 is	 that	 this	 sets	 a	 pattern.	 Searle	 and	 others’	
responses	 are	 unable	 to	 decisively	 refute	 the	 objections	 to	 the	 satisfaction	 of	
interlocutors.	This	is	despite	that	the	more	considered	replies	concede	that	there	is	a	
case	to	be	answered.	The	problem	is	that	it	remains	possible	to	place	a	question	mark	
																																																								
32	Note,	the	Bushou	structure	of	Chinese	symbols	is	conducive	to	shape	matching	for	parts	of	Chinese	
characters	and	some	English-Chinese	dictionaries	use	this	format	to	expedite	finding	the	pinyin,	though	
it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	this	relates	to	the	Chinese	room	experiment	in	the	original	argument,	which	
is	purely	about	formal	symbol	matching	rather	than	identifying	meaning	based	on	decomposition	of	
characters	in	a	mainly	bi-syllabic	language	of	the	type	Chinese	is.	
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against	the	terms	of	Searle’s	critique,	and	so	offer	alternative	terms	or	merely	consider	
the	argument	incomplete.		
For	example,	similar	to	Turing’s	game	the	Chinese	room	provokes	a	‘can	the	
game	 be	 played?’	 response	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘can	 the	 experiment	 be	 constructed?’.	
However,	there	are	limits	to	this	line	of	reasoning,	since	the	argumentation	scheme	
status	 of	 Searle’s	 Chinese	 room	 differs	 from	 Turing’s	 game.	 Clearly,	 both	 require	
consistency,	and	both	involve	a	claim	that	follows	from	the	initial	construct:	in	Turing’s	
case	the	claim	is	that	implications	(or	reasonable	inferences)	follow	regarding	thinking	
from	function,	in	Searle’s	case	that	they	do	not.	However,	it	is	intrinsic	to	Turing’s	case	
that	a	version	of	the	game	be	actually	constructible,	whereas	it	is	sufficient	for	Searle’s	
case	that	 the	thought	experiment	be	conceivable.	Turing’s	case	hinges	on	practical	
(albeit	 future)	 demonstration,	whereas	 Searle’s	 need	only	 demonstrate	 in	 thought	
that	such	a	practical	demonstration	is	insufficient	for	inferences	to	be	made	regarding	
thought	for	AI.	However,	it	is	here	that	dispute	arises,	and	the	terms	of	this	dispute	
underpin	continuation	of	versions	of	all	the	standard	objections	to	Searle’s	argument.	
Specifically,	what	does	Searle’s	argument	assume,	what	does	it	reasonably	allow	one	
to	infer,	and	what	are	the	limits	of	any	substantive	case?		
	
Dispute	perpetuated	through	the	limits	of	argument:	designing	a	successful	failure	
and	the	context	of	‘insufficient’		
	
Many	replies	argue	that	Searle	has	taken	the	position	of	a	part	in	a	whole	and	then	
made	 inferences	 from	 the	 part.	 The	 Chinese	 room	 argument	 is	 in	 this	 sense	
‘reductive’,	 though	the	problem	 is	variously	referred	to	as	a	 level	of	analysis	error,	
category	mistake	etc.	Searle	introduces	a	human	operator	that	carries	information	(an	
operating	unit	or	processor	qua	program),	but	this	is	simply	one	component.	To	take	
the	‘point	of	view’	of	a	component	is	to	miss	the	possibility	that	it	is	not	operatively	
significant	 in	 isolation,	and	so	the	characteristics	denied	on	the	basis	of	a	part	may	
exist	based	on	a	relational	whole.	From	this	point	of	view,	the	formal	structure	of	the	
Chinese	room	argument	described	in	terms	of	a	component	is	designed	by	Searle	to	
be	a	successful	failure.	Searle	is	setting	up	a	construct	that	must	fail	because	of	the	
position	from	which	inferences	are	made,	rather	than	he	genuinely	establishes	that	
an	AI	could	not	pass	an	appropriately	conceived	and	described	test.	Thus,	in	terms	of	
the	 systems	 critique,	 he	 has	 taken	 a	 sub-system	 position,	 which	 cannot	 actually	
address	its	target.	This	critique	then	becomes	part	of	iterations	of	other	objections:	
semantics	may	be	a	property	of	the	system,	analogous	to	a	mind,	and	 intelligence,	
awareness	etc	may	be	conceivable	as	potentials	of	complex	artificial	systems,	where	
these	systems	may	emulate	neural	patterns,	and	if	embodied	(a	robot),	and	so	tactile-
as-experiential	 in	 the	 world,	 could	 have	 or	 develop	 to	 be	 what	 Searle	 claims	 the	
Chinese	room	establishes	that	AI	cannot	demonstrate	(intelligence,	internal	semantic	
significance,	awareness	etc.).	
For	 Searle,	 all	 these	 replies	 miss	 the	 point.	 The	 room	 orients	 on	 a	 core	
difference:	 formal	 symbol	manipulation	 in	 contrast	 to	 comprehension	of	meaning.	
There	are	different	 terms	 involved	and	 these	are	not	 synonymous	 (understanding,	
meaning,	intelligence,	awareness,	consciousness),	and	so	more	might	be	said	about	
each,	 but	 this	 is	 irrelevant	 or	 superfluous	 to	 the	 initial	 insight	 of	 the	 thought	
experiment.	 Expanding	 from	 a	 sub-system	 to	 any	 defined	 actual	 system,	 and	 so	
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altering	the	level	of	analysis,	does	not	in-and-of-itself	change	the	status	of	the	claims.	
The	entity	either	has	or	does	not	have	the	capacity	to	comprehend	meaning	(and	by	
extension	has	other	characteristics	associated	with	the	human).	For	Searle,	critics	do	
not	 establish	 that	 it	 has	 the	 capacity.	 So,	 simulation	 remains	 merely	 successful	
simulation.	However,	 this	 clearly	 does	 not	 deter	 critics,	 since	 they	 are	 still	 able	 to	
reverse	Searle’s	point,	partly	because	of	the	limits	of	what	can	be	claimed	from	the	
Chinese	room	argument.		
The	 argument	 only	 establishes	 that	 successful	 simulation	 is	 insufficient	 to	
establish	that	a	computer	and	a	mind	are	the	same,	and	that	an	AI	can	have	significant	
mind-like	 characteristics.	 It	 does	 not	 establish	 impossibility.	 As	 such,	 responses	
continue	 to	 develop	 along	 three	 mutually	 related	 lines:	 (1)	 what	 intelligence,	
understanding	etc	are	is	more	ambiguous,	contingent,	contestable,	and	nuanced	than	
Searle	 allows;	 (2)	 Searle	 is	 missing	 something	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 actual	 equivalence	
between	how	a	mind	and	computer	operate	(properly	described	the/a	technology	can	
be	what	Searle	states	it	is	not,	and	so	can	a	mind);	(3)	Searle	is	addressing	a	problem	
that	technology	is	progressively	overcoming	(and	so	potential	is	being	missed	by	the	
way	 Searle	 mis-specifies	 the	 problem	 in	 parts).	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 Searle’s	
intervention	has	ultimately	become	part	of	 the	continuing	discourse	 initially	set	by	
Turing	 --	 not	 least	 because	 it	 reprises	 and	 so	 iterates	 the	 problem	 that	 dispute	
regarding	a	test	design	is	not	itself	a	decisive	refutation	that	a	digital	computer	can	be	
programmed	to	successfully	play	an	imitation	game,	from	which	inferences	can	then	
be	made.	Whilst	one	can	argue	Turing	does	not	establish	that	it	is	possible	to	construct	
a	digital	computer	for	such	a	game,	it	has	remained	the	case	that	perhaps	one	could	
be	constructed.	Searle,	does	more	than	any	other	to	establish	that	simulation	is	not	
sufficient	 for	 an	 inference	 to	 equivalent	 characteristics	 of	 an	 entity.	 However,	 his	
claims	have	remained	subject	to	dispute,	since	the	primary	power	of	the	argument	is	
based	on	insufficiency.				
To	be	clear,	Searle	does	not	claim	a	future	AI	could	never	have	characteristics	
we	associate	with	the	human	mind	(he	acknowledges	this	to	be	an	empirical	issue).	
His	argument	is	that	proponents	of	AI	have	established	nothing	beyond	formal	symbol	
manipulation,	and	so	claims	in	cognitive	science	that	the	mind	is	like	a	computer	(and	
a	computer	is	like	a	mind)	should	not	have	foundational	status.	If	read	in	this	narrow	
sense,	it	seems	curious	then	that	the	majority	of	replies	seek	to	question	the	basis	of	
what	 is,	 in	 this	 context,	 meant	 only	 to	 question	 what	 seems	 an	 unthinking	
presumption	about	the	nature	of	thought.	The	problem	is	that	Searle	does	more	than	
question	in	this	way	(his	context	 is	broader).	As	Searle	notes,	the	broader	 issue	for	
philosophy	of	mind	is	why	would	one	assert	that	a	mind	and	a	computer	are	the	same,	
and	 why	 would	 one	 persist	 and	 pursue	 lines	 of	 reasoning	 that	 first	 require	 this	
assertion.	The	context,	seemingly,	is	a	basic	fallacy	of	reasoning	that	has	then	dogged	
cognitive	science,	which	in	turn	affects	the	AI	problematic:	initially	in	the	form	of	an	
overt	behaviourism	and	eventually	in	a	residual	form	(Searle,	1980,	1985,	2002,	2010).	
For	Searle,	this	in	turn	is	indicative	of	an	odd	form	of	dualism,	where	mind	is	separable	
both	empirically	 and	 conceptually	 from	 the	brain	 (a	 computer	 and	a	mind	are	 the	
same,	and	so	the	brain	is	either	irrelevant	in	itself	or	equivalent	in	its	functioning	to	a	
computer).	The	implication	 is	that	cognitive	science	seems	to	be	mis-specifying	the	
problem	of	constitution	and	causal	powers	of	an	organic	brain	in	terms	of	the	problem	
of	mind	(opting	for	a	mind	is	like	a	computer	approach,	which	is	syntactic	in	structure,	
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and	fails	to	account	for	meaning	as	content	in	relation	to	its	biochemistry),	whilst	AI	is	
benefiting	from	the	mis-specification	through	a	unifying	functionalism	(what	both	AI	
and	a	mind	are	is	defined	by	what	they	do).	
Clearly,	for	this	broader	set	of	issues	to	make	sense	one	needs	to	go	beyond	
the	Chinese	room	argument.	One	needs	a	philosophy	of	mind	argument.	For	Searle,	
this	has	involved	an	explicit	turn	to	ontology,	and	in	terms	of	the	broader	aspects	of	
the	development	of	the	human	and	of	the	problem	of	AI,	a	social	ontology.	The	link	
here	 is	 not	 immediately	 obvious.	 However,	 consider	 that	 Searle’s	 argument	 is	
underpinned	by	his	general	approach	to	intentionality.	Intentionality	is	the	capacity	
for	‘aboutness’	of	the	mind;	its	capacity	to	create	mental	states	in	regard	of	or	with	
reference	to	states	of	affairs	in	the	world	(and	this	is	more	than	just	‘I	intend	to	do’,	
including	also	belief,	desire	etc.).	For	Searle,	it	is	manifestly	the	case	that	in	humans	
this	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 human	 brain	 as	 organic	 or	 biological	 phenomena.	
Awareness,	consciousness,	self-consciousness,	understanding,	meaning,	 intelligence	
and	 so	 forth	 are	 likewise	 biologically	 caused	 (or	 as	 Searle	 more	 often	 states,	
constituted)	and	involve	causal	powers	in	the	world.		
For	Searle,	a	key	feature	of	humans	is	their	sociality.	Intentionality	allows	for	
collective	intentionality,	defined	as	the	capacity	for	intentionality	to	be	we-directed:	
this	‘we’	remains	individual,	and	does	not	necessarily	require	joint	thinking,	but	always	
involves	a	referencing	to	what	others	can	in	combination	enable	or	do	that	affects	the	
capacity	for	what	one	is	also	doing,	through	the	assumption	that	others	are	following	
similar	 mutual	 points	 of	 reference.	 This	 mutuality	 is	 grounded	 in	 or	 becomes	 an	
organizing	 feature	 of	 the	 social	world	 built	 up	 from	 ‘status	 function	 declarations’,	
typically	 in	 the	 form	of	 ‘X	counts	as	Y	 in	C’.	The	declaration	 imposes	a	 function	on	
objects	and	people	 that	are	not	 simply	performable	by	virtue	of	physical	 structure	
(they	 are	 products	 of	 the	 ascription	 or	 recognition	 of	 status	 --	 a	 wall	 becomes	 a	
property	boundary).	From	this	general	form,	complex	institutions	(essentially	grouped	
rules)	develop,	and	this	is	the	basis	of	a	constructed	socially	reality	within	which	one	
can	refer	to	 institutional	facts	(John	is	a	Professor	at	Berkeley),	where	the	whole	 is	
heavily	dependent	on	 linguistic	representation	and	hence	meaning.	Humans	are	by	
virtue	of	biology	capable	of	meaning,	and	it	is	through	various	related	capacities	that	
the	very	possibility	of	AI	arises	through	technology	within	societies	that	also	depends	
on	meaning.	Searle,	of	course,	may	refer	to	function	(status	function),	but	there	is	only	
a	superficial	lexical	similarity	between	his	concerns	and	those	of	the	functionalism	he	
opposes.	 For	 example,	 status	 functions	 are	 about	 the	meaningful	 pursuit	 of	 living	
socially	not	the	determined	efficacy	of	completing	a	task	(though	this	may	be	a	goal	
of	living	socially).	Concomitantly,	to	emphasise	functionality	rather	than	causal	power	
or	constitution	is	to	mis-specify	being	in	terms	of	doing,	and	this	is	a	basic	problem	of	
how	both	the	human	and	society	are	conceived.					
The	point	to	make	here	is	that	there	is	continuity	and	coherence	between	the	
different	aspects	of	Searle’s	general	argument,	and	that	the	combination	makes	sense	
of	his	opposition	to	functionalism.	For	Searle,	developing	his	position	on	philosophy	
of	mind	and	social	ontology	(beginning	first	with	his	work	on	speech	acts)	has	been	a	
life’s	work,	and	from	his	point	of	view	that	work	augments	his	specific	claims	set	out	
in	the	Chinese	room	argument.	For	critics,	however,	it	indicates	that	his	claims	in	the	
Chinese	room	argument	do	not	stand-alone.	They	require	commitments	that	are	not	
part	of	the	Chinese	room	argument.	Searle	essentially	creates	the	challenge:	prove	
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that	an	AI	understands	what	it	is	doing.	The	default	intrinsic	to	Searle’s	position	is	that	
we	just	know	that	it	does	not	understand	(based	on	comprehension	of	meaning).	We	
know	this	because	we	designed/programmed	the	entity,	and	we	know	this	is	different	
than	 what	 we	 know	 about	 ourselves.	 The	 case	 of	 AI	 seems	 to	 be,	 therefore,	 an	
either/or	issue	that	hinges	on	evidence	in	a	way	that	is	different	than	how	we	attribute	
in	 other	 cases.	 Those	 other	 cases	 are	 shared	 aspects	 of	 the	 human	 (degrees	 of	
awareness	etc)	one	might	attribute	to	animals,	what	we	attribute	to	other	humans	
(since	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	assume	they	are	 like	us),	and	what	we	might	attribute	 to	
aliens	(since	they	may	be	like	us).	Each	of	these	is	not	designed	by	us	and	so	does	not	
require	some	 ‘forgetting’,	which	 the	AI	case,	 from	Searle’s	point	of	view,	seems	to	
require.		
However,	though	hinging	on	evidence	Searle’s	case	is	grounded	on	theory;	that	
is,	Searle’s	cumulatively	developed	broader	position.	Moreover,	plausible	as	the	focus	
on	evidence	seems,	it	raises	the	problem	of	what	exactly	would	satisfy	Searle	in	the	
form	of	proof.	It	cannot	be	mere	function	and	so	cannot	be	a	black	box	behaviourist	
proof,	but	this	too	seems	to	disallow	as	much	as	it	disproves	a	functionalist	response.	
Since	the	test	will	be	of	something	artificial,	 to	critics,	at	 the	extreme,	and	despite	
caveats,	 Searle	 seems	 to	 have	 (at	 least	 inadvertently)	 disallowed	 any	 practical	
demonstration	 because	 he	 seems	 tacitly	 committed	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 an	 artificial	
entity	is	by	definition	synthetic	and	so	can	only	demonstrate	simulation.	Put	another	
way,	 though	Searle	 claims	 that	AI	 confuses	 simulation	with	duplication	 (simulating	
understanding	is	not	actual	understanding,	so	is	not	duplicating	it)	the	reverse	is	that	
he	 resists	 the	 possibility	 that	 anything	 other	 than	 a	 brain	 can	 duplicate,	 and	 thus	
realise	 given	 states	 (and	 yet	 a	 synthetic	 heart	 is	 not	 a	 simulation-only).	 Searle	
inadvertently	over-writes	fallibility	and	future	contingency	via	current	‘forgetting’.		
So,	 for	 critics,	 Searle	 has	 done	more	 than	 he	 set	 out	 to	 do.	 This	 is	 a	 basic	
vulnerability	that	critics	have	developed	to	different	degrees	and	with	more	or	 less	
sympathy	for	the	original	argument:	his	position	takes	a	plausible	intuition	regarding	
difference,	 but	 requires	 its	 own	 assertions	 regarding	 what	 might	 be	 the	 basis	 of	
understanding;	 it	 thus	 involves	 a	 tacit	 certainty,	 which	 critics	 can	 draw	 further	
inferences	 from	 regarding	 prejudice	 or	 ‘magic	 in	 the	 meat’	 ‘chauvinism’	 --	 the	
significant	status	accorded	to	the	brain	as	the	seat	of	given	characteristics	confuses	
significance	with	special	or	unique	or	spiritual	or	mysterious…33	One	can	read	Searle	
as	hinging	the	difference	on	the	nature	of	response:	a	human	responds	to	meaning	
because	of	meaning	(and	so	meaningfully),	an	AI	responds	to	meaning	because	of	form	
(and	so	mechanistically).	The	two	are	causally	different.	Meaning	is	not	the	reason-as-
cause	for	the	response	of	the	AI	(so	there	is	no	semantic	just	syntax).	However,	for	
critics,	if	there	is	causation	then	cause	motivates	content,	so,	subject	to	redescription,	
one	can	begin	to	claim	that	meaning	is	produced	(semantics	can	be	derived	from	the	
causal	 process	 of	 which	 syntax	 is	 a	 part).	 The	 question	 then	 becomes,	 how	 it	 is	
produced	 and	what	 produces	 it,	 re-opening	 up	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 and	 argument	 that	
trade	on	complex	system	interconnectivity	for	both	mind	and	AI,	contesting	the	way	
semantic,	intelligence	etc.	are	defined	and	used,	speculating	on	the	basis	of	possible	
ways	to	duplicate	(rather	than	merely	simulate),	reconstructing	an	argument	that	a																																																									
33	Magic	in	the	meat,	derives	from	the	science	fiction	writer	Terry	Bisson	who	resituates	the	context	as	
a	conversation	between	two	entities	who	have	never	come	across	organic	minds	before.		
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robot	can	duplicate	aboutness	through	sensory	capacity	(as	experience)	and	so	derive	
(a	functionalist	founded)	meaning	capacity	and	so	forth.													
Clearly,	for	Searle	this	again	all	misses	the	point.	As	far	as	we	know	there	is	no	
equivalent	 mental	 state	 in	 an	 AI	 as-is.	 Subtle	 violence	 seems	 to	 be	 perpetrated	
regarding	our	common	understanding	of	understanding	(though	this	too	becomes	a	
counter-argument	--	since	common	sense	plays	no	role	in	much	of	science	and	can,	as	
convention,	impede	proper	understanding	or	investigation).		However,	the	point	here	
is	not	whether	one	endorses	or	concurs	with	each	argument,	but	rather	that	the	form	
of	 Searle’s	 case	 continues	 to	 provoke	 responses	 along	 these	 lines.	 Insufficiency,	
assumptions,	 consequences	 for	 argumentation,	 and	 then	 dependence	 on	 context	
material,	provide	 the	grounds	 for	 reasoned	 if	not	necessarily	always	 reasonable	or	
sympathetic	responses.			
And	so	debate	continues	to	evolve	in	and	around	the	Chinese	room	argument	
based	on	multiple	lines	of	development	that	use	it	as	a	point	of	departure,	trade	on	
the	limits	of	what	it	can	claim,	and	situate	this	to	various	concerns	of	the	critic.34	The	
argument	has	unified	critics	as	a	point	of	convergence	for	disparate	argument	rather	
than	agreement:	eliminative	materialists	working	in	neuroscience	and	philosophy	of	
mind	 (e.g.	 Churchland	 and	 Churchland,	 1990),	 professional	 philosophers	 able	 to	
deconstruct	 the	case	and	parse	 its	many	 implications	as	they	pertain	to	semantics,	
functionalism,	 alternative	 views	 of	 intentionality	 etc	 (e.g.	 Boden	 1988;	 Chalmers,	
1992;	 Pinker	 1998;	 Fodor,	 1992;	 Dennett,	 2013),	 and	 futurists	 with	 agendas	 that	
entangle	 AI	 and	 TH	 (Kurtzweil,	 2000).35	 As	 a	 point	 of	 convergence,	 then,	 Searle’s	
Chinese	 room	 has	 not	 created	 consensus,	 but	 rather	 a	 focal	 point	 around	 which	
disagreement	coalesces.		
Again,	this	is	ostensibly	odd	if	one	takes	the	Chinese	room	argument	at	face	
value:	a	thought	experiment	that	places	a	question	mark	against	equivalence	of	AI	and	
that	 reminds	 cognitive	 science	 that	 the	 brain	 is	 significant	 for	 the																																																									
34	It	is	ironic	perhaps	that	I	am	pointing	this	out	as	an	exercise	in	doing	the	same.		
35	Pinker,	for	example,	stands	on	the	opposite	side	to	Searle	as	committed	to	a	variety	of	functionalist	
information	 processing	 (‘computation’	 and	 ‘program’)	mind-AI	 approach:	 ‘The	mind	 is	 a	 system	 of	
organs	of	computation,	designed	by	natural	selection	to	solve	the	kinds	of	problems	our	ancestors	faced	
in	their	foraging	way	of	life,	in	particular,	understanding	and	out	manoeuvring	objects,	animals,	plants,	
and	other	people.	The	summary	can	be	unpacked	into	several	claims.	The	mind	is	what	the	brain	does;	
specifically,	 the	 brain	 processes	 information,	 and	 thinking	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 computation.	 The	 mind	 is	
organized	into	modules	or	mental	organs,	each	with	a	specialized	design	that	makes	it	an	expert	in	one	
arena	of	 interaction	with	the	world…	On	this	view,	psychology	is	engineering	in	reverse.	 In	forward-
engineering,	one	designs	a	machine	to	do	something;	in	reverse-engineering,	one	figures	out	what	a	
machine	was	designed	to	do…	The	computational	 theory	of	mind	 is	 indispensable	 in	addressing	the	
questions	we	 long	 to	 answer…	 the	 content	of	brain	 activity	 lies	 in	 the	patterns	of	 connections	 and	
patterns	of	activity	among	the	neurons.	Minute	differences	in	the	details	of	the	connections	may	cause	
similar-looking	brain	patches	to	implement	very	different	programs.	Only	when	the	program	is	run	does	
the	 coherence	 become	 evident…	 The	 computational	 theory	 of	 mind	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as	 the	
despised	‘computer	metaphor.’	The	claim	is	not	that	the	brain	is	like	commercially	available	computers.	
Rather,	 the	claim	 is	 that	brains	and	computers	embody	 intelligence	 for	 some	of	 the	same	reasons.’	
(Pinker,	 1998:	pp.	 21,	 25-6).	 Pinker	positions	 Searle’s	 Chinese	 room	as	 an	 argument	 that	 trades	on	
common	sense	but	not	science,	makes	ambiguous	the	link	to	biochemistry	of	the	brain	for	mind	(in	a	
way	that	information	processing	does	not),	whilst	claiming	that	the	biochemistry	of	the	brain	is	core	to	
consciousness,	intentionality,	awareness	etc.	which	he	never	properly	defines	or	explains	(Pinker,	1997	
pp:	93-96).	Note,	though	Searle’s	Chinese	room	has	become	a	key	issue	and	so	point	of	departure,	it	is	
not	central	to	all	works	that	explore	it.	Fodor	(1992)	is	equally	concerned	with	Churchland	on	meaning.					
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experienced/observed	characteristics	of	the	human	(it	has	causal	powers	by	virtue	of	
its	 constitution).	 However,	 it	 is	 less	 odd	when	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 strength	 of	
Searle’s	argument	is	also	its	weakness:	it	has	a	tight	argument	for	a	clear	distinction,	
seems	 to	 demand	 an	 empirical	 response,	 extends	 to	 expose	 the	 assumptions	 that	
have	prevented	an	answer	he	deems	plausible	(the	mind	is	a	computer,	though	this	
too	is	ambiguous	if	one	means	only	computational),	and	is	situated	to	an	alternative	
theorization	that	grounds	an	answer	(his	ontology	of	human	intentionality	etc.).	The	
weakness	 is	 that	 the	 combination	 provides	 for	multiple	 lines	 of	 reasonable	 reply.	
Concomitantly,	Turing’s	game	and	Searle’s	room	are	by	far	the	most	cited	works	on	AI	
(partly	because	use	exceeds	a	focus	on	AI	only).	In	April	2017,	a	Google	scholar	search	
on	 ‘Mind,	 Brains	 and	 Programs’	 returned	 over	 59,000	 results,	 and	 ‘Computing,	
Machinery	and	Intelligence’	more	than	176,000.	
Ironically,	 Searle’s	 attempt	 to	 simplify	 and	 focus	 debate	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 core	
difference,	 which	 implicitly	 contests	 the	 problem	 set	 in	 motion	 by	 Turing	 of	 a	
seductive	tendency	to	proliferate	debate	based	on	the	exploration	of	minutiae,	has	
produced	a	maelstrom	of	minutiae.	This	has	had	some	positive	consequences,	since	it	
has	fostered	an	AIs	focus	on	entities,	pushing	functionalism	to	become	more	carefully	
considered	regarding	how	and	what	produces	function.	Inter	alia,	it	has	contributed	
to	formal	repudiations	of	behaviourism	(and,	less	constructively,	for	a	tendency	for	it	
to	become	a	term	of	abuse	in	discourse	whose	reversal	is	a	pejorative	reference	to	
‘mentalism’).	However,	the	positioning	and	influence	of	the	argument	has	had	further	
consequences.	
		
AIw	and	AIs:	resolutely	unresolved	lines	of	inquiry		
	
We	began	this	essay	by	differentiating	AIw	and	AIs	based	on	focus.	AIw	involves	a	focus	
on	function	that	tends	to	set	aside	entity	status.	AIs	involves	a	focus	on	entities	that	
decomposes	into	two	subcategories:	a	focus	on	the	equivalence	between	human	and	
AI,	with	a	focus	on	significance	for	the	human,	primarily	within	philosophy	of	mind,	
and	a	mirroring	focus	on	the	status,	characteristics	and	potential	of	AI	entities.	Searle’s	
Chinese	room	may	be	about	AI	but	it	is	intended	to	demonstrate	something	about	the	
human.	It	is	in	this	sense	first	subcategory	AIs.	However,	as	we	have	set	out,	Searle’s	
argument	 has	 not	 created	 agreement.	 It	 has	 become	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 for	
reasonable	disagreement.	If	one	works	backwards	through	all	the	material	we	have	
considered	 so	 far	 in	 this	 paper	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 disagreement	 is	 not	 mere	
formlessness.	The	grounds	of	disagreement	are	concerned	with	function.	Moreover,	
in	so	far	as	responses	to	Turing	and	to	Searle	have	contested	functionality,	much	of	
the	debate	has	concerned	ways	to	preserve	functionalist	ways	of	thinking	(no	irony	
intended)	 about	 the	 problem	 of	 AI	 and	 of	 the	 human	 (mind).	 Much	 of	 the	
development	of	argument	has	been	neo-functionalist,	and	that	which	has	not	been	
has	been	about	the	limits	of	critique	(sufficiency	of	argument	via	games,	tests,	thought	
experiments)	of	what	is	also	functionalist	by	focus.	Despite	Searle’s	intervention,	there	
has	been	no	immanent	critique	that	has	decisively	shifted	the	terms	of	debate.	Though	
it	is	not	false	to	say	there	has	been	an	ontological	turn	in	philosophy	of	science	and	
social	science	in	some	ways	and	to	some	degree,	one	cannot	reasonably	claim	that	
explicit	ontology	or	social	ontology	are	standard	points	of	departure	for	the	problem	
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of	 AI.	On	 the	 contrary,	 that	 Searle’s	 position	 is	 situated	 to	 an	 ontology	 and	 social	
ontology	is	used	against	his	Chinese	room	argument.		
	 There	is,	of	course,	nothing	intrinsically	illegitimate	in	critique	that	questions	
the	relations	in	a	situated	argument.	However,	there	is	a	danger	that	one	conflates	
critique	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	 way	 an	 argument	 is	 situated	 with	 a	 basic	 general	
problem	that	an	argument	is	situated	at	all.	This	is	particularly	important	in	locating	
Searle’s	 work.	 All	 argument-as-claim	 ultimately	 involves	 an	 ontology,	 and	 so	 the	
alternative	to	Searle’s	argument	should	not	be	a	refusal	of	ontology	but	an	explicitly	
addressed	ontological	argument.	Read	appropriately	Searle’s	Chinese	room	argument	
is	not	merely	augmented	by	his	ontology,	but	specifically	rooted	in	ontological	issues.	
It	 begs	 questions	 of	 functionalism	 regarding	 the	 constitution	 of	 entities	 and	 their	
causal	powers.	As	such,	much	of	the	perpetuation	of	functionalism	in	spite	of	Searle’s	
argument	 is	 a	 refusal	 to	 engage	 at	 the	 level	 of	 ontology,	 whilst	 pursuing	 tacit	
ontological	issues.	This	has	had	observable	consequences.36			
Function	has	normalised	as	the	overwhelming	consideration	in	and	for	AI.	Of	
course,	noting	 this	phrasing	can	seem	superficially	 ridiculous.	How	could	AI	not	be	
concerned	 with	 function?	 However,	 the	 nature	 of	 concern	 flows	 from	 what	 is	
considered	and	 in	what	ways.	 Focus	does	not	necessarily	 create	 clarity,	but	 rather	
potentially	adverse	normativity.	The	very	existence	of	AIw	is	a	deferment	of	the	status	
of	entities	that	presupposes	the	ineluctability	of	AI	as	technology.	There	is	an	‘AI	 is	
coming	 and	we	must	 cope’	 that	 decentres	 the	 seat	 of	 decision	making,	 as	 though	
human	 choices	were	 not	 dictating	whether	 and	what	 kinds	 of	 AI	 develop	 and	 are	
adopted.	 ‘Cope’	becomes	 ‘let’s	 get	on	with	 it’	 as	 though	 the	basis	of	 function	was	
settled.	This	has	a	‘meanwhile’	or	inter	alia	context.	AIs	may	not	have	settled	anything,	
but	the	basis	of	non-settlement	invites	a	focus	on	function,	and	typically	presumes	a	
functionalist	 frame	of	 reference.	So,	dominant	aspects	of	 the	concept	of	AIs	are	at	
least	 associated	 with	 the	 general	 pervasiveness	 of	 AIw.	 As	 such,	 the	 bifurcation	
between	these	two	that	I	previously	referred	to	is	not	without	mutuality,	and	this	is	
important,	 since	 it	 is	 because	 of	 mutuality	 that	 some	 issues	 or	 foci	 or	 ways	 of	
conceiving	are	marginalised,	inadequately	developed	or	become	interstitial.		
As	 already	 noted,	 if	 functionalism	 dominates	 then	 the	 problem	 of	 being	
becomes	a	problematic	of	doing,	which	in	turn	can	become	a	problem	of	efficiency.	
The	human	‘doing’,	as	tasks,	becomes	a	taskmaster	mastering	our	sense	of	what	the	
human	 is.	 This	 is	 sociological	 rather	 than	 purely	 philosophical	 (involving	 the	
positioning	and	relative	power	of	 ideas,	rather	than	just	the	substantive	content	of	
those	ideas).	A	focus	on	efficiency,	for	example,	may	absorb	the	social	context	that	
dominates	and	expresses	 (represses)	 intrinsic	aspects	of	 the	human.	Efficiency	 is	a	
technical	 term	 but	 also	 a	 shaped	 value;	 it	 is	 referenced	 to	 the	 socio-economic																																																									
36	Though	Searle	is	not	concerned	with	the	problem	of	AIw,	as	we	have	set	it	out,	his	own	AIs	argument	
refuting	a	functionalist	(behaviourist)	variety	of	strong	AI,	with	reference	to	philosophy	of	mind,	does	
provide	an	argument	for	how	a	split	 in	focus	might	arise	because	both	sides	of	the	split	can	share	a	
concern	with	function.	This	then	can	operate	ideologically	and	so	be	influential	far	beyond	any	issue	of	
‘one	thing	directly	causes	another’.	It	is	not	difficult	to	understand	how	a	program-centred	view	of	mind	
in	cognitive	science	can	operate	to	decentre	a	concern	with	what	is	specifically	human.	It	is	not	difficult	
to	understand	how	this	way	of	thinking	about	thinking	(and	other	characteristics)	can	affect	processes	
of	 change.	 Clearly,	 one	 can	 recognize	 basic	 entanglements	 here	with	 TH,	 specific	 and	 general.	 The	
various	exchanges	between	Searle	and	the	TH	futurist	Kurzweil	are	the	most	obvious	manifestation	of	
this.	
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conditioning	of	the	system	in	which	values	inhere	(principles	of	capitalism	that	affect	
what	humans	do	in	the	name	of	efficiency).		
It	may	well	be	the	case	that	ethics	are	a	profoundly	important	part	of	AIs,	but	
they	are	not	central,	controlling	or	most	important	as	a	source	of	consequence	in	the	
world	because	of	AIs.	Furthermore,	if	the	dominant	AIw	discourse	starts	from	‘cope’,	
then	the	power	of	ethical	discourse	to	shape	the	social	consequences	of	AI	(and	also	
then	TH)	is	subverted.	It	is	also	obfuscated	in	so	far	as	functionalism	may	inform	the	
concepts	of	entities	to	which	ethical	analysis	is	applied.	Moreover,	consider	the	way	
language	use	has	changed	as	and	for	AI.	Despite	critique	of	the	extension	of	meaning	
regarding	 thinking,	 learning	 etc,	 meaning	 has	 still	 been	 extended,	 and	 so	 has	
ultimately	been	appropriated.	Turing	claims	and	Searle	concedes	that	a	future	AI	may	
be	thinking,	intelligent	and	so	forth,	subject	to	how	these	are	conceived	and	subject	to	
some	empirical	test	or	demonstration.	In	the	meantime,	the	language	of	what	has	not	
yet	been	incontestably	achieved	has	been	colonised	and	so	normalised.37	A	future	that	
may	never	be	is	already	here	in	terms	of	the	language	we	use	regarding	what	artificial	
entities	do	but	which	ultimately	expresses	an	 is	 (a	be):	 ‘intelligence’	 is	an	accepted	
everyday	associative	term	qua	AI,	according	to	everyday	referential	communicative	
acts	between	humans	AI	 do	 ‘learn’...	 Socialisation	 through	 language	use	 is	 already	
occurring	around	function.	The	world	we	live	in	is	thus	drawing	us	into	a	future	we	are	
constructing	 as	 ineluctable	 via	 language	 that	 contributes	 to	 a	 ‘we	 must	 cope’	
mentality.						
	
What	follows	from	function:		
Interstitial	problems	and	ontology	as	critique	
	
The	first	point	to	make	here	is	that	ontology	itself	has	become	interstitial.	It	is	not	the	
typical	point	of	departure	for	AIs	and,	by	virtue	of	its	focus,	is	not	a	primary	concern	
for	AIw.	Noting	this	is	by	no	means	to	denigrate	the	sophistication	in	its	own	terms	of	
work	 that	 has	 been	 done.	 Nor	 is	 it	 to	 invite	 unreasonable	 expectations	 of	 what	
ontology	 can	 achieve.	 Rather	 it	 is	 to	 note	 that	 all	 arguments-as-claims	 involve	 an	
ontology,	and	clarity	here	affords	clarity	to	other	and	subsequent	issues.	This	is	not	to	
suggest	philosophy	is	unclear,	or	at	least	sets	out	to	clarify,	since	analytical	philosophy	
in	particular	is	concerned	with	precision	and	clarity.	However,	such	clarity	is	epistemic	
and	need	not	be	ontologically	posed	in	general	or	realistically	referenced	in	particular.	
Arguably,	the	familiar	functionalism	articulated	via	theory	is	imposed	on	reality	rather	
than	derived	from	it.		
Moreover,	clarity	is	situated	to	focus.	This,	essentially,	is	what	this	paper	has	
argued	 by	 exploring	 the	 development	 and	 consequences	 of	 focus.	 Much	 of	 the	
seduction	of	Turing’s	imitation	game	puts	aside	ontology,	inviting	development	of	the	
game,	whilst	seeming	to	trade	on	a	functionalist	set	of	claims	that	then	become	the	
point	of	dispute	in	terms	of	what	the	game	can	demonstrate	(via	its	substitution	of	
questions).	Ultimately,	functionalism	and	the	equivalence	between	AI	and	the	human	
are	claims	about	being.	As	such,	Searle’s	response	is	an	ontologically	motivated	reply.	
The	Chinese	room	thought	experiment	contests	the	equivalence	of	AI	and	human	in	
order	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 significant	 characteristics	 of	 the	 human	 in	 relation	 to																																																									
37	There	is	a	great	deal	less	talk	of	artificial	stupidity.		
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meaning	 cannot	 be	 demonstrated	 for	 an	 AI,	 and	 yet	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
constitution	of	the	organic	brain	that	creates	causal	power	in	terms	of	mind,	though	
Searle	 is	 wary	 of	 this	 language	 of	 distinction	 between	 brain	 and	 mind	 due	 to	 its	
historical	legacy	and	connotations.								
	 Of	 course,	 many	 ontologically	 oriented	 elaborations	 are	 possible,	 and	 an	
ontology	 is	not	assertion	but	 reasoned	argument	 subject	 to	evidence,	 critique	and	
subsequent	critically	posed	development.38	So,	as	already	noted,	Searle’s	argument	is	
not	immune	from	critique,	but	critique	need	not	be	the	abandonment	of	ontology.	For	
example,	as	Tony	Lawson	notes,	Searle	resists	the	language	of	emergence.	According	
to	 Lawson,	 the	 subject	 matters	 of	 Searle’s	 ontology	 and	 social	 ontology	 seem	 to	
require	a	concept	of	emergence	to	express	properties	for	and	in	entities	and	systems	
(Lawson,	 2016).	 In	 his	 reply	 to	 Lawson	 Searle	 rejects	 this	 claim,	 in	 so	 far	 as	what	
emergence	 actually	 is,	 is	 not	 made	 clear,	 and	 what	 emergence	 explains	 that	
constitution	does	not	is	likewise	unclear	(Searle,	2016).39	However,	Searle’s	argument	
turns	on	the	naming	of	an	entity,	which	has	an	organization,	and	then	the	distinction	
between	what	follows	from	the	organization	in	terms	of	properties,	and	what	is	known	
and	accounted	for	in	terms	of	those	properties.	This	distinction	is	recognizable	from	
early	twentieth	century	emergentist	philosophy,	but	creates	new	problems	in	terms	
of	 the	 distinctions,	 if	 the	 point	 of	 emergence	 is	 first-and-foremost	 to	 express	 the	
properties	that	would	not	occur	without	the	organization,	and	so	the	properties	are	
irreducible	 to	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 decomposed	 parts	 -–	 structural	 integrity	 is	 a	
characteristic	of	a	building,	consciousness	of	the	brain,	and	trust	of	a	community,	in	
so	far	as	appropriately	constituted	and	active/activated.	All	require	the	organization-
as-constitution	 to	 be	manifest	 or	 to	 be	 possible,	 but	 not	 all	 involve	 an	 additional	
property	that	is	unexplained	that	we	deem	additional	since	it	is	so	far	unexplained	(as	
it	does	 in	 the	case	of	 consciousness).40	 It	 is	 this	additional	unexplained	 that	Searle																																																									
38	So,	ontology	may	provide	clarity	but	it	does	not	guarantee	that	matters	are	settled…	It	merely	creates	
an	additional	and	appropriate	context	of	argument	by	recovering	the	traditional	domain	of	metaphysics	
that	much	of	modern	philosophy	eschews.	
39	For	another	constructive	critique	of	Searle	see	Elder-Vass	(2012),	and	for	an	assessment	of	Elder-Vass	
see	Morgan	(2014)		
40	The	point	at	issue	seems	to	be	that	additional	implies	cannot	be	reduced	to,	and	the	measure	of	this	
is	cannot	be	explained	in	terms	of;	however,	the	ontic	characteristic	of	the	organization	is	the	creation	
of	 the	grounds	of	a	property	not	whether	 in	 fact	 the	property	 is	 fully	comprehended	regarding	 the	
organization-as-constitution.	 If	 this	 were	 so	 then	 the	 very	 moment	 we	 had	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	
consciousness	 it	would	 be	 fully	 accounted	 for	 in	 relation	 to	 constitution	 and	 so	would	 cease	 to	 be	
emergent	by	definition,	and	yet	remain	a	property	that	would	not	exist	without	constitution.	The	hinge	
thus	tacitly	seems	to	be	a	difference	of	meaning	and	emphasis	regarding	the	relation	of	known	and	
additional	whilst	the	argument	itself	is	expressed	as	‘fully	accounted	for	by	x	and	therefore	reducible	
to	 x’,	 where	 to	 x	 becomes	 confused	 as	 a	 which	 to	 x?	 the	 parts	 or	 the	 constitution,	 and	 then	 the	
constitution	as	an	x	or	a	new	meta-encompassed	constitution	of	this	original	x	–	brain	is	not	sufficient	
therefore	brain	and	new	x	is	constitution	is	mind…	etc?	In	all	cases	constitution	is	the	named	entity	that	
is	then	a	source	of	the	property,	but	the	property	is	always	describable	as	arising	from	the	constitution.	
Just	 because	one	 knows	and	designs	 a	house	 to	have	 structural	 integrity	does	not	mean	 structural	
integrity	 does	 not	 ‘emerge’	 from	 the	 constitution-as-combination	 (it	 is	 a	 product	 of…).	 One	 can	 of	
course	argue	about	whether	one	wants	to	term	this	emergence	or	simply	state	that	the	constitution	
produces	(where	the	latter	still	does	not	differentiate	consciousness	and	structural	integrity	except	in	
so	 far	 as	 currently	 known	 –	 an	 epistemic	 rather	 than	 ontic	 distinction),	 and	 one	 can	 argue	 about	
whether	one	wants	to	refer	to	consciousness	and	artifacts	as	of	the	same	kind	or	category	of	this	more	
general	 category.	 It	 is	 these	 that	 Searle	 seems	 to	actually	be	 contesting	and	 Lawson	does	not	help	
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associates	 with	 emergence.	 However,	 if	 social	 ontology	 requires	 a	 concept	 of	
emergence,	 it	 is	 not	 quite	 the	 one	 that	 Searle	 is	 rejecting.	 It	 is	 rather	 emergence	
because	of	constitution	-–	a	reference	to	a	range	of	properties	of	properties	in	relation	
to	organization.	What	seems	to	be	at	stake	initially	is	language	use	for	clarity,	but	this	
ultimately	creates	different	ways	of	developing	similar	concerns.						
Lawson’s	social	ontology	overlaps	with	but	is	different	from	Searle’s	approach.	
It	distinguishes	communities	(organized	systems	of	relations	expressed	through	rights	
and	 obligations	 for	 socially	 positioned	 humans)	 and	 artefacts	 (non-human	 though	
socially	 constituted	 and	 specified	 objects)	 as	 emergent	 social	 entities,	 and	 makes	
particular	reference	to	 language	as	an	 important	emergent	system.	One	might	also	
note	 that	 since	 for	 Lawson	 artefacts	 are	 not	 communities,	 AI	 introduces	 a	 further	
potential	 issue	 for	 Lawson’s	 social	 ontology,	 by	 virtue	 of	 what	 an	 AI	 may	 be.	 In	
Lawson’s	 terms	 an	 AI	 could	 be	 an	 artefact	 that	 participates	 in	 language	 using	
communities,	though	whether	one	would	describe	AI	as	an	artefact	would	then	be	at	
issue.		
Lawson’s	 is	a	constructive	critique	of	Searle’s	 social	ontology.41	But	Searle’s	
use	of	AI	 is	also	instructive	here	regarding	the	consequences	of	the	sub-categorical	
split	in	AIs.	In	Chapter	Six	of	Making	the	Social	World	Searle	makes	the	case	that	social	
reality	creates	desire-independent	 reasons	 for	acting.	He	does	so	by	extending	 the	
argument	set	out	in	the	Chinese	room	thought	experiment.	Specifically,	he	wants	to	
contest	that	reasons	to	act	only	arise	if	one	also	has	a	desire	to	so	act	(Hume’s	‘reason	
is	a	slave	of	passion’).	However,	for	Searle,	deontic	powers	transcend	desire	or	purely	
personal	motivation.	 Social	 reality	 creates	 cross-referenced	duties,	 obligations	 and	
requirements.	 In	 simplest	 form,	 promise	 keeping	 demonstrably	 creates	 desire-
independent	 reasons	 for	 action.	 In	 general,	we	use	 institutions	without	destroying	
them	 (extending	 sometimes	 to	 recognizing	 that	 reproducing	 the	 institutions	 is	
necessary	or	important	to	do	--	the	duty	to	vote).	We	routinely	suppress	inclinations	
and	modify	behaviour	in	ways	that	override	‘I	don’t	feel	like	it	right	now’	or	‘I’d	rather	
just	do	x’	(we	go	to	work,	we	respect	property	rights	etc).	In	so	far	as	this	is	so,	deontic	
powers	are	a	feature	of	institutions,	and	the	combination	affects	how	and	about	what	
reasoning	occurs	and,	therefore,	what	we	do.																																																											
himself	 here	 by	 emphasizing	 novelty,	 which	 seems	 to	 imply	 cannot	 be	 or	 is	 not	 known	 (which	 is	
different	but	related	to	cannot	be	predicted	–	the	qualifiers	matter	as	do	matters	a	posteriori).	Acting	
back	upon	creates	a	dispute	in	terms	of	organization	as	constitution	(but	even	here	one	can	argue	that	
a	house	or	artifact	by	virtue	of	 constitution	affects	 the	durability	of	and	environment	within	of	 the	
artifact	–	structural	integrity	is	also	a	constituted	causal	effect	for	decay	if	redescribed,	whilst	material	
cause	remains	a	different	issue…										
41	For	example,	Lawson	states:	 ‘Instead	of	viewing	 individuals	as	materially/practically	positioned	as	
components	of	a	totality,	however,	Searle,	seemingly	proposes	a	more	mentalistic	or	representational	
approach.	 According	 to	 it	 individuals	 rather	 are	 merely	 ‘counted’	 as	 in	 effect	 being	 appropriately	
positioned,	with	associated	positional	powers	or	functions.	I	say	‘in	effect’	because	positions,	positional	
powers/functions,	and	positioning	are	not	Searle’s	language.’	(Lawson,	2016:	p.	370).	For	Lawson,	the	
development	 of	 language	 presupposes	 practices;	 social	 objects	 do	 not	 require	 contradiction	 in	 the	
sense	an	object	becomes	materially	 two	 things,	 rather	 that	 for	 it	 to	be	 social	 involves	a	process	of	
emergence	that	creates	communities	within	which	organisation,	social	positioning	and	use	allows	for	
the	object	to	be	social	(one	object	may	be	many	things,	but	it	is	neither	contradiction	nor	meaningless	
to	refer	to	them	as	social	objects,	and	it	is	insufficient	to	redescribe	the	whole	as	an	object	with	a	status	
function	 -	 a	 computer	may	 be	 a	 component	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 systems	without	 being	more	 than	 one	
computer	or	a	computer	and	not	a	computer).										
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Crucially,	the	deontic	powers	of	social	reality	only	make	sense	if	one	assumes	
‘a	gap’.	That	is,	the	possibility	of	not	fulfilling	an	obligation	or	recognizing	a	right.	This	
is	free	will,	though	this	is	not	a	phrasing	Searle	is	comfortable	with.	Rather,	he	chooses	
to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 constitution	 of	 social	 reality	 presupposes	 the	 possibility	 of	
refusal,	and	so	of	choice.	For	example,	an	obligation	is	not	an	obligation	if	there	is	no	
possibility	of	deciding	 to	 fail	 to	execute.	 It	becomes	merely	stimulus-response,	and	
this	would	be	unrecognizable	as	human	social	reality	(and	the	same	applies	to	promise	
keeping	and	other	variations).	Searle	clarifies	this	point	by	contrasting	human	activity	
with	a	programmed	robot.	The	robot	in	Searle’s	construct	lacks	consciousness	--	 its	
response	is	a	‘determined	mechanical	emission’	(Searle	201:	p.	136).	However,	deontic	
powers	 require	 consciousness	 and	 reflexive	 capacity	 in	 order	 for	 recognition	 of	
institutions	to	affect	choice.	‘I	may	not	feel	like	doing	x	but	will	do	it	anyway…’,	is	quite	
different	than	determination-as-compulsion	in	the	form	expressed	by	the	behaviour	
of	non-conscious	artificial	entities.		
The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 Searle’s	 main	 social	 ontology	 use	 of	 AI	 remains	
contrastive	with	 the	 human,	 following	 the	 insight	 developed	 in	 the	 Chinese	 room	
thought	experiment	regarding	symbol	manipulation.	Searle	relocates	his	critique	of	
functionalism,	 residual	 behaviourism	 and	 cognitive	 science	 in	 order	 to	 support	 his	
argument	for	the	construction	of	social	reality:		
	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 deontic	 power	 makes	 no	 sense	 unless	 you	 presuppose	
consciousness	 and	 the	 gap.	 Once	 you	 regard	 the	 creatures	 as	 like	 the	
computational	models	common	in	cognitive	science,	then,	it	seems	to	me,	you	
cannot	 have	 institutional	 reality	 in	 our	 sense.	 You	 might	 program	 the	
machinery	 to	 resemble	 some	 of	 the	 forms	 of	 institutional	 reality,	 but	 the	
substance	would	be	removed.		(Searle,	2010:	p.	137)	
	
I	by	no	means	wish	to	suggest	the	robot	argument	used	here	is	ill-founded.	Rather	I	
want	to	suggest	that	it	illustrates	ontology	can	be	pursued	in	a	variety	of	ways,	once	
situated	to	or	using	the	problem	of	AI.	Other	elaborations	are	possible.	Consider,	that	
Searle’s	main	focus	on	AI	is	to	emphasise	that	the	brain	matters	for	the	capacities	of	
mind	 we	 are	 familiar	 with.	 As	 such,	 his	 focus	 is	 what	 AI	 does	 not	 demonstrate	
regarding	what	mind	is.	Equally,	however,	one	might	ask	what	would	be	the	causal	
capacities	of	a	conceivable	AI	mind,	since	it	surely	follows	they	need	not	be	the	same	
as	 those	 of	 a	 human,	 if	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 entity	 is	 different.	 This	 is	 second	
subcategory	AIs.		It	is	contrastive	in	a	mirroring	sense.	An	AI	entity	may	have	equivalent	
characteristics	 as	 categorisations	 to	 the	 human	 (intelligence,	 understanding,	
consciousness,	 self-consciousness…	 intentionality),	 but	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 they	will	
have	all	or	similar	characteristics	within	those	categorisations	of	characteristics.	As	will	
become	clear,	this	can	have	additional	important	consequences.			
	
Constitution	and	second	subcategory	AIs	
	
One	 can	 imagine	 that	 differences	 create	 basic	 Nagel	 (1979)	 problems	 of	
phenomenological	divides.42	Consider	that	human	memory	is	not	eidetic	functionality																																																									
42	Phenomenology	concerns	the	world	as	we	are	rather	than	as	it	is;	the	focus	is	experiential.	This	is	a	
different	emphasis	to,	but	not	a	denial	of,	ontology-as-realism.	Phenomenology	may	argue	for	but	does	
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dictated	 by	 processing	 power	 and	 subject	 to	 cumulative	 'error'.	 It	 is	 the	 drawing	
together	of	fragments	according	to	narratives	and	purposes	(projects).	It	is	inherently	
creative	 and	 transitional;	 the	 very	 act	 of	 recalling	 repurposes	 and	 overlays	 in	 and	
through	time.	We	are	used	to	framing	a	problem	of	memory	as	one	of	unreliability	of	
memory	and	witnessing,	but	this	is	a	reductive	sense	of	what	memory	is,	referenced	
to	a	capacity	the	vast	majority	do	not	have	(perfect	recall).	It	tells	us	little	about	the	
actual	 significance	 of	 memory.	 Memory	 is	 active,	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 cannot	 be	
'dispassionate'	 (see	 McGilchrist,	 2009).43	 This	 is	 different	 than	 an	 objectivity-
subjectivity	 dichotomy	or	 a	 reality	 and	 appearance	 problematic	 (see	 Collier,	 2003;	
Rescher,	2011).	Active	memory	 is	a	constituent	 in	the	temporality	of	human	being;	
our	being	develops	as	we	exist	through	time,	and	as	we	reconceive	our	past	and	direct	
it	to	the	future.	
Contrast	 this	 with	 AI	 as	 archetypally	 conceived.	What	 kind	 of	 being	 is	 the	
product	of	eidetic	functionality?	What	is	learning	and	experience	to	an	entity	of	error	
correction?	Moreover,	consider	the	difference	in	the	grounds	of	being	through	time.	
Human	 temporality	 is	 finite;	 not	 only	 does	 it	 have	 an	 expectation	 of	 an	 end,	 it	 is	
experienced	as	an	unsteady	process	of	degeneration	and	bodily	change	in	ourselves	
and	observed	in	others.	Leonard	Cohen	expresses	this	as:		
	
Everybody	has	experienced	 the	defeat	of	 their	 lives.	Nobody	has	a	 life	 that	
worked	out	the	way	they	wanted	it	to.	We	all	begin	as	the	hero	of	our	own	
dramas	in	centre	stage	and	inevitably	life	moves	us	out	of	centre	stage,	defeats	
the	hero,	overturns	the	plot	and	the	strategy,	and	we’re	left	on	the	sidelines	
wondering	why	we	no	longer	have	a	part	-	or	want	a	part	-	in	the	whole	damn	
thing.	Everybody’s	experienced	this,	and	when	it	 is	presented	to	us	sweetly,																																																									
not	entail	 a	 radical	disjuncture	between	 reality	 and	appearance.	Nagel’s	 famous	bat	argument	also	
comments	on	Turing:	‘Consciousness	is	what	makes	the	mind	body	problem	really	intractable…	[and	
reductionist]	 discussions	 of	 the	 problem	 give	 it	 little	 attention	 or	 get	 it	wrong.’	 (1979:	 p.	 165).	 He	
differentiates	 this	 from	 the	 Turing	 machine-IBM	 problem	 which	 are	 ‘successful	 reduction’	 but	 are	
unlikely	to	shed	light	on	the	mind	body	problem	since	‘we	have	at	present	no	conception	of	what	an	
explanation	 of	 the	 physical	 nature	 of	 a	 mental	 phenomenon	 would	 be.’	 (1979:	 p.	 166)	 ‘The	most	
important	and	characteristic	feature	of	conscious	mental	phenomena	is	very	poorly	understood.	Most	
reductionist	theories	do	not	even	try	to	explain	it…	the	fact	that	an	organism	has	conscious	experience	
at	all	means,	basically	that	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	be		that	organism…	fundamentally	an	organism	
has	 conscious	 mental	 states	 if	 and	 only	 if	 there	 is	 something	 that	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 that	 organism	 -	
something	it	is	like	for	the	organism.	We	may	call	this	the	subjective	character	of	experience.	It	is	not	
captured	by	any	of	the	familiar,	recently	devised	reductive	analyses	of	the	mental,	for	all	of	them	are	
logically	 compatible	 with	 its	 absence.	 It	 is	 not	 analyzable	 in	 terms	 of	 any	 explanatory	 system	 of	
functional	 states,	 or	 intentional	 states,	 since	 these	 could	 be	 ascribed	 to	 robots	 or	 automata	 that	
behaved	like	people	though	they	experienced	nothing.’	(1979:	p.	166)	According	to	Nagel,	if	physicalism	
as	reduction	to	material	states	is	to	be	defended	then	phenomenological	features	must	themselves	be	
given	 a	 physical	 account,	 but	 this	 seems	 impossible	 in	 so	 far	 as	 ‘every	 subjective	 phenomenon	 is	
essentially	 connected	 with	 a	 single	 point	 of	 view.’	 (1979:	 p.	 167)	 Nagel’s	 main	 point	 is	 that	
psychophysical	reduction	is	a	move	towards	greater	objectivity	by	removing	species-specific	points	of	
view	toward	the	object	of	investigation,	in	terms	of	general	effects	and	properties	that	are	not	simply	
a	 matter	 of	 human	 senses.	 However,	 experience	 cannot	 follow	 this	 pattern,	 since	 moving	 from	
appearance	to	reality	makes	no	sense	as	a	way	to	conceive	experience	(1979:	p.	174).		
43	We	also	experience	moment-to-moment	incoherencies,	disjunctures,	fragments,	flashes	of	images	
etc	but	we	do	not	experience	these	as	error	we	simply	accept	them	as	part-and-parcel	of	being	and	
from	incongruity	other	expressive	potentials	are	built:	humour,	irony,	inspiration	and	so	forth.		
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the	feeling	moves	from	heart	to	heart	and	we	feel	 less	 isolated	and	we	feel	
part	of	the	great	human	chain,	which	is	really	involved	with	the	recognition	of	
defeat.	(Ellen,	2016)	
	
Brain	states	may	be	bio-chemical	(involving	neurons,	oxytocin	etc),	but	what	would	
sympathy	(recognition	of	another’s	-	typically	-	adverse	situation)	and	empathy	(the	
experienced	 feeling	 for	 another’s	 -	 typically-	 adverse	 situation)	 be	 for	 an	 entity	
without	 the	 biochemistry,	 and	without	 first	 person	 expectation	 and	 experience	 of	
finitude,	degeneration	and	suffering?	Where	would	sentimentality	and	compassion	
come	 from	 and	 how	would	 these	 be	 exhibited?	 How	 and	 in	what	ways	would	 an	
equivalent	AI	socialize	and	be	socialized	vis-à-vis	fellow	feeling?	One	could,	of	course,	
seek	to	code	or	design	for	synthetic	feeling	(but	again	what	can	this	mean?),	and	inter	
alia	design	an	AI	with	a	nervous	system,	and	so	a	system	for	pleasure	and	pain.	One	
might	construct	 this	as	a	component	of	 sensuality,	but	what	would	be	 the	general	
quality	 of	 emotion	 in	 relation	 to	 sensuality	 for	 such	 an	 AI?	 In	 a	 human	 senses,	
sensuality,	experience	and	emotion	are	not	identities,	and	how	one	becomes	another	
is	little	understood	(even	if	it	can	increasingly	be	mechanistically	correlated).	So,	what	
kind	of	emotive	states	if	any	would	an	AI	have	or	could	an	AI	be	given	the	capacity	to	
have?		
		Moreover,	consider	what	may	be	basic	to	difference	in	AI.	I	am	aware	that	I	
have	brain	states,	but	awareness	and	self-consciousness	have	only	limited	access	to	
and	control	over	brain	states	(I	can	calm	myself	but	cannot	negate	stress	creation	--	
though	some	TH	advocates	aspire	to	this).	But	AI	consciousness	seems	to	involve	code-
awareness	of	a	different	order	to	brain	state	awareness.	An	AI	may	possess	eidetic	
functionality,	but	it	may	also	posses	the	capacity	to	(re)write	code.	As	a	being	it	would	
thus	be	potentially	self-altering	and	the	consequences	of	this	for	being	in	the	world	
are	difficult	to	conceive.	Eidetic	functionality	and	fundamental	mutability	of	self	seems	
a	 profound	 clash,	 creating	 a	 conflicted	 constitution	 of	 self	 (an	 inner	 life	 and	
introspection	 that	 confronts	preservation	and	continuity	 challenges	 to	being).	 Self-
cultivation	may	share	a	language	frame	but	not	a	real	meaning	sense	between	human	
and	AI.44	AI	may	be	its	own	project	 in	quite	a	different	sense	than	is	the	case	for	a	
human	(unless,	of	course,	one	aspires	to	TH).		
Consider	also	what	kind	of	experience	of	the	world	would	this	self-cultivating	
being	be	directed	through?	Self-consciousness	and	embodied	first-person	perspective	
are	 basic	 to	 a	 developed	 average	 adult	 human.	 An	 AI	 could	 have	 dissipated	
consciousness	and	multiple	points	of	simultaneous	perspective	and	experience;	even	
if	it	was	(partly	or	some	of	the	time)	embodied.45	And	in	what	sense	could	an	AI	desire?	
It	may	be	the	case	as	Searle	suggests	that	we	have	desire-independent	reasons	for	
acting,	but	humans	want	things	and	this	is	subtly	different	than	having	goals.	Society	
would	 be	 different	 without	 desire,	 since	 many	 aspects	 of	 how	 we	 engage	 with																																																									
44	Inter	alia,	AI	may	be	an	efficient	cause	but	also	may	be	its	own	material	cause;	categorisation	of	cause	
within	a	typology	may	become	blurred.		
45	 It	 could	 also	 have	 quite	 different	 quasi-neurological	 and	 hence	 sensory	 relations	 to	 the	 world,	
following	patterns	found	in	the	animal	kingdom,	though	not	necessarily	these.	Some	species	of	octopus	
(as	cephalopods)	have	approximately	500	million	neurons,	but	more	of	these	are	 in	their	arms	than	
‘brain’	and	experiment	indicates	some	species	have	high	capacity	problem	solving	skills	combined	with	
a	radically	different	sensory	experience	of	the	world	(Godfrey-Smith,	2017)					
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organizations	depend	as	much	on	our	desires	as	they	do	on	our	capacity	to	override	
them	(they	become	the	root	of	aspiration	and	so	are	delayed	or	altered	rather	than	
repressed).	Marketing	would	make	no	sense	without	desire,	and	yet	marketing	is	a	
central	component	 in	real	socio-economic	systems.	One	might	go	further	and	note	
that	aspects	of	the	‘gap’	as	stated	by	Searle	imply	also	the	integration	or	perhaps	more	
accurately	interaction	of	the	individual	and	aspects	of	society	through	deontology	that	
depend	on	the	relation	between	life	projects	of	individuals	and	the	aspects	of	society	
(however	named)	that	exist	as	organized	components.	This	is	not	to	trivialize	human	
projects	as	 simply	products	of	desire	 (by	 suggesting	 they	 lack	 reflexivity,	durability	
etc),	but	rather	to	suggest	desire	may	be	something	different	or	absent	for	an	AI.					
Desire	in	general	is	expressive	in	a	way	that	having	a	goal	only	need	not	be.	It	
is	a	bodily	 relation	of	 thought	 (see	Damasio,	1994).	The	body	of	an	AI	as	a	seat	of	
thought	 could	 be	 quite	 different	 here	 and	 one	 might	 extend	 this	 thought	 about	
thought	and	the	body	to	many	other	differences.	Though	the	purpose	of	sleep	remains	
a	matter	of	dispute,	recent	research	indicates	one	of	the	processes	that	occurs	during	
sleep	is	b-amyloid	clearance	based	on	convective	exchange	of	cerebrospinal	fluid	and	
interstitial	fluid.	Put	another	way,	sleep	(a	potentially	dangerous	period	of	required	
inactivity)	 involves	 a	 shutdown	where	 neurotoxic	 waste	 products	 produced	whilst	
awake	are	cleaned	from	the	central	nervous	system	(Xie	et	al,	2013).	However,	this	
‘shutdown’	is	also	a	period	of	dream-states.	One	may	reasonably	ask	on	what	basis	an	
AI	would	shutdown	and	whether	this	is	sleep	from	which	dream-states	could	arise?	In	
a	 human,	 dream-states	 are	 important	 for	 waking	 states	 as	 sources	 of	 inspiration,	
reflexive	 change	 and	many	 other	 consequences.	Would	 a	 self-conscious	 AI	 have	 a	
subconscious	and	an	unconscious?												
One	could	go	on	listing	points	of	potential	difference	because	of	constitution.	
Alternatively,	one	could	note	that	much	of	the	above	requires	one	to	assume	that	an	
AI	can	in	fact	think,	an	assumption	that	takes	for	granted	the	technological	capacity	to	
create	thought	(Turing’s	aspiration	completed),	but	simultaneously	questions	that	the	
technology	can	be	assumed	to	resolve	other	problems	of	 (through	duplication)	the	
self	(an	embodied	thinking	feeling	human-like-as-human-similar/emulating	entity).	As	
such,	the	focus	on	difference	splits	difference	based	on	a	non-necessary	divide	in	what	
is	assumed	(a	positive	solution	to	one	aspect,	a	negative	for	another).		However,	it	is	
precisely	 because	 assumptions	 regarding	 duplication	 in	 one	 aspect	 do	 not	 require	
assumed	duplication	in	the	other	that	the	potential	differences	can	be	explored.	It	is	
why	 they	 have	 been	 a	 staple	 of	 science	 fiction	 and	 of	 futurist	 speculation	 for	
decades.46	It	is	also	why	such	speculation	has	also	been	translated	as	critique	of	the	
Chinese	 room	 thought	 experiment	 (most	 obviously	 via	 the	 robot	 objection).	 In	 TH																																																									
46	 The	 speculation	 sits	 within	 a	 broader	 universe	 of	 philosophical-as-speculative	 argument.	 For	
example,	the	possibility	that	our	reality	is	a	cosmological	virtual	reality	space:	if	a	material	species	in	a	
material	universe	survives	long	enough	to	achieve	advanced	technology	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	it	
will	 also	produce	computer	 technology,	and	 this	will	 involve	exponential	 advances	 in	 simulation;	at	
some	point	advanced	computers	could	run	indistinguishable	‘real’	simulations.	This	being	so	one	might	
then	assume	the	ratio	of	computer	simulation	realities	to	material	realities	favours	computer	realities,	
and	this	would	imply	that	the	likelihood	is	that	any	given	species	that	is	self-aware,	such	as	ourselves,	
lives	in	such	a	‘reality’.	As	a	further	step,	any	self-aware	entity	that	evolves	within	a	virtual	reality	will	
develop	science	to	interrogate	that	reality.	The	closer	investigation	comes	to	the	fundamentals	of	that	
reality	the	more	it	will	be	revealed	that	the	basis	of	the	reality	is	mathematical	(a	strong	Platonic	claim	
for	the	status	of	mathematics	inherent	in	a	coded/designed/synthetic	virtual	reality).		
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these	are	the	seductions	of	a	world	we	are	on	the	cusp	of	creating.	None	of	which	is	
to	suggest	explicit	ontology	has	been	the	typical	point	of	departure.			
The	 immediate	point,	however,	 is	that	subcategories	of	AIs	are	also	dividing	
lines.	Searle’s	approach	has	been	significant	as	a	key	point	around	which	disagreement	
could	coalesce,	and	has	in	this	sense	helped	to	create	and	foster	the	subcategories	of	
AIs.	Though	Searle’s	Chinese	room	is	helpful	in	setting	out	difference	(what	an	AI	does	
not	 demonstrate	 about	 a	 human)	 it	 is	 less	 helpful	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 may	 be	 the	
different	constituent	aspects	of	an	AI	once	a	dividing	line	has	been	drawn.	It	is	under	
elaborated	 in	 this	 way	 (however,	 see	 Preston	 and	 Bishop,	 2002).	 Posed	 in	 purely	
philosophical	 terms	 this	 may	 seem	 unimportant,	 since	 Searle’s	 original	 argument	
regarding	whether	AI	is	in	fact	thinking	has	not	simply	disappeared.	But	the	problem	
is	not	just	philosophical,	it	is	sociological	regarding	the	consequences	of	philosophy.	
The	 very	 separation	 into	 subcategories	 has	 become	 a	 problem	 in	 this	 sociological	
context.	Working	across	 the	subcategories	has	become	a	challenge,	partly	because	
there	 is	 something	 disempowering	 about	 the	 initial	 location	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 a	
subcategory	within	science	fiction	and	futurism.	One	is	constantly	dealing	with	what	
can	seem	simultaneously	profound,	but	also	overblown	and	perhaps	unserious.	This	
is	by	no	means	to	denigrate	interesting	work	that	is	done.	For	example,	in	philosophy	
Shanahan	(2010)	on	embodied	AI,	or	Sparrow’s	(2004)	alternative	to	Turing’s	game,	
which	takes	its	inspiration	from	Blade	Runner’s	Voight-Kampff	test	to	create	a	thought	
experiment	 to	 assess	 the	moral	 capacities	 of	 an	 artificial	 entity.	 But	 consider	 the	
broader	 problem	 of	 context	 based	 on	 increasing	 recognition	 of	 problems	 and	
potentials	of	the	actual	technologies	that	are	developed	under	the	aegis	of	AI.		
Here	one	might	note	the	2017	23	Asilomar	AI	Principles	that	are	intended	to	
guide	 the	 future	 development	 of	 AI.47	 These	 heavily	 emphasize	 control,	 benefit,	
common	 good,	 risk	 assessment	 and	 caution.	However,	 the	 principles	 are	 not	 legal	
injunctions,	nor	do	they	refer	to	intrinsic	(or	set	binding	extrinsic)	limits	to	technology,	
nor	can	they	prevent	alternative	interest-incentives	that	may	subvert	the	principles	(a	
state’s	 concerns	with	 security,	 surveillance	and	 superiority	of	 arms;	 a	 corporations	
concerns	with	competitive	advantage	and	market	capture).48	It	remains	the	case	as	
we	first	noted	early	in	the	essay	that	the	subject	matters	of	second	subcategory	AIs	
are	gradually	coming	into	the	purview	of	organizations,	but	doing	so	is	a	socio-political	
activity	 that	 is	 affected	by	 the	dominance	of	 concerns	 that	have	 accompanied	 the	
development	of	categorizations.	Recall	the	case	of	EU	deliberations	on	AI,	the	idea	of	
an	 electronic	 person	 was	 not	 central,	 and	 yet	 was	 recognized	 to	 be	 increasingly	
important	to	address.	Manifestly,	based	on	the	development	of	categorizations,	the	
problems	are	multi-faceted:	normalisation	of	AI,	the	issue	of	‘cope’,	functionalism	and	
function,	 but	 now	 also	 dividing	 line	 inertia’s	 that	 reduce	 the	 urgency	 or	 resist	 the	
centrality	of	 concerns	with	 real	 technological	developments	 that	may	be	occurring	
under	the	aegis	of	AI.	One	might	want	to	consider	this	also	in	terms	of	other	essays’																																																									
47	https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/		
48	For	example,	cyberwar	and	the	new	securitisation	are	deep	problems.	There	is	no	mutually	assured	
destruction	approach	to	cyberwar,	and	this	makes	self-restraint	logics	difficult	to	implement.	Cyberwar	
is	not	just	information	extraction	putting	security	operatives	at	risk.	It	is	also	an	ability	to	attack	and	
paralyze	electricity	 systems,	hospitals,	welfare	administration	or	any	 complex	bureaucracy.	 It	 is	 the	
capacity	to	manufacture	fake	news	as	interventions	in	democratic	processes.	These	wars	can	be	fought	
in	proxy;	dumping	information	onto	Wiki-leaks…	Cyberwar	information	is	power	but	not	truth.	
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comments	on	tendencies	towards	TH.		In	any	case,	it	is	not	a	matter	of	blame	to	note	
that	Searle’s	Chinese	room	is	limited	as	a	resource	in	terms	of	any	reasonable	analysis	
of	actual	AI,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	its	discursive	role	has	been	important.		
	
From	Searle	to	real	problems	of	‘AI’	
	
Furthermore,	once	one	starts	 thinking	about	sociological	nuance	one	also	starts	 to	
think	about	the	way	this	inheres	in	social	ontology,	and	this	brings	us	back	to	matters	
of	elaboration.	For	Searle,	his	social	ontology	is	a	philosophy	for	the	social	sciences	
not	 a	 philosophy	 of	 the	 social	 sciences;	 it	 is	 a	 simplified	 (rather	 than	 simplistic)	
apparatus	that	expresses	the	common	constituents	from	which	social	reality	is	built.	
The	claim	is	that	all	human	institutional	reality	is	created	and	maintained	by	a	‘single	
logico-linguistic	 operation’:	 status	 function	 declaration,	 and	 so	 has	 a	 ‘common	
underling	structure’	 (2010:	p.	201).	Two	problems	arise.	First,	 the	position	requires	
that	 status	 function	 declaration	 be	 fully	 descriptive	 of	 the	 structure	 and,	
concomitantly,	second,	the	position	requires	that	other	and	further	matters	are	not	
significant	for	both	the	structure	of	social	reality	and	what	occurs	on	in	and	through	
that	structure,	where	this	 is	deemed	to	be	actual	constituted	social	 reality,	since	 if	
they	 are	 significant	 then	 the	 structure	 itself	 is	 also	 not	 quite	 the	 structure-in-
operation,	 which	 seems	 like	 a	 tension	 or	 incompleteness	 if	 not	 a	 contradiction	 in	
terms	of	what	structure	is	vis-à-vis	creation	and	maintenance.		
One	needs	to	be	careful	not	to	traduce	Searle	here.	Searle’s	social	ontology	
(like	all	of	his	work)	 is	brilliant.	However,	 it	also	has	 its	 limits	and	 like	all	works,	 its	
points	of	 pressure.	 Searle	has	 configured	his	 claim	 regarding	 social	 ontology	 to	be	
internally	 consistent	 but	 in	 so	 doing	 he	 has	 preconfigured	 it	 to	 be	 potentially	
misleading.	The	claim	is	that	human	institutional	reality	is	fully	accounted	for	and	so	
created	and	maintained	by	an	instantiated	variety	of	his	social	ontology.	Since	Searle	
is	 the	 one	 to	 define	 institutions	 through	 rule	 construction,	 and	 defines	 rule	
construction	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 status	 function	 declaration,	 then	 it	 is	 by	 logical	
consistency	that	the	claim	acquires	coherence.	But	the	inference	is	that	social	reality	
is	 fully	 accounted	 for,	 rather	 than	 it	 is	 an	 internal	 system	 of	 rule	 creation	 and	
reproduction	that	is	accounted	for.	Coherence	becomes	credence.	Social	ontology	is	
a	concern	with	social	being,	Making	the	Social	World	and	The	Construction	of	Social	
Reality	 are	 titles	 that	 convey	 the	 impression	 that	 more	 than	 linguistically	 stated	
(statable)	rule	systems	are	being	accounted	for,	unless	all	that	is	significant	are	such	
rule	systems.															
Though	Searle’s	approach	is	stripped	down	and	elegant	it	can	also	read	like	an	
attempt	to	construct	a	code	for	how	society	operates,	where	the	system	in	operation	
seems	to	be	dependent	on	so	much	more	than	the	code,	and	so	the	code	is	not	fully	
expressive	 of	 what	 society	 is.	 This	 seems	 slightly	 ironic	 if	 one	 considers	 how	 the	
Chinese	room	thought	experiment	is	directed	(code	is	insufficient	for	comprehension)	
rather	 than	 how	 it	 is	 formulated.	 Searle’s	 structure	 (his	 social	 ontology	 as	 status-
function	 declaration)	 does	 not	 internalize	 error,	 ambiguity,	 conflict,	 contingency,	
multiplicity,	 materiality,	 the	 constitution	 of	 distinct	 parts	 and	 their	 interactions	
through	a	formal	account	of	emergence,	and	it	provides	little	sense	of	the	different	
varieties	of	transactions	with	reality	a	being	is	engaged	in	(bodily,	personally,	socially	
etc),	which	may	also	extend	to	how	a	person	who	is	not	simply	an	expression	of	the	
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sum	of	social	constructs	negotiates	and	 lives	through	social	constructions	 (and	this	
must	 be	 important	 if	 Searle’s	 ‘gap’	 --	 free	 will	 --	 is	 to	 be	 real,	 and	 then	 also	
instantiated).		
If	status	function	declarations	are	all	that	is	required	to	create	and	maintain	
social	reality	then	everything	else	becomes	superfluous,	an	etc	or	details	(and	much	
of	 this	 for	Searle	 is	delegated	as	 ‘background’).49	The	formal	operative	potential	of	
directed	 language	 use	 becomes	 the	 overwhelmingly	 significant	 aspect	 of	 society.	
However,	one	might	argue	that	everything	else	matters	to	what	actually	occurs	and	
so	what	things	become	in	and	through	time.	If	one	is	to	warrant	the	claim	that	a	social	
ontology	 can	 be	 the	 philosophy	 for	 social	 science	 it	must	 also	 be	 a	 philosophy	 of	
society.50	It	must	be	sociologically	operative.	Searle	is	confident	that	his	approach	is.	
Status-function	 declaration	 as	 social	 ontology	 does	 more	 than	 merely	 confirm	 an	
internally	consistent	claim	regarding	the	logico-linguistic	statement	of	itself	as	theory.	
The	claim	 is	also	that	 it	has	more	than	merely	some	purchase	on	social	 reality.	For	
Searle,	it	is	the	building	blocks	of	institutional	reality,	and	also	a	basis	for	explanatory	
investigation.	 Here	 Searle	 argues	 that	 institutions	 ground	 institutional	 facts,	 and	
behavior	operates	with	entities	referenced	to	these	through	rationality	in	the	form	of	
‘propositional	structures’	that	express	reasons	for	acting	(every	actual	deontic	power	
has	a	why	and	because	potential	for	investigation).		
However,	 though	 Searle’s	 social	 ontology	 allows	 one	 to	 ask	 and	 answer	
important	questions	about	society,	it	is	questionable	that	it	can	provide	appropriately	
developed	explanatory	accounts	of	what	has	and	is	actually	happening	in	society	(it	
has	a	some	rather	than	the	relation	to	accounting	for	and	explaining	society).	This	is	
despite	that	Searle	claims	in	reply	to	Lawson	that	‘Most	important,	the	analysis	has	to	
really	analyze.	Nothing	must	be	 left	unexplained’	 (Searle,	2016:	p.	402).51	Arguably	
Searle’s	social	ontology	produces	sociologically	limited	accounts	of	social	reality:	it	is	
an	institutional	fact	that	a	is	President.	He	had	rights	b	and	duties	d	within	institution	
e	where	x	counted	as	y	in	c.	It	is	by	virtue	of	rationality	h	that	person	j	did	g,	and	this	
was	accounted	for	by	deontic	power	p	under	reasons	for	acting	n.	One	could	describe	
Donald	 Trump	 in	 terms	 of	 deontic	 powers,	 institutions,	 institutional	 facts,	 and	
rationalities	through	reasons	for	acting,	but	arguably	doing	so	would	not	provide	a	
satisfying	 explanation	 (of	 personhood,	 life	 projects,	 integration	 into	 existing	
possibilities	of	institutions	in	decay,	changes	through	time	based	on	interactions	in	the																																																									
49	This	is	implicit	in	Lawson’s	critique	of	Searle	and	occurred	to	me	whilst	reading	that	critique;	notably,	
‘the	 sort	 of	 totality	 it	 is…	 has	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	 sorts	 of	 positions	 and	 power	 relations	 that	will	 be	
involved’	(2016:	p.	388).		
50Consider:	actual	operative	deontology	 is	not	abstract	 logic	 it	 is	also	the	 integration	of	 institutional	
conditions	with	possible	life	projects	and	ultimate	concerns.	This	is	a	sociological	problem	not	reducible	
to	constitutive	rules	or	institutional	facts	along	the	lines	typically	stated	by	Searle.	It	is	the	feeling	of	
and	 for	 a	 system.	 Searle’s	 logic	 of	 reason	may	not	 be	 ill-founded	but	 the	 framing	of	 reason	 seems	
insufficient	 to	 capture	 the	 fullness	 of	 human	 lived	 experience	 as	 social	 reality.	 As	 abstraction	 it	 is	
impersonal	and	disembodied	and	this	seems	to	abstract	from	what	seem	extremely	important	aspects	
of	the	human	condition	in	order	to	make	claims	about	what	conditions	human	existence.		
51	Searle’s	response	to	Lawson	also	seems	to	trade	on	an	ambiguity	between	only	found	in	humans	and	
the	only	thing	important	for	the	constitution	of	social	reality:	status-function	declaration	seems	to	be	
unique	to	human	civilization	therefore	status-function	declaration	 is	all	that	 is	significant	for	human	
civilization	as	constructed.	It	is	not	clear	that	this	should	follow,	and	so	it	cannot	be	the	actual	force	of	
argument	as	claim	that	can	be	used	to	refute	by	reply	the	statement	of	alternatives	that	seem	to	share	
constituents	with	animals.	
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context	 of	 disintegration,	 creating	 unintended	 consequences	 etc).	 Trump	 is	 at	 the	
least	a	status	dysfunction.	As	sociology	the	account	would	(without	augmentation)	be	
exsanguinated,	as	psychology	it	would	be	silent.52								
Perhaps	this	seems	like	something	of	a	detour	from	the	focus	on	focus	in	terms	
of	AIw	and	AIs.	However,	recall	that	the	point	is	to	assess	the	consequences	of	how	
arguments	have	been	constructed,	positioned	and	pursued.	We	have	already	noted	
that	 the	 problem	 of	 AI	 is	 not	 just	 philosophical,	 it	 is	 sociological	 regarding	 the	
consequences	of	philosophy.	One	might	now	also	add	that	the	problem	is	sociological	
regarding	the	form	of	philosophy	and	that	includes	ontology.	Searle’s	Chinese	room	
has	played	a	major	role	in	developing	the	sub-categorization	of	AIs.	His	own	approach	
to	 the	Chinese	 room	situated	 in	 terms	of	his	ontology	and	 social	ontology	provide	
limited	resources	as	ways	to	think	about	any	realized	AI	(since	its	constitution	is	likely	
to	be	different).	One	might	now	add	to	that,	though	the	point	is	contestable	based	on	
competing	 ontologies,	 the	 ontology	 and	 social	 ontology	 within	 which	 Searle’s	
approach	to	his	Chinese	room	argument	is	situated	(a	reversal	of	the	above	phrasing)	
provide	 limited	 resources	 for	 addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 any	 actual	 technological	
changes	under	the	aegis	of	AI.	This	is	a	different	point	than	that	the	existence	of	the	
subcategories	of	AIs	seems	to	have	created	discursive	constraints	on	addressing	the	
problem	of	any	actual	technological	changes	under	the	aegis	of	AI	(where	the	primary	
concern	is	not	how	actual	‘AI’	develops	to	function	in	the	world).	The	point	here	is	that	
the	 social	 ontology	provides	 limited	 resources	 for	 exploring	 society	as	a	 system	 in	
operation,	and	‘AI’	is	an	important	source	of	change	and	challenge	within	that	system.		
If	one	is	to	consider	processes	in	time	then	one	needs	an	ontology	of	process	
and	 time	 with	 a	 developed	 and	 consistent	 methodology.	 Archer’s	 realist	
morphogenesis	seems	an	obvious	candidate	(see	Archer,	1995,	2012).	However,	if	we	
are	to	consider	specifics,	then	the	concept	of	relational	goods	seems	a	useful	way	to	
bring	this	essay	to	a	close,	since	it	allows	us	to	follow	on	from	contemporary	change	
in	and	around	actual	AI	whilst	returning	to	the	problem	of	focus	on	function	in	a	more	
immediate	way.							
				
Function,	AI,	substitution,	delegation	and	Relational	Goods	
	
The	sense	that	AI	is	coming	and	we	must	cope	is	now	widespread.	However,	there	are	
various	attempts	to	position	this	as	intrinsically	beneficial,	or	liable	to	be	so	based	on	
the	already	existing	processes	that	exist	by	which	AI	is	developing	or	through	which	
its	development	can	be	managed.	If	we	return	to	the	100	years	Stanford	project	report	
we	began	 from,	 I	 suggested	 this	exhibited	an	AIw	position,	whilst	 it	 simultaneously	
acknowledged	 the	 role	of	 law	etc	 in	 relation	 to	 this,	which	 I	 suggested	was	 also	 a	
matter	 that	evoked	AIs	 issues	of	entities	and	shaped	the	way	some	of	 those	 issues	
were	stated	and	made	more	or	less	significant.	We	are	now	in	a	position	to	say	more	
about	this.	According	to	the	Stanford	report:			
	
The	measure	of	success	for	AI	applications	is	the	value	they	create	for	human	
lives…	Given	 the	 speed	with	which	AI	 technologies	 are	 being	 realized…	 the																																																									
52	 As	 philosophy	 the	 problem	 of	 logico-construction	 as	 presupposition,	 where	 primary	 statements	
define	and	confine	subsequent	developments,	also	creates	a	problem	of	transposition	if	one	wants	to	
consider	the	whole	as	necessary	rather	than	sufficient	for	explanation.	
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Study	 Panel	 recommends	 that	 all	 layers	 of	 government	 acquire	 technical	
expertise	 in	AI…	Faced	with	 the	profound	changes	 that	AI	 technologies	 can	
produce,	pressure	for	‘more’	and	‘tougher’	regulation	is	probably	inevitable.	
Misunderstandings	 about	 what	 AI	 is	 and	 is	 not	 could	 fuel	 opposition	 to	
technologies	with	the	potential	to	benefit	everyone.	Inappropriate	regulatory	
activity	 would	 be	 a	 tragic	 mistake.	 Poorly	 informed	 regulation	 that	 stifles	
innovation,	or	relocates	it	to	other	jurisdictions,	would	be	counterproductive…	
In	privacy	regulation	[we	advocate],	broad	legal	mandates	coupled	with	tough	
transparency	requirements	and	meaningful	enforcement	–	rather	than	strict	
controls…	 This	 in	 turn	 supports	 the	 development	 of	 professional	 trade	
associations	and	standards	committees	that	spread	best	practices…	(Stone	et	
al,	 2016:	 p.	 10)	 ‘Policies	 should	 be	 evaluated	 as	 to	 whether	 they	 foster	
democratic	values	and	equitable	sharing	of	AIs	benefits,	or	concentrate	power	
and	 benefits	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 fortunate	 few…	 [Thereafter,	 AI	 must	 be	
introduced]	 in	ways	 that	build	 trust	and	understanding,	and	respect	human	
and	civil	rights.’	(Stone,	2016:	p.	11)	
	
Now,	consider	the	context	 in	which	the	statements	above	are	made	and	also	what	
they	and	the	report	in	general	do	not	state.	The	page	11	quote	sits	awkwardly	with	
the	page	10,	 since	 the	 latter	 (taking	privacy	as	an	archetype)	emphasises	 that	one	
should	 resist	 regulation	 until	 well	 informed	 and	 suggests	 the	 best	 source	 of	 such	
information	is	the	best	practice	that	emerges	from	trade	associations	and	standards	
committees.	 It	 leads	 to	 a	 dominance	 of	 self-regulation	 in	 market	 situations	 by	
powerful	private	parties	to	those	situations.	In	general,	this	assumes	that	information	
and	 practice	 are	 already,	 or	 are	 developing	 along,	 lines	 that	 are	 objectively-as-
universally	 beneficial	 and	 that	 this,	 furthermore,	 is	 either	 normatively	 beneficial	
through	 development	 and	 discussion	 by	 parties	 or	 is	 a	 situation	 of	 normative	
neutrality	 in	 relation	 to	 technology	 (since	 more	 and	 better	 information	 and	 best	
practice	are	 intrinsic	to	processes	and	these	are	associated).	But	this	then	requires	
that	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 change	 and	 innovation	 within	 the	 world	 and	 under	 the	
authority	of	the	requisite	bodies	is	expressible	in	these	beneficial	ways	and	that	no	
other	 considerations	 can	 also	 exist	 that	 subvert,	 shape	or	 co-opt	what	 occurs	 and	
under	what	circumstances.	This	is	a	sophisticated	way	to	express	acquiescence	or	lack	
of	resistance	or	further	scrutiny	to	an	ineluctable	process	of	change	in	relation	to	‘AI’	
(where	AI	is	a	travelling	frontier	of	technological	development	rather	than	an	entity	
for	which	thought	etc	has	been	decisively	demonstrated).	It	reverses	the	meaning	of	
caution	to	mean	‘do	not	be	hasty	in	impeding	change’	rather	than	‘consider	carefully	
what	the	consequences	of	change	may	be	before	they	actually	manifest’.	Moreover,	
it	restricts	the	capacity	to	participate,	and	so	be	powerful,	to	those	who	are	already	
powerful	by	virtue	of	position	as	control	of	information	or	resources.	It	empowers	and	
authorises	 those	 who	 own	 rather	 than	 those	 who	 are	 subject	 to	 consequences.	
Concomitantly,	it	creates	a	barrier	to	broadening	and	democratising	deliberation	and	
participation	 in	 the	 process	 by	which	 change	 occurs	 and	 through	which	 change	 is	
shaped.	AI	 is	what	AI	does	and	AI	will	be	what	AI	researchers	do	acquire	more	of	a	
problematic	 set	 of	 connotations	 when	 considered	 in	 this	 way.	 AIw	 is	 not	 without	
strength	if	one	starts	to	think	about	power	relations,	and	here	one	might	also	go	back	
to	and	rethink	the	context	of	the	Pew	research	I	previously	referred	to.	In	the	US	at	
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least,	 the	 public	 feel	 uninformed	 and	 unable	 to	 effectively	 engage	with	 change	 in	
relation	to	AI	(and	TH).						
Then	consider	the	nature	of	contemporary	capitalist	societies	in	which	the	set	
of	injunctions	against	hasty	injunction	are	made.	The	value	to	human	lives	is	not	the	
measure	of	success	in	capitalist	processes,	so	stating	this	as	the	measure	of	success	of	
AI	 applications	 is	 potentially	 adverse	 arrogation	 rather	 than	 justified	 extension.	 A	
camouflage	 of	 concerned	 language	 disguises	 a	 basic	 logic	 that	 requires	 that	 the	
specific	 interests	 of	 some	 become	 the	 engine	 by	 which	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 will	
manifest.	Now	consider	how	the	two	are	supposedly	integrated,	aligned	or	mediated:	
it	is	not	in	relation	to	citizens	as	citizens	only.	It	is	citizens	as	consumers,	citizens	as	
workers,	 and	 then	 citizens	 as	 further	 recipients	 of	 services	 (state	 provided	 or	
otherwise	in	the	context	of	welfare).	Let	us	consider	these	in	order.		
In	terms	of	dominant	ideology,	it	is	as	consumers	that	the	many	exercise	power	
through	markets,	and	so	it	 is	through	the	dynamics	of	such	behaviour	that	a	lightly	
regulated	and	mainly	self-regulated	system	of	corporations	is	shaped.	The	wants	and	
needs	of	the	many	are	responded	to	by	corporations,	and	so	corporations	are	shaped	
by	 what	 the	 many	 want	 and	 need.	 Corporations	 are	 disciplined	 in	 this	 primitive	
democratic	expression	of	individual	power	that	becomes	collective	power	through	its	
effect	on	the	profits	of	corporations.	However,	 the	value	of	human	 lives	 is	not	 the	
focus	or	goal	of	this	system,	 it	 is	deemed	to	be	an	unintended	consequence	of	the	
interactions	of	 the	 system.	Rather	 than	a	public	deliberation	on	what	 the	value	 to	
human	lives	is	and	how	this	is	expressed	in	terms	of	the	concepts	of	want	and	need,	
we	are	left	to	simply	assume	that	processes	will	deliver	what	we	really	want	or	need,	
and	this	will	be	of	value	to	human	lives.	This	implicitly	entails	benign	or	benevolent	
capitalism	 where	 technological	 change	 including	 AI	 is	 more-or-less	 conducive	 to	
human	progress.	 It	also	disguises	the	asymmetry	of	power	that	 is	heavily	weighted	
towards	corporations.	
Corporations	shape	what	we	want	or	need	and	shape	the	markets	 in	which	
individuals	 supposedly	 exercise	 democratised	 marketplace	 power.	 Profit	 drives	
corporations	to	capture	markets	and	limit	and	pressurise	choices.	The	effect	of	real	AI	
here	can	be	multiple.	For	example,	in	the	absence	of	‘net	neutrality’	(a	prohibition	on	
service	providers	manipulating	access	to	the	range	of	sources	of	services	to	encourage	
some	over	others	--	a	hidden	market	advantage	through	constituting	the	market	of	
choices)	then	AI	can	be	used	to	channel	access	and	activity	to	anything	that	requires	
internet	 connectivity.	Another	 example	 is	 that	 in	 the	 absence	of	 prohibition,	AI	 as	
smart	 algorithms	 can	produce	opaque	 artificial	 stupidity	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 contest	
because	of	the	apparent	objectivity	of	big	data	and	quantified	metric	based	decisions	
(affecting	everything	from	credit	access	because	of	credit	ratings,	to	who	gets	fired	
based	 on	 ‘performance’	 measures).	 What	 both	 these	 examples	 illustrate	 is	 that	
corporations	can	control	the	infrastructure	of	contemporary	life	through	AI	in	ways	
that	 preconfigure	 the	 social	 world	 of	 the	 consumer.	 Thereafter,	 specific	 AIs	 can	
become	necessary	 to	participation	 in	 society	and	so	necessary	 to	employability,	or	
acceptance	through	social	normativity	(apps,	smartphones	and	chatbots	all	have	this	
potential).	All	of	which	suggests	that	an	 information	and	best	practice	approach	to	
regulation,	devolving	to	self-regulation,	as	technologies	develop	under	the	aegis	of	AI,	
cannot	be	assumed	to	be	a	decentred	form	that	leads	to	outcomes	that	value	human	
lives.	There	is	rarely	a	simple	situation	where	consumers	can	choose	between	infinite	
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options	 with	 no	 consequence	 to	 themselves	 but	 every	 consequence	 for	 the	
corporation.	 An	 information	 and	 best	 practice	 approach	 favours	 those	 who	 are	
already	powerful	by	virtue	of	position	through	control	of	 information	or	resources,	
has	 the	 potential	 for	 human	 harms,	 and	 subordinates	 any	 concerns	 regarding	 the	
value	of	human	lives	to	the	values	of	corporations.																				
	As	I	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper	there	are	grave	potential	problems	
here	in	terms	of	AIw	and	the	problem	of	focus	on	function	as	a	way	to	decentre	or	
marginalise	 the	 important	 issue	 of	 what	 is	 important	 to	 human	 concerns	 or	
flourishing.	In	addition	to	the	context	of	consumption,	AI	has	major	ramifications	for	
work.	 A	 discursive	 split	 is	 beginning	 to	 emerge	 between	 those	who	 argue	 that	 an	
imminent	AI	(and	robotic	AI)	revolution	will	be	transformative	and	liberating	and	those	
who	argue	it	will	be	devastating.	The	former	is	typically	expressed	as	an	intent	to	‘take	
the	robot	out	of	human	work	rather	 than	to	put	 the	human	out	of	work’	 (tedious,	
repetitive,	and	onerously	physical	labour	will	no	longer	be	necessary	for	some	sub-set	
of	humans).	The	latter	is	typically	stated	as	a	‘this	time	is	different	argument’	(AI	will	
affect	almost	all	parts	of	economies	almost	simultaneously,	including	previously	non-
replicable	skilled	middle	and	upper	income	jobs	such	as	accounting,	law	and	medicine,	
preventing	 a	widespread	 response	of	 transition	 to	 some	other	 kind	of	work,	 since	
there	will	be	insufficient	scope	for	that	work	---	capitalist	creative	destruction	is	this	
time	 going	 to	 be	 destructively	 destructive).	 The	 problems	 hinge	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
substitution	of	AI	for	humans	within	a	context	where	the	economic	system	requires	
sufficient	humans	to	be	employed	to	earn	the	income	that	then	becomes	the	source	
of	consumption	that	maintains	the	corporations	that	use	the	labour	(whether	it	be	AI	
or	human).	The	basic	challenge	is	that	 individual	corporations	are	required	to	treat	
with	caution	or	resist	technology	that	creates	a	24	hour	a	day	workforce	that	does	not	
get	sick,	does	not	retire,	does	not	strike,	and	does	not	earn	wages	or	seek	terms	and	
conditions,	 since	 if	 they	do	not	 resist	 then	 the	 system	of	 corporations	 is	 adversely	
affected	collectively	by	the	self-interest	of	every	individual	corporation	(though	there	
is	nothing	new	about	this	tension,	since	Marx	was	able	to	point	it	out	150	years	ago).	
The	 collective	 consequences	 of	 that	 self-interest	 is	 then	 socio-economic	 collateral	
damage	--	the	potential	for	widespread	socio-economic	disintegration	and	disruption	
with	real	human	costs,	unless	solutions	emerge	or	are	designed	(such	as	a	universal	AI	
tax	on	production	of	goods	and	services	in	conjunction	with	universal	basic	income	for	
humans,	or	the	monetisation	of	state	spending	systems	--	a	radical	new	approach	to	
the	institutions	of	fiscal	policy	via	money	creation).	Again,	there	is	a	clear	problem	of	
how	to	address	the	value	of	human	lives	here	based	on	processes	that	are	already	
recognized,	but	are	not	sufficiently	centred	as	matters	of	concern	for	the	populations	
of	societies	that	seem	set	to	experience	the	consequences	(they	are	currently	matters	
of	 latent	 anxiety	 rather	 than	 front-and-centre	 urgent	 debate).	 So,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
citizens	as	consumers	there	seems	to	be	an	adverse	assumption	that	it	is	by	opting	in	
and	out	of	markets	that	most	problems	will	be	solved,	and	in	the	case	of	citizens	as	
workers,	 the	 consequences	 for	workers	wait	 upon	 the	 capacity	 of	 corporations	 to	
recognize	the	collective	problem	of	their	individual	activity	where	it	is	their	individual	
activity	that	markets	encourage	(the	bottom	line).			
		Awareness	in	the	world	of	a	coming	AI	revolution	in	the	form	of	substitution	
and	work	is	growing.	People	are	also	increasingly	aware	that	AI	involves	an	issue	of	
delegation.	That	is,	the	taking	over	of	activity	by	AI	on	behalf	of	humans.	This	is	the	
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realm	 of	 citizen	 welfare	 (the	 nurturing	 of	 self	 and	 others).	 The	 way	 people	 are	
becoming	aware	of	this	is	fragmented.	There	is	a	recognition	that	the	use	of	AI	may	
free	up	time:	an	‘internet	of	things’	can	coordinate,	anticipate	and	undertake	tasks	on	
our	behalf	through	AI	--	everything	from	adjusting	central	heating,	to	shaping	through	
suggestion	and	pre-selection	what	we	may	want	to	be	informed	about,	be	interested	
in,	and	consume,	to	managing	a	calendar	and	maintaining	contacts	with	associates,	
colleagues,	friends	and	family.		
Clearly,	the	possibilities	here	can	be	positioned	as	potential	benefits	to	human	
lives	(and	perhaps	also	to	the	environment).	However,	much	as	in	the	previous	cases,	
one	cannot	assume	 that	potential	 is	 realised	or	 that	 it	 is	without	 the	possibility	of	
adverse	consequences.	Delegation	creates	a	host	of	potential	problems.	If	delegation	
is	subordinated	to	efficiency	then	time	is	freed	up	from	things	we	may	have	failed	to	
appropriately	value	in	order	to	create	time	to	pursue	imposed	functions	that	may	be	
harmful	to	the	nurturing	of	a	fully	realised	human.	Things	forgone	may	have	had	value	
in	themselves:	the	craft	of	making	or	completing	something,	the	development	of	self	
through	 the	 thinking	 through	 and	 doing	 of	 something	 on	 one’s	 own	 behalf,	 the	
pleasure	and	meaningfulness	in	engagement	with	others,	and	so	forth.	Curtailment,	
convenience	and	quickness	of	end	product	based	on	delegation	are	not	necessarily	
the	same	as	‘better’.	This	is	particularly	so	if	the	process	of	delegation	infantilises	the	
self	and	leads	to	the	freeing	of	time	that	is	then	captured.	One	should	not	neglect	the	
Tomorrow’s	World	fallacy:	for	decades	media	have	been	predicting	that	labour	and	
timesaving	technologies	would	result	in	greatly	increased	leisure	and	reduced	work	
because	more	can	be	done	in	less	time.	Though	it	may	be	that	future	AI	transforms	
work	through	substitution,	in	the	meantime,	the	observed	tendency	of	technological	
changes	has	been	the	capacity	to	compel	more	hours	of	work,	and	for	some,	this	has	
been	 based	 on	 the	 capacity	 to	 work	 from	 anywhere	 at	 anytime	 (in	 connective	
employment)	or	to	be	called	in	to	work	at	anytime	(in	‘gig’	economies).	In	this	context	
the	 value	 of	 human	 life	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	meaning	 and	 practice	 imposed	 on	
efficiency.	Benign	or	benevolent	capitalism	can	no	more	be	assumed	here	than	it	can	
in	terms	of	the	citizen	as	consumer,	not	least	because	the	two	increasingly	overlap	in	
consumption-based	and	financialised	societies	of	debt-dependence.				
In	terms	of	citizen	welfare	and	delegation	there	is	also	recognition	that	many	
societies	 confront	 a	 demographic	 problem	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 aging	 population	
combined	with	 reduced	birth	 rates	and	disaggregated	patterns	of	 living,	 creating	a	
problem	of	care	for	the	elderly;	AI	and	smart	accommodation	based	on	an	internet	of	
things,	 combined	 with	 robotics,	 are	 now	 being	 considered	 likely	 solutions	 to	 this	
problem.	Ostensibly,	 this	more	 than	 any	 other	 area	 seems	 one	 in	which	 potential	
benefits	 will	 manifest.	 However,	 it	 still	 shares	 with	 all	 the	 other	 areas	 set	 out	 an	
ultimate	 problem	 of	 being	 and	 doing.	 There	 is	 a	 basic	 challenge	 that	 needs	 to	 be	
addressed	in	terms	of	how	being	can	be	nurtured	regarding	what	is	and	what	is	not	
done.	This	is	an	issue	that	a	focus	on	function	cannot	resolve	unless	we	also	consider	
the	nature	of	the	human	that	the	problem	of	function	is	to	be	resolved	for.53																																																										
53	 And	 so	 the	 problem	 of	what	 is	 a	 person	 and	 in	what	 sense	 they	 flourish	 and	 suffer	 is	 centrally	
important;	there	is	great	scope	for	development	here	of	a	naturalistic	ethics	(if	what	a	person	is	affects	
how	a	person	flourishes).	Searle,	for	example,	considers	this	in	terms	of	human	rights	in	Making	the	
Social	World,	 Andrew	 Sayer	 provides	 a	 general	 account	 of	 embodied	 needy	 beings	 in	Why	 Things	
Matter	to	People	and	Chris	Smith	provides	a	set	of	constituents	of	a	person	in	What	is	a	Person?	--	an	
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As	I	have	argued	throughout	and	cumulatively,	AIw	defers	the	problem	but	with	
powerful	 consequences	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 favours	 what	 already	 exists	 in	 terms	 of	
tendencies,	interests	and	power.	Following	Turing	and	Searle,	AIs	creates	a	whole	host	
of	issues	that	never	quite	bring	together	a	central	concern	with	technology	as	is	and	
the	human	who	 is	affected.	 Inter	alia	ontology	 is	 rendered	 interstitial,	 and	yet	 the	
issues	are	quintessentially	a	matter	of	ontology	and	social	ontology.	In	terms	of	this	
final	matter	of	 the	 realm	of	citizen	welfare	one	 insightful	 conceptual	 innovation	 in	
social	ontology	is	Donati	and	Archer’s	relational	goods.	Relational	goods	provide	an	
important	 way	 to	 think	 about	 how	 the	 human	 is	 nurtured	 in	 and	 through	 social	
relations.	 For	 Donati	 and	 Archer	 relational	 goods	 are	 goods	 created	 and	 enjoyed	
through	 relations,	 they	 involve	some	activity	which	 is	 its	own	reward	but	 that	also	
creates	collective	social	benefits.	Such	goods	are	diverse	and	are	constituted	as	the	
quality	of	a	relation	that	arises	between	people,	such	as	trust,	as	well	as	the	quality	of	
experience	 of	 cooperation,	 coproduction	 or	 collaboration.	 Such	 relations	 can	 be	
intimately	inter-subjective	and	informal	or	more	associative	and	impersonal,	but	in	all	
cases	the	goods	are	not	interchangeable	with	material	goods,	and	do	not	consist	in	
the	product	of	the	activity	(Donati	and	Archer,	2015:	pp.	199-200	and	207).		They	are	
constituted	and	enjoyed	through	the	activity.	As	such	they	require	development	and	
nurture	 and	 become	 the	 products	 of	 enduring	 relations.54	 They	 cannot	 simply	 be	
created	by	law	or	dictate.	They	cannot	be	captured	or	appropriated	by	any	given	party	
and	 cannot	 be	 commodified,	 bureaucratised	 or	 marketised	 without	 the	 relations	
themselves	 being	 subverted	 in	 ways	 that	 corrode	 the	 goods	 that	 are	 otherwise	
constituted.	 They	 are	 ‘pro-social’	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 contribute	 to	 the	 integration	of	
society,	 but	 they	 also	 do	not	 fit	 readily	 into	 traditional	 categories	 of	 the	 public	 or	
private	sphere,	since	the	former	is	associated	with	administrative	provision	of	goods	
by	the	state	and	the	latter	with	the	marketisation	of	goods	by	corporations,	neither	of	
which	 captures	 the	 sense	 of	what	 relational	 goods	 are	 or	 provides	 unproblematic	
grounds	for	the	constitution	of	relations	from	which	they	arise.	However,	according	
to	Donati	 and	 Archer,	 relational	 goods	 ‘correspond	 to	 fundamental	 human	 needs’	
(2015,	p	215)	and	‘If	these	goods	are	ignored,	dismissed	or	repressed,	the	entire	social	
order	 is	 impoverished…	 with	 serious	 harm	 caused	 to	 people	 and	 the	 overall	
organization	[of	society]’	(2015:	p.	203).		
The	 concept	 of	 relational	 goods	 can	 appear	 amorphous,	 but	 this	 seems	 a	
consequence	of	what	the	concept	 is	 intended	to	articulate,	rather	than	a	failure	of	
clarity.	 We	 intuitively	 recognize	 that	 there	 is	 something	 common	 to	 the	 positive	
quality	of	experience	of	relations	and	there	is	nothing	mysterious	about	this.	What	is	
mysterious	is	the	way	society	can	both	recognise	and	yet	fail	to	foster	such	relations	
(what	else	is	instrumentality,	alienation,	ennui	or	even	anomie,	if	not	an	anti-human																																																									
approach	then	critiqued	by	Archer	and	also	Porpora,	since	there	is	no	clear	sense	in	terms	of	which	
Smith’s	 set	 is	 the	 set	 of	 required	 constituents,	 rather	 than	merely	 a	 list	 of	 possible	 characteristics.	
Lawson	also	provides	a	variety	of	naturalistic	ethics.			
54	In	general,	Donati	and	Archer	claim	that	relational	goods	require:	1)	a	personal	and	social	identity	of	
participants	 (they	 cannot	 be	 anonymous	 for	 each	 other)	 2)	 non-instrumental	 motivation	 of	 each	
subject;	the	relation	must	involve	more	than	achievement	of	some	end	3)	participants	must	acquire	or	
be	inspired	by	rule	of	reciprocity	as	a	symbolic	exchange	4)	sharing:	goods	can	only	be	produced	and	
enjoyed	 together	 by	 those	who	participate	 5)	 require	 elaboration	 over	 time;	 a	 single	 interaction	 is	
insufficient	for	the	relations	6)	reflexivity	that	operates	relationally	-	sharing	is	also	of	the	sense	of	what	
it	is	that	is	shared.		
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relational	failure).	For	example,	following	my	comments	on	AIs	early	in	this	paper	the	
European	 Union	 Civil	 Law	 on	 Robotics	 both	 marginally	 recognizes	 (in	 two	 short	
statements)	and	yet	defers	any	meaningful	comment	on	the	quality	of	 relations	as	
goods,	specifically	in	the	form	of	care:	‘the	‘soft	 impacts’	on	human	dignity	may	be	
difficult	to	estimate,	but	will	still	need	to	be	considered	if	and	when	robots	replace	
human	care,’	(EP,	2016:	p.	4)	and	‘human	contact	is	one	of	the	fundamental	aspects	
of	 human	 care…	 replacing	 the	 human	 factor	with	 robots	 could	 dehumanise	 caring	
practices,’	(EP,	2016:	p.	9).	What	is	clear	is	that	a	concept	of	relational	goods	provides	
a	 potentially	 insightful	way	 to	 examine	 the	 issue	 of	 delegation	 in	 terms	 of	 AI	 and	
citizen	welfare.	In	so	doing	it	returns	us	to	ethics,	a	perennial	issue	for	AI,	but	does	so	
on	a	broader	canvas:	
	
The	 proof	 that	 today’s	 public	 ethics	 do	 not	 involve	 a	 common	 good	 in	 a	
relational	sense	 is	 found	 in	the	case	 in	which,	 for	example,	the	problems	of	
peace,	development,	the	environment,	and	also	of	new	forms	of	poverty	are	
not	confronted	as	problems	of	concrete	human	relations	between	co-present	
subjects	but	are	simply	treated	as	‘things’	to	eliminate	by	marginalizing	violent	
persons,	punishing	those	who	do	not	succeed	in	competing,	banning	polluters,	
and	 helping	 the	 poor	 with	measures	 that	 promote	 passivity,	 Problems	 are	
confronted	by	putting	people	where	they	cannot	cause	trouble.	These	are	false	
solutions	to	problems	because	they	are	not	inspired	by	the	common	good	in	
that	 they	 leave	 aside	 completely	 the	 necessity	 of	 involving	 poor	 and	
marginalized	people…	In	the	arena	of	social	policies,	it	is	now	very	clear	that	
these	modalities	for	confronting	distress,	poverty,	and	social	marginalization	
are	 completely	 unsatisfactory.	 Peace,	 development,	 a	 clean	 and	 safe	
environment,	a	decent	life	for	everyone	-	these	are	all	goods	that	correspond	
to	the	relational	character	of	these	objectives:	that	is	to	say	they	can	only	be	
achieved	together;	they	are	not	the	sum	of	individual	preferences…	Relational	
goods	are	the	key	for	moving	from	the	welfare	state	to	the	welfare	society.’	
(Donati	and	Archer,	2015:	p.	217)	
	
Conclusion	
	
AI	is	one	issue	among	many	and	in	the	end	must	be	conceived	as	one	aspect	of	one	
world.	Searle	 is	surely	correct	that	social	science	 is	an	 investigation	 into	a	single	(if	
multiply	 produced	 and	 constructed	 and	 disputed)	world	 (2016).	 This	 is	 a	 claim	 he	
shares	with	realist	ontology	and	social	ontology.	However,	as	I	have	tried	to	establish	
in	 this	essay	 the	problem	of	AI	has	not	 come	 together	 in	any	 clear	 singular	 sense.	
Sophisticated	origins	(‘yesterday’s’)	in	philosophy	have	had	consequences.	Foci	have	
developed	 expressing	 bifurcations	 and	 marginalisations,	 and	 creating	 interstitial	
issues.	Little	 if	anything	has	been	resolved,	and	so	function	has	dominated	 in	ways	
that	are	significant	for	what	occurs	whilst	dispute	continues.	A	whole	host	of	critically	
important	 issues	 based	 on	 actual	 technological	 potentials	 have	 arisen.	 Tomorrow	
continues	to	be	affected	by	today	without	(people	in)	today	having	any	clear	collective	
idea	how	it	(they)	will	produce	tomorrow.	And	yet	there	is	content	to	process	in	so	far	
as	some	have	a	very	clear	idea	of	their	agenda,	and	they	in	the	main	are	not	thinking	
as	citizens	or	being	invited	to	(or	inviting	others	to)	deliberate	as	citizens.											
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